

Decision **REVISED DRAFT DECISION OF COMMISSIONER WOOD**
(Mailed 3/2/2004)

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Order Instituting Rulemaking on the
Commission's Own Motion to Establish
Consumer Rights and Consumer Protection Rules
Applicable to All Telecommunications Utilities.

Rulemaking 00-02-004
(Filed February 3, 2000)

**INTERIM DECISION ISSUING GENERAL ORDER ____,
RULES GOVERNING TELECOMMUNICATIONS CONSUMER PROTECTION**

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Appendix A – General Order

**INTERIM DECISION ISSUING GENERAL ORDER ____,
RULES GOVERNING TELECOMMUNICATIONS CONSUMER PROTECTION**

Summary

By this decision the Commission adopts General Order No. __ (G.O. __), Rules Governing Telecommunications Consumer Protection, applicable to all Commission-regulated telecommunications utilities. G.O. __ sets forth: in Part 1, a telecommunications consumers' Bill of Rights, the fundamental consumer rights that all communications service providers must respect; in Part 2, a set of Consumer Protection Rules all carriers must follow to protect those rights; in Part 3, Rules Governing Privacy; in Part 4, Rules Governing Billing for Non-communications-Related Charges, in response to recent state legislation; and in Part 5, Rules Governing Slamming Complaints, to implement federal rule changes enacted in 2000 by the Federal Communications Commission. Where the new rules supersede current rules, the order so notes. Carriers are required to revise their tariffs where they conflict with the new rules, provided, however, that those revisions may not reduce current consumer protections. The Commission does not at this time implement the rulemaking order's proposal to have the Consumer Protection Rules replace tariffs for competitive telecommunications services.

This proceeding remains open to consider whether the Commission should implement a telecommunications consumer education program, and if so, how it should be structured; whether to curtail the Commission-sanctioned limitation of liability; and whether additional rules requiring that communications directed at consumers and subscribers be in languages other than English are needed.

Background

As the Commission observed in opening this rulemaking, the past decade has been witness to a rapid evolution in the telecommunications industry, not only in the technology the industry employs but as well in its structure, the mix of services it provides, and the ways it provides those services. A wide variety of what were once monopoly services is increasingly available from competing providers. Regulatory policies have likewise been evolving in ways aimed at enabling and promoting competition and all the benefits competition has promised to provide. At the same time, legislators and regulators have not been blind to the potential for abuse that may exist in any market, regulated or fully competitive. This Commission has for some time recognized that the ongoing shift to a more competitive telecommunications marketplace challenges it to find new methods to protect consumers, and it has made great strides in meeting that challenge.

The Commission's stated purpose for this proceeding, then, is to consider whether to revise its existing consumer protection rules and/or establish new rules applicable to regulated telecommunications utilities. If changes are needed, the task is to decide what specific rules should be revised or established and for which classes of telecommunications utilities.

The rulemaking order that began this proceeding introduced a Commission staff report suggesting specific consumer protection measures, including a telecommunications consumers' bill of rights, rules to protect those rights, and changes to the industry's current tariffing and limitation of liability practices. Respondent utilities and interested parties were invited to submit comments and replies, and a full spectrum of stakeholders did so. Regulated utilities were well represented, individually and in groups and associations

expressing shared views. Local, state and federal governments commented. Individuals and organized groups made presentations on behalf of residential and small business consumers. In all, the Commission received 71 submittals from 39 groups consisting of 67 named entities, some of which were in turn associations of many more unnamed members. Not surprisingly, commenters representing the telecommunications utilities were generally opposed to the staff report's proposed rights and rules and other measures, while consumer representatives were generally supportive. There were exceptions in each camp, both as to individual commenters and specific proposed measures. The rule-by-rule discussion sections to follow will provide more on the positions taken in comments, and some of the alternatives suggested.

The Commission's next step was to arrange to hear as much input as possible from consumers. The public was invited to 20 public participation hearing sessions in 13 locations throughout the state between mid-June and September 2000. With the utilities' assistance, informative notices were published and mailed to virtually every telecommunications consumer in California. Those unable to attend were urged to express their views in writing. By fall 2000, some 1200 people had taken the time to attend one of the public sessions and more than 300 of them made public statements. Those who spoke represented a cross section of the affected public: residential customers, large and small business customers, senior citizens, union members and representatives, public officials, minority business associations, low income groups, community-based organizations of every kind, and many others. Another 2000 responded and made their views known by letter or e-mail. The general public sentiment as expressed in both the public participation hearings

and correspondence was overwhelmingly in favor of the Commission's taking on a much stronger consumer protection role.

In January 2001, Assigned Commissioner Carl Wood issued two rulings seeking comments on two additional sets of proposed rules falling within the scope of the rulemaking proceeding. The first set was Proposed Rules on the Inclusion of Non-communications-Related Charges on Telephone Bills. On September 29, 2000, Governor Gray Davis signed Assembly Bill (AB) 994¹ extending a Public Utilities Code Section 2890² ban on non-communications-related charges in telephone bills to July 1, 2001. AB 994 also added Section 2890.1 to the Public Utilities Code, explicitly directing the Commission to adopt by that date any additional rules it determined necessary to implement the billing safeguards set forth in Section 2890. AB 994, Sections 1(c) and 1(d), cites this rulemaking proceeding as a proper vehicle for the Commission to do so. After considering some 31 sets of comments and replies, we issued Decision (D.) 01-07-030 adopting a set of interim rules governing the inclusion of non-communications-related charges on telephone bills. We stated that those rules, possibly with some modifications, would be incorporated into and superseded by the new general order we adopt in this decision.

In the second January ruling, the Assigned Commissioner sent out for comments his Proposed Rules for Slamming, prepared in response to the FCC's decision in CC Docket No. 94-129. The FCC rules gave each state the option to

¹ AB 994, Stats. 2000, Ch. 931.

² All references are to the Public Utilities Code unless otherwise noted.

act as the adjudicator of slamming complaints, both interstate and intrastate. Under the FCC's order, each state which opts to take on that responsibility must notify the FCC of the procedures it will use to adjudicate individual slamming complaints. We received 24 sets of comments and replies on those proposed rules.

On June 6, 2002, Assigned Commissioner Wood issued a draft decision and a proposed general order, "Rules Governing Telecommunications Consumer Protection," for public comment. Thirty-two sets of comments were filed, followed by four days of workshops during which industry and consumer representatives thoroughly vetted the draft decision and general order. At the conclusion of the workshops, Commissioner Wood agreed to suspend the proceeding schedule to allow carrier and consumer representatives to convene an informal working group to suggest rule changes both sides could agree to. After the working group submitted its report, the parties were afforded two more opportunities to submit comments and reply comments before the next draft decision was issued; 24 groups did so, producing an additional 29 sets of comments or replies. Parties had another opportunity for input when the draft decision and general order were mailed for public comment on July 24, 2003 as required by Public Utilities Code Section 311(g)(1). Additional changes were made in response to the Section 311(g)(1) comments, and the revised draft served a second time to parties to allow comments and replies to comments on those changes and the draft decision's proposed treatment of the economic effects of the new general order.

After considering extensive party and public input, the Commission is adopting G.O. ___, Rules Governing Telecommunications Consumer Protection, Appendix A to this order. New G.O. ___ includes five parts: Parts 1 and 2

comprise the final version of the telecommunications consumers' Bill of Rights and rules to protect those rights first proposed in R.00-02-004; Part 3 consists of the Rules Governing Privacy; Part 4 is the set of Rules Governing Billing for Non-communications-Related Charges we issued in D.01-07-030, with only minor changes; and Part 5 is Rules Governing Slamming Complaints.

Below we discuss each part of new G.O. ____ in turn. For the consumer protection rights and rules in Parts 1 and 2, each right is addressed and then each rule, linking the rule to the right(s) it will help safeguard. The input we received on the draft rights and rules from the parties was extensive and generally very constructive. It would be unhelpful, and because so many contributed, impractical as well, to repeat every point raised in the comments. Instead, we summarize the significant issues raised and explain how these updated rules accommodate them.

Part 1: Bill of Rights

In 1993, the Legislature passed and the governor signed AB 726, the Telecommunications Customer Service Act of 1993, adding Sections 2896 and 2897 to the Public Utilities Code. Under Section 2896(a), the Commission must require telephone corporations to furnish their customers with sufficient information to make informed service and provider choices, including, *e.g.*, providers' identities, service options, pricing, and terms and conditions of service. Under Section 2896(c), customers are to receive information concerning the regulatory process and how they can participate in that process and resolve

complaints.³ Further, through Section 2897, the Legislature directed the Commission to apply its Section 2896 policies to *all* providers of telecommunications services in California and invited the Commission to supplement them as necessary. The Legislature thus acknowledged the need for some of the consumer protection measures we implement in this proceeding and directed the Commission to ensure that carriers of all classes abide by certain basic standards of disclosure and customer service.⁴

³ § 2896. The commission shall require telephone corporations to provide customer service to telecommunication customers that includes, but is not limited to, all the following:

(a) Sufficient information upon which to make informed choices among telecommunications services and providers. This includes, but is not limited to, information regarding the provider's identity, service options, pricing, and terms and conditions of service. A provider need only provide information to its customers on the services which it offers.

(b) Ability to access a live operator by dialing the numeral "0" as an available, free option. The commission may authorize rates and charges for any operator assistance service provided subsequent to access.

(c) Reasonable statewide service quality standards, including, but not limited to, standards regarding network technical quality, customer service, installation, repair, and billing.

(d) Information concerning the regulatory process and how customers can participate in that process, including the process of resolving complaints.

§ 2897. Consistent with other provisions of this code, orders, rules, and applicable tariffs of telecommunications service providers, the commission shall apply these policies to all providers of telecommunications services in California. These policies are not exclusive and may be supplemented by the commission.

⁴ These new rules are part of an effort to *strengthen* our consumer protections. So, *e.g.*, where current tariffs provide stronger protections than these, they will remain; where we have enforcement actions underway based on § 2896, they will continue.

We are not the first to recognize the potential in a telecommunications bill of rights:

Whether or not a commission wishes to pursue establishment of a bill of rights in a legal venue, the concept provides one perspective on the evolution of regulatory regimes beyond ratebase, rate-of-return regulation. We are in a period of dynamic change in the relationship of the institutional arrangements for production and delivery of telecommunications services to individuals as consumers and citizens. The pendulum is shifting away from a high degree of government control that worked well throughout the 20th century but would be over-regulation in the new era. Yet we continue to seek a good society and individual autonomy.

* * *

State regulatory commissions have frequently used a bill of rights as a way of informing consumers about service they should expect from utilities including telephone companies With the birth of local competition in telecommunications, several commissioners and consumer advocates realized that the idea of rights is a powerful tool for identifying and filling gaps in protections traditionally provided through ratebase, rate-of-return regulation. Their proposals for a telecommunications bill of rights typically include claims for individuals as both consumers and citizens.⁵

This 1999 NRRI research report identified five other states whose commissions had entertained such proposals between 1995 and 1999. If the specific rights the rulemaking order proposed for comment were unique, the concept was not.

At its July 2002 Summer Meeting, the Board of Directors of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners passed a resolution urging that

⁵ A *Critical Perspective on a Telecommunications Bill of Rights*, The National Regulatory Research Institute, November, 1999.

a consumer bill of rights be developed for the protection of all residential and small business telecommunications consumers, regardless of their provider of such services. That resolution included an almost-verbatim recitation of the same seven rights we adopt today, and went on to urge both the FCC and the individual state commissions to consider adopting comprehensive and effective rules to implement them.⁶

In their initial comments on the staff's proposed rules, many carrier representatives questioned whether this consumer protection proceeding and these rights and rules, indeed, *any* rights and rules, are needed. They made one argument time and again with respect to individual rules and the set of rules overall: Left to itself, the competitive marketplace will oust the least consumer-responsive carriers and bring out the best in service quality and marketing behavior. This comment, however, best reflects our view:

In a perfect world, all telecommunications carriers would operate honorably and never seek unfair advantage at the expense of their residential and business customers. Unfortunately, perfection in competition and conduct remains only an ideal. In the meantime, it is the Commission's responsibility to enact clear and concise rules to guide industry conduct. In the long run, such rules will benefit consumers, carriers and the general public alike.

Our proposed rules generated considerable difference of opinion among those who responded. The proposed rights, in contrast, did not. Some parties proposed additional rights; a few proposed rewording these. Notwithstanding

⁶ *Resolution on Telecommunications Bill of Rights*, sponsored by the Committee on Consumer Affairs and adopted by the NARUC Board of Directors on July 31, 2002.

carrier resistance to the proceeding overall, the parties generally embraced both the rights concept and staff's proposed implementation of it. With that in mind, our discussion here will be limited.

The first two rights, *Disclosure* and *Choice*, have only minor wording changes. These rights were nearly universally accepted and we need not dwell on them.

The *Right of Privacy* was also accepted in principle even as parties differed as to how it should be translated to rule. Here perhaps as much as anywhere could be seen the schism between consumer advocates and carriers. The former treated privacy as a true right of the individual, as indeed it is.⁷ Carrier advocates, on the other hand, were far more likely to view privacy in terms of the negative impacts it might have on their access to subscriber information as a commercial and marketing tool. Most subscribers, they maintain, want to be marketed to and value the convenience unfettered access to their records allows. Those who do not should bear the responsibility for opting out. Following that reasoning, carriers' comments went largely to marshaling legal arguments against Commission restrictions. Since it is the privacy rules and not privacy as a right that is at issue, we will pick up this discussion when we address implementation under Part 3 below.

⁷ "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, *and privacy*." California Constitution, Article 1, Section 1, Declaration of Rights (Emphasis added).

The next two proposed rights, *Public Participation*, and *Oversight and Enforcement*, are related in that both address consumers' interaction with the agencies that establish telecommunications policies, rights and rules and ensure carrier compliance. As many commenters pointed out, what is perhaps the most important aspect from the consumer's perspective was inadvertently lost in the wording: Consumers' rights need to be enforced.

Thus, these two proposed rights have now been combined to address consumers' relationship with regulators:

Public Participation and Enforcement: Consumers have a right to participate in public policy proceedings, to be informed of their rights and what agencies enforce those rights, and to have effective recourse if their rights are violated.

Two statements have been moved to the rules from the proposed *Right of Accurate Bills and Redress*, and additional qualifications have been added. We agree that both statements in the original draft of this right are important requirements of carriers: "Vendors of telecommunications services shall provide clear information explaining how and where consumers can complain"; and, "Consumers shall have their complaints addressed without harassment." The first is explicit in Rules 1, 6 and 9, and the second is subsumed within this right as rewritten and implicit in Rule 11. Other parties point out that redress should be fair, prompt and courteous, and we concur. This right then becomes:

Accurate Bills and Redress: Consumers have a right to accurate and understandable bills for products and services they authorize, and to fair, prompt and courteous redress for problems they encounter.

In addition to their comments on the rights proposed in the staff report, parties initially suggested several more which could be summarized as rights to: safety; non-discrimination (also labeled equal access); service guarantees;

immediate access to impartial dispute resolution; and adequate representation in public policy proceedings. Among those, we address here a *Right to Safety*, and a *Right to Non-Discrimination*. Service quality is a real issue of concern that we will have more to say about later. Access to dispute resolution is part of *Accurate Bills and Redress* and *Public Participation and Enforcement*; consumer representation in public policy proceedings is part of the *Right to Public Participation and Enforcement*.

At least six parties, including the state's two largest incumbent local exchange carriers, endorsed adding a *Right to Non-Discrimination*. As with the *Right to Safety*, although it was not explicit in the first iteration, neither was it ignored in the draft rules. A carrier expressed it best: "Many of the rules promulgated by staff are already directed to the implementation of such a right, but its express enumeration will ensure that consumer protection is implemented in a non-discriminatory fashion."

Commenters advocating adding a *Right to Non-Discrimination* introduced it from three distinct but overlapping approaches. First, two commenters mentioned non-discrimination only in the narrow context of freedom from redlining.⁸ Others suggested a *Right to Non-Discrimination* more broadly in the

⁸ The practice of excluding a geographic area (e.g., a low-income or minority neighborhood or community) from some beneficial service or opportunity is often referred to as redlining. The Commission addressed telecommunications redlining in Decision (D.) 96-12-056: "Redlining refers to the discriminatory provision of telecommunications services whereby areas characterized by minority customers might not be afforded access to the same types or quality of telecommunications services offered to customers in non-minority areas." In that same decision, it set forth this regulation: "Redlining is prohibited and the Commission shall take strong action against any carrier engaging in redlining."

context of (in various combinations) race, color, creed, ethnicity, disability, gender, age, economic status, or language. Lastly, one commenter described it as an obligation under the law to treat all similarly situated customers the same, as required by Section 453.⁹ We are often called on to interpret and apply Section 453 in our role as regulators, and it is in this most broad sense expressed by Section 453 that we will interpret the *Right to Non-Discrimination*. In their opening and reply comments on the June 2002 draft decision, the wireless carriers took issue with the proposed wording of our *Right to Non-Discrimination*, arguing, “The law does not provide... that all customers be treated equally.” They would restate the right as, “Every customer has the right to be free of unreasonable discrimination, prejudice or disadvantage with respect to similarly situated customers,” ostensibly to conform it more closely with Section 453. Other commenters expressed no such concerns. After re-examining Section 453, we note that nowhere does it state or imply that there could exist a *reasonable* level of discrimination, a *reasonable* level of prejudice, or a *reasonable* level of

⁹ § 453 (a) No public utility shall, as to rates, charges, service, facilities, or in any other respect, make or grant any preference or advantage to any corporation or person or subject any corporation or person to any prejudice or disadvantage.

(b) No public utility shall prejudice, disadvantage, or require different rates or deposit amounts from a person because of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical handicap, medical condition, occupation, sex, marital status or change in marital status....

(c) No public utility shall establish or maintain any unreasonable difference as to rates, charges, service, facilities, or in any other respect, either as between localities or as between classes of service.

disadvantage that could be acceptable as between similarly situated customers. We have retained the draft wording.

The suggestion to add the *Right to Safety* first appearing in the June 2002 draft came from two participants. One wrote,

Although perhaps less acute than in electric and gas service, consumers have a basic right to practices that will promote (or at least not endanger) their physical safety. Rule 14 (Employee Identification) and Rule 15 (Access to 911 Emergency Services) are two examples of rules that promote consumer safety.

Our intent to promote telecommunications consumers' safety was indeed an unwritten foundation for both of those rules. We agree that *Safety* should be added as a basic right. Most commenters accepted adding *Safety* as it was described in the June 2002 draft, the wireless carriers again being the exception. Wireless carriers would have us limit this right by relating it solely to employee identification and 911 service, but we have not done so. While it is true that the *Right to Safety* finds expression only in Part 2, Rules 14 and 15, consumers have that right in more than just those two areas even though we have not attempted to define additional rules today to address every other possible area.

Industry commenters urged the Commission close the Part 1 Bill of Rights with a disclaimer that the rights are not themselves enforceable, but rather serve as a policy statement or preamble to the consumer protection rules that follow. Consumer groups were split on the topic, the consumer arm of the collaborative working group arguing that such a statement would unreasonably foreclose what might otherwise be perfectly reasonable enforcement actions, while some other prominent consumer representatives (including one who was also a working group participant) would add a comment stating, "This Bill of Rights

shall serve the same purpose as a statement of legislative intent.” We accept the carriers’ suggestion and have added a comment.

Part 2: Consumer Protection Rules

We begin with some overall observations on the input we received through parties’ many rounds of comments and replies since the initial proposed consumer protection rules were distributed with the rulemaking order. First, we were gratified to see the thoroughness with which the parties approached the task. Not only did the parties tender their positive and negative reactions to each rule, but in most cases they then went on to explain those reactions and suggest changes we might make to conform each rule to their positions. Commenters were also imaginative in proposing additional rights and rules. A number of them on both sides of the service relationship will recognize their handiwork in the new general order. Second, while we could have anticipated that consumer representatives would in general be enthusiastic toward new rules and carrier representatives much less so, there was a remarkable degree of crossover. Even some of the more prominent carriers and consumer advocates were quick to acknowledge the strengths of positions opposed to theirs when that was appropriate. Third, there were many suggestions that were on the periphery of what was originally envisioned in the rulemaking order. Some of those, such as enhanced enforcement and consumer education programs, we will mention later in this order. Others advanced topics that are outside the scope of the proceeding but we may follow up on in new proceedings in the future. Service quality was perhaps the most prominent example. We draw a distinction in this proceeding, however, between consumer protection rules and service quality rules: the latter are much more likely to involve objective measures of performance. We recently issued Order Instituting Rulemaking (R.) 02-12-004

with the express purpose of establishing service quality measures and reporting requirements which complement our consumer protection rules.

Relationship to Existing Rules and Tariffs

Many parties in their comments urged us to make clear which of our earlier requirements we intend to supersede by these rules. The Commission has enacted other sets of carrier-class specific consumer protection rules in its proceedings over the years, and those rules were in fact the source for many of the rules staff proposed in its report. There are also consumer protections set forth in federal and state statutory requirements, FCC rules, Commission general orders, and Commission decisions, many of which we have drawn on in addition to the parties' comments in drafting this final set of rules applicable to all carriers. In defining the relationship of these new rules to existing rules and tariffs and which of our earlier requirements we intend be superseded, we here address each source of current consumer protection requirements: tariffs, carrier-class specific rules, Commission decisions and general orders, and state and federal statutes and FCC orders.

Tariffs

Tariffs have historically been the primary source of Commission-initiated consumer protection rules for all classes of carriers. Each tariffed carrier class generally has begun with a core set of rules¹⁰ which Commissions past then required and/or allowed to be modified and updated to reflect changes in

¹⁰ See, *e.g.*, G.O. 96-A, Section II.C(4), which outlines a set of 19 subjects appropriate for the stationary utilities to include in their tariffs.

technology, law and the marketplace over the years. With the advent of competition, the local exchange carriers (LECs), competitive local exchange carriers (CLCs), and incumbent LEC (ILEC) affiliated interexchange carriers (IECs) are still tariffed, while the non-ILEC affiliated IECs have a choice of being tariffed or non-tariffed. Commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) carriers were exempted by D.96-12-071 from having to file tariffs, but required to continue following their formerly-tariffed consumer protection rules under a transition procedure set up in D.96-12-071, as explained below. With today's rules, we establish updated standards for consumer protection to be applied across all carrier classes. It is perhaps inescapable in drafting a single set of rules for all carriers and carrier classes that some carriers will have in force individual tariff requirements that already exceed various requirements in the new rules. We do not intend by these rules to encourage or allow carriers to relax any current tariffed consumer protections. Where current tariffs fall short of our new standards, we will require carriers to modify their tariffs accordingly. Where the tariffs already provide an equivalent or greater level of protection, those higher levels remain in force.

CLC Rules

The current CLC-specific consumer protection rules were established in R.95-04-043 and Order Instituting Investigation (I.) 95-04-044, our rulemaking and investigation into competition for local exchange service, when CLCs first became eligible for certification. D.95-07-054, Appendix B, Consumer Protection and Consumer Information Rules for CLCs, served as an important source document for the rules in this proceeding. Those Appendix B rules have been considered and are superseded in their entirety by our new G.O. ____.

Subsequently, D.95-12-056 in the same local exchange competition proceeding

introduced additional requirements. Some of those relate to our new general order in the areas of, *e.g.*, deposits, redlining, and end-user 911 service. Those requirements were not classified as consumer protection rules *per se* in D.95-12-056, but we have reviewed them in preparing G.O. _____. None are inconsistent with our new G.O. _____, so all of the requirements of D.95-12-056 will remain in effect.

Detariffed IEC Rules

IECs have been tariffed since they were first certificated as a separate carrier class in the 1980's. As we observed in D.98-08-031, "Our current consumer protection rules [for IECs] are reflected in our Decisions, General Orders and other rules, as well as in the utilities' tariffs." That decision in R.94-02-003 and I.94-02-004, our proceeding to establish a simplified registration process for non-dominant telecommunications firms, offered non-ILEC affiliated IECs an exemption from tariffing. Pursuant to Section 495.7(c), the Commission established in D.98-08-031 a set of consumer protection rules for the exempted services. Again, those rules have been considered and are superseded by our new G.O. _____.

CMRS Rules, and the CMRS Proceeding

CMRS carriers are a diverse group of sub-classes that followed different paths to reach today's state of regulation.¹¹ In D.96-12-071 we exempted

¹¹ D.96-12-071 defined CMRS broadly as including cellular services, personal communication services (PCS), wide-area specialized mobile radio services (SMR), and radiotelephone utilities (RTU or paging) services. In D.95-10-032, we addressed in general which CMRS providers are subject to Commission jurisdiction, and what effect the federal Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 had on the CMRS regulatory

Footnote continued on next page

all regulated CMRS carriers from filing tariffs, and also allowed them to offer service through customer-specific contracts without Commission pre-approval. To replace the consumer protections formerly in tariffs, we stated our intent to develop and adopt one uniform set of consumer protection rules applicable to all CMRS providers, after which any previously filed CMRS tariff rules would be superseded by those newly adopted rules:

The purpose behind any tariff filing requirements would be to adjudicate any consumer complaints and protect consumer interests. In the event such information is needed to resolve a particular consumer complaint or dispute that falls within our current jurisdiction, we still have the authority to require carriers to promptly provide the Commission with the requisite rate and other information. Therefore, we shall continue to require each CMRS provider to maintain a record of its rates, other terms and conditions and revisions thereto, at its general office. While we have concluded that the filing of CMRS tariffs should no longer be required, we still remain concerned that the terms and conditions of service offered by each CMRS provider continue to provide adequate protection to consumers. We have traditionally relied upon the filing of tariffs to assure that the consumer protection provisions within those tariffs were adequate. *We believe, however, that a more efficient alternative to requiring the separate filing of tariffs by every CMRS provider is to develop and adopt one uniform set of Consumer Protection Rules applicable to all CMRS providers.*

* * *

program. We provided further clarification in D.96-12-071. The term 'CMRS' in today's decision refers only to those sub-classes over which we have previously asserted continuing jurisdiction.

In order to provide for regulatory continuity between now and the time we adopt a set of consumer protection rules applicable to CMRS providers, as an interim measure, we shall continue to enforce each CMRS provider's existing consumer protection rules. By existing consumer protection rules, we refer to those categories of rules summarized in G.O. 96-A, Section II.C(4). These rules as categorized in G.O. 96-A are set forth in the existing tariffs currently in effect for each CMRS provider, even though a copy of every CMRS provider's currently effective tariff may not be on file with the Commission. We shall apply these existing rule provisions in dealing with any CMRS consumer complaints or billing disputes that come before us during this interim period. If necessary to resolve a complaint, we shall direct the CMRS provider to supply a copy of its currently effective consumer protection rules to the Commission if a currently-effective copy was not previously filed. *Once we adopt a generic set of consumer protection rules for CMRS providers, any previously filed G.O. 96-A CMRS tariff rules shall be superseded by those newly adopted rules.* (D.96-12-071). (Emphasis added).

Accordingly, we intend the consumer protection rules we adopt today to fulfill the purpose anticipated in D.96-12-071 by superseding any previously-filed CMRS provider tariff rules.

General Orders

The new rules have been carefully coordinated with previously-enacted portions of our forthcoming General Order 96-B, Rules Governing Advice Letters and Information-only Filings.¹² The primary areas of overlap are

¹² The Commission has a proceeding open, R.98-07-038, to adopt a new general order, G.O. 96-B, Rules Governing Advice Letters and Information-only Filings, to supersede G.O. 96-A. Pending G.O. 96-B's enactment, the Commission has issued D.01-07-026, Interim Opinion Adopting Certain Requirements for Publishing and Providing Service

Footnote continued on next page

in Rule 1(a), which requires Internet tariff publication, and Rule 8, Tariff Changes, Contract Changes, Notices and Transfers. As described later below, those previously-enacted portions of G.O. 96-B have in fact already determined much or most of what is in our new Rule 8.

In addition to the G.O. 96 series, we also believe these rules to be consistent with all other Commission general orders, and thus no part of any Commission general order is superseded. We have, however, added clarification that carriers must continue to comply with the requirements set forth in General Order 153, Procedures for Administration of the Moore Universal Telephone Service Act, where they apply. That general order establishes differing requirements for, among other things, deposits to initiate Universal Lifeline Telephone Service. The requirements of General Order 153 take precedence over these rules whenever there is a conflict between them for a service offered under the Universal Lifeline Telephone Service program.

State and Federal Statutes, and FCC Orders

We have also drawn from state and federal statutes and FCC orders in assembling these consumer protection rules. We are acutely aware of the need to remain within bounds where those authorities constrain us, and we have been cautious to do so. In those areas where we have drawn rules more consumer-protective than those of other authorities might be, it is because we have

Under Tariffs, and D.02-01-038, Second Interim Opinion Adopting Certain Requirements for Notifying Telecommunications Customers of Proposed Transfer, Withdrawal of Service, or Higher Rates or Charges. The rules adopted in those two interim decisions will eventually be codified in G.O. 96-B.

authority to do so. We have provided cross-references to certain state and federal statutes and regulations in comments to the rules for the convenience of carriers and the public, and in some instances to clarify the relationship of our rules to those authorities. All carriers need to be aware that we have not attempted to echo in these rules every legal requirement that applies to them, and of their need to comply with all applicable legal requirements.

Applicability

To Carriers

First, we affirm that we intend these rules to be applicable to all Commission-regulated telecommunications utilities and, through them, to agents acting on their behalf. We have reworded the definition of “carrier” to clarify that it includes all entities, whether required to be certificated or registered, that provide telecommunications-related products or services and are subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction pursuant to the Public Utilities Code.¹³ Carriers pointed to a number of areas where our staff qualified its initially proposed rules through reference to specific carrier classes, frequently local exchange or basic service providers. Some carriers would have us exempt them from these rules entirely, or from specific rules, or set up a separate set of rules for their classification. We have considered the carriers’ comments as well as those of others and, as a result, have made many adjustments. The rules are now more

¹³ § 885, *e.g.*, makes prepaid telephone debit card providers, as specified, subject to the registration requirements of §1013 unless they are certificated to provide telephone service, and thus required to comply with rules the Commission may establish relating to them. See §1013(b) and §1013(g)(5). The Commission’s current practice is to certificate such providers under §1001.

situational than carrier-class specific; where a carrier class doesn't encounter a given situation, the rule remains effective but is applicable only where the specified circumstances exist.

To Consumers

Having decided to apply these rules to all carriers, the question arises, to whom should these protections be afforded on the consumer side? In making their case to be exempted entirely from the rules, the CMRS carriers point out that the historical LEC distinction between business and residential service doesn't generally apply to wireless carriers. A traditional wireline telephone number or instrument is almost always associated with a location, typically either a place of business or a residence. A wireless instrument and wireless number are more often thought of as associated with an individual, and that individual is far less likely to define personal wireless access as exclusively business or exclusively residential. It is also true that there are many small business customers¹⁴ who suffer the same problems as residential customers: slamming, cramming, the difficult process of gathering sufficient information to make informed service choices, billing problems, and so forth. In short, there is a strong case for applying the consumer protection rules to both individuals and businesses.

On the other hand, large businesses are much more capable than individuals and small businesses of reaping advantage from the competitive

¹⁴ Protections have been extended to non-individual subscribers other than businesses (*e.g.*, government and quasi-governmental agencies, associations, *etc.*) by treating them identically with businesses for purposes of these rules.

markets for communications services.¹⁵ Large businesses are more likely to have the sophistication and resources to evaluate their choices, to call into play the high volumes that give customers leverage with providers, and to participate in contractual arrangements through which they can negotiate for terms and non-standard service configurations that best suit their needs. Large businesses are less dependent on the kind of rules we are establishing here, and in some cases rules could even stand in the way of large businesses that desire to negotiate specific, non-conforming contract provisions. On balance, we agree with commenters who would have carriers be bound by the rules in their dealings with small businesses but leave carriers and large businesses the latitude to negotiate. One commenter representing small businesses suggested drawing the dividing line between large and small businesses at twenty lines, and that was the figure proposed in the June, 2002 draft decision. In subsequent comments, carriers suggested small businesses be defined as those having three or fewer lines. Carriers credit that definition to a 1999 FCC decision, but the FCC did not intend it as a threshold for applying consumer protection measures. We believe three lines is too low for that purpose; in fact, we commonly see advertisements nowadays for “family plans” offering more than three access lines in one account. Carriers, small business representatives and consumers did agree that the definition should also incorporate a maximum number of T-1 lines:¹⁶ some carriers would exclude from the definition of small businesses all businesses

¹⁵ According to the FCC, as of June 2, 2000, CLCs served 17.5% of big businesses and institutions, but only 3.2% of homes and small businesses.

¹⁶ T-1 lines provide the capacity equivalent of 24 switched voice-grade access lines.

which subscribe to T-1 service, while consumer and small business representatives would exclude only those with more than two T-1 lines. We are adopting a one T-1 line limit, along with a suggestion that small businesses should be defined by a billed account, so that when a bill is aggregated among a number of locations, the criteria are applied cumulatively. Thus, except where noted, each carrier will be required to observe these rules when dealing with any customer having (or applicant seeking) the carrier's service on twenty or fewer access lines, provided that the customer or applicant also has no more than one T-1 line. That is not to say that larger customers will receive no benefit from these rules. Many of the improvements they generate will help all customers: straightforward carrier disclosure and marketing practices; customer notices of all types; and access to the regulatory process for disputes. And even the largest businesses that rely heavily on negotiated contracts for services will still have available the traditional protections of tariffs when they choose tariffed services.

Other

It has also been suggested we make clear that we do not intend by issuing these rules to foreclose consumers, district attorneys, the Attorney General, or other agencies from enforcing consumer protections through the courts. That clarification has been added.

The New Consumer Protection Rules

To begin our discussion of specific Part 2 rules, it is useful to distinguish generally among the coverages of Rules 1, 2 and 3. Rule 1 focuses on information the Commission requires carriers to provide consumers to enable them to make informed choices and enforce their rights. Rule 2 sets standards the Commission requires carriers to follow if they choose, as all active carriers do, to solicit consumers, and prohibits certain practices related to obtaining or retaining

customers. Rule 3 sets standards the Commission requires carriers to follow in initiating service once a consumer has selected the provider. There is some overlap in that certain requirements could fall into more than one area, and that has engendered minor misunderstandings reflected in the comments. Service agreements are perhaps the best example because they may serve as tools to help consumers make choices and enforce their rights (Rule 1), offers to consumers and thus solicitations directed at them (Rule 2), and statements of terms and conditions to be implemented in initiating and providing service once the consumer has chosen (Rule 3). This iteration of the rules attempts to clarify what was intended through careful wording and explanatory comments set forth below each rule.

Rule 1: Carrier Disclosure

Disclosure is one of the fundamental telecommunications consumer rights in this proceeding, and is also key to safeguarding other rights. Rule 1 will help ensure that consumers are able to learn what products and services are available to them from regulated telecommunications carriers, and at what rates, terms and conditions of service (*Right to Disclosure*). With that information, they should be able to choose the providers, products and services that best suit their needs (*Right to Choice*). Having chosen their providers and services, they need to be able to verify their bills using the true rates, terms and conditions of services to which they subscribe, to know how to reach their providers for inquiries, disputes and complaints (*Right to Accurate Bills and Redress*), and to know how to reach the Commission's Consumer Affairs Branch (CAB) when they are unable to obtain satisfaction through the carrier (*Right to Public Participation and Enforcement*). Lastly, subscribers and potential subscribers need to know a carrier's customer information-handling practices so they can balance their need

for privacy with their need for the carrier's products and services (*Right to Privacy*).

Reactions to Rule 1 as proposed in the staff report were mixed. While many carriers argue that no rules are needed, most don't oppose disclosure in the general sense but do suggest revisions to Rule 1. Consumer representatives overwhelmingly favor more disclosure, oftentimes in far more detail than earlier proposed. They maintain that there are currently few if any satisfactory sources of telecommunications consumer information. Tariffs are too complex and usually not readily available. Carrier marketing often features incomplete information focused on recruiting customers rather than educating them. And where carriers rely on oral disclosures, they put the alleged disclosure beyond any possibility of effective proof or disproof. Not unexpectedly, Internet web posting drew considerable attention, as described below.

In response to customer input through the public participation hearings and correspondence and the many rounds of party comments, we have made a number of changes in Rule 1 from the version staff first presented with the rulemaking order. First, it clarifies that utilities meeting certain size criteria are indeed required to establish World Wide Web sites on the Internet and to publish on those web sites the rates, terms and conditions of their services. The staff's proposed Rule 1(b) requirement to provide information on request has been differentiated into information to be provided to customers and information to be provided to the public. Rule 1 now pays more heed to timeliness in accepting customer and public telephone requests and in responding to them. We have added a provision defining the minimum level of customer disclosure information basic service providers must include in their alphabetical telephone directories, complemented by another requiring Commission approval before

they may remove such information. Last, the restriction against incorporating formulae by reference has been clarified to apply to service agreements and contracts and responding to inquiries.

As noted, consumer representatives overwhelmingly favor disclosure, and Internet disclosure in particular. In fact, among them they proposed a long list of detailed requirements for carriers' Internet sites. All carriers would be required to adopt standard language and a common format for displaying web-posted information. All would be required to post the Commission's and carrier's toll-free telephone numbers; to post carrier U-numbers and all California names under which they do business; to post carrier practices such as disconnection, deposit, refund and privacy policies; to post links to the Commission and to these consumer protection rules; to post information on fees and taxes, low-income programs and eligibility rules; etc. One commenter would facilitate rate comparisons by using this proceeding to require all carriers to bill in standard units; require a standard format for all carriers to send the Commission electronic disclosure and complaint information; and have the Commission become in effect a clearinghouse for all carriers' rate and service disclosure information.

Several carriers either endorsed posting disclosure information on the World Wide Web or would not oppose it with limitations. The most frequently expressed reservation was that carriers may have literally thousands of services, many of which are no longer offered to new customers but have a few remaining active subscribers. And even for those services they do offer, carriers would like to post only a representative sample. Some cite in their opposition the expense or the administrative burden involved. One picks up a consumer representative's observation that non-standardized web sites can become labyrinths to suggest that if the Commission were to require carriers to post as

much detail as some would have them, the result would be confusing and overwhelming rather than helpful to consumers.

We favor the view that telecommunications carriers are among the more technically sophisticated players in the business world today. Comments made by a number of them indicate their concern lest the Commission's new rules inhibit delivering to their customers the very latest in communications and marketing technology. In an industry embracing greater Internet compatibility, it should not be too much to expect the larger participants to set up informative and consumer-friendly web sites. As one carrier put it, "In the Information Age, publication of a carrier's tariffed rates, terms and charges on a web site is a consumer-friendly and commercially feasible method of implementing full disclosure, and web site publication [is] appropriate for residential service offerings."

By D.01-07-026, an interim decision in our proceeding to revise G.O. 96-A, the Commission enacted the following provision applicable to the stationary utilities, including the regulated telecommunications carriers:

The Commission strongly encourages all utilities, and requires certain utilities as described below, to publish and keep up-to-date their respective tariffs, as currently in effect, at sites on the Internet freely accessible to the public.

A utility that serves California customers under tariffs, and whose gross intrastate revenues, as defined in Public Utilities Code Section 435(c) and reported to the Commission for purposes of the Utilities Reimbursement Account, exceed \$10 million, shall publish, and shall thereafter keep up-to-date, its currently effective California tariffs at a site on the Internet. The Internet site shall be accessible, and the tariffs shall be downloadable, at no charge to the public. At all times, the utility shall identify at the site any tariffs that would change as the result of Commission approval of modifications the

utility has proposed in a pending application or advice letter. The utility shall update the site within five business days of the effective date of any such approval. The utility shall also provide instructions at the site for getting copies of such pending application or advice letter, and of no longer effective tariffs. If it is difficult to publish at the site the maps or forms in the utility's tariffs, the utility shall provide a means of downloading the maps or forms, or shall provide instructions for getting copies in printed format.

A utility whose gross intrastate revenues, as last reported to the Commission, exceed \$10 million, shall comply with this Internet publication requirement no later than January 1, 2002. Any other utility whose gross intrastate revenues, as reported in the utility's annual report to the Commission after January 1, 2002, exceed \$10 million, shall comply with this Internet publication requirement no later than 180 days after the date of the annual report.

For telecommunications carriers that meet the \$10 million threshold and file tariffs with the Commission, the new Rule 1(a) requirement here is consistent with that adopted in D.01-07-026. Telecommunications carriers that meet the \$10 million criterion and provide Commission-regulated, non-tariffed services, *e.g.*, the CMRS carriers and non-tariffed IECs, are covered under Rule 1(b) and will eventually post on the web the key rates, terms and conditions of each offering under which they provide or offer to provide California intrastate service to individual subscribers or small businesses.

Carriers would limit Rule 1(b) to listing information applicable to currently available plans. But, as the carriers themselves acknowledge, their non-tariffed offerings change frequently; deleting active plans from the electronic listings when they are no longer available to new subscribers would save very little while denying a significant proportion of all subscribers access to their most ready source of information. Consumer representatives opposed the carriers' changes, and instead suggested adding to Rule 1(b) additional language that

would make it more detailed and prescriptive. We have condensed the wording of both Rules 1(a) and 1(b) by deleting the references to D.01-07-026 as unnecessary and incorporating the remaining requirements of Rules 1(a)(1) and 1(a)(2) into Rule 1(a), and 1(b)(3) and 1(b)(4) into Rule 1(b). The result is simple yet definitive.

This latest version of Rule 1(b) does make significant changes in reaction to the comments. Where the June 2002 draft decision required carriers to post *all* rates, terms and conditions for all active plans, this version only requires carriers to post the *key* (as defined) rates, terms and conditions for plans that are open to new subscribers. And, once a plan is no longer open to new subscribers, access to its key rates, terms and conditions may be narrowed to those subscribers to whom they still apply, and to the California Attorney General.

Since carriers' Rule 1(b) web postings are anticipated to be prime sources of information for consumers, it is critical that carriers' service descriptions, rates, terms and conditions be understood. To that end, and because they are in effect offers to provide service, Rule 1(b) defines these web postings as solicitations subject to all of the other requirements applicable to solicitations under these Part 2 rules. Carriers objected to defining them as them solicitations, but could not explain why we should establish lower standards of disclosure for their web postings than applying that term invokes.

Carriers have suggested that they be allowed at least 180 days to bring their web sites into compliance with Rule 1(b). We have adopted that guideline for carriers newly reaching the \$10 million threshold; those exceeding the threshold today will have 120 days to bring all of their operations into compliance. Finally, consumer representatives suggest that we require carriers meeting the Rule 1(b) threshold to post on their web sites, or link from their web

sites, the Commission's new consumer protection rules. That requirement was already included as Ordering Paragraph 9 in the Assigned Commissioner's June 2002 draft decision and has been retained in this decision.

Staff's proposed Rule 1(b) has now become Rules 1(c) and 1(d), the distinction being whether a request for information comes from a subscriber or from another member of the public. For the former, the emphasis here is on ensuring the subscriber can obtain responses to enable him or her to understand and deal with the bill (or any other aspect of the service) regardless of whether the charges on it originate with this carrier or another. For the latter, the emphasis is on providing information that consumers can use to evaluate the carrier and its services. We have also retained the June 2002 draft decision's proposed Rule 1(d)(1) requirement for a carrier to divulge its legal name upon request; the working group gave no reason for recommending it be deleted, and the information could prove necessary to a consumer in pursuing legal remedies.

The three special conditions applicable to Rules 1(c) and 1(d) introduced in the June 2002 draft have been redesignated as Rule 1(e), and the sections following it renumbered. One of the complaints most often heard in the Commission's many public participation hearings was the difficulty of reaching carriers by telephone and getting prompt, consistent answers and solutions the carrier would then follow through on. Many industry commenters advanced the notion here that no new rules were needed because their customers' increasing ability to vote with their feet gives carriers more than sufficient incentive to do right. Customers who spoke at the public participation hearings would clearly disagree. Carriers, and those entities to whom carriers refer requests, must arrange to accept all requests for customer service within a reasonable time and without excessive waiting intervals or rejections for lack of staffing or facilities.

Rule 1(e)(1) requires that telephone lines used to take subscriber inquiry, complaint and dispute calls give access to a carrier representative as quickly and reliably as lines the carrier provides for receiving incoming sales calls. The Commission does have authority to set objective speed of answer standards for carriers' business offices, and it has done so. G.O.133-B, Rules Governing Telephone Service, includes a requirement that all telephone utilities providing service in California answer 80% of their business office calls within 20 seconds in offices serving 10,000 or more lines.¹⁷

Several industry commenters objected to the staff's proposal that carriers provide immediate responses to customer and public inquiries. An organized and efficient carrier should have available all of the non-customer-specific information set forth in Rules 1(c) and 1(d). With today's interactive customer databases, current customer-specific information should be available immediately to a service representative answering a call. The parties' comments indicate that some information is not immediately available, and some is not available at all. Third-party billing can be particularly problematic. We find it troubling that carriers have set up and allowed to persist a system under which they bill the public for services assertedly provided, while at the same time they cannot give a prompt answer to a subscriber who wants to know what entity originated the charge and why. At the behest of a billing aggregator, a LEC sells the power and intimidation of its bill without being able to give an honest answer to the most basic customer question of all, "Do I really owe this?" A

¹⁷ The Commission has also opened a proceeding, R.02-12-004, into the service quality standards for all telecommunications carriers and revisions to G.O.133-B.

major wireless carrier bills its subscriber for calls another carrier says were made, and then “would not expect the roaming carrier to answer questions about roaming charges,” nor find it feasible to put the customer in touch with the roaming carrier.

Our draft rules made no mention of one of the most valuable sources of disclosure information telephone subscribers are likely to turn to: their local telephone directories. Under Section 728.2, the Commission no longer has jurisdiction or control over classified telephone directories or commercial advertising included in carriers’ alphabetical directories, but it does retain jurisdiction over other aspects of alphabetical telephone directories. A casual inspection of the largest ILEC’s San Francisco white pages introductory section shows a praiseworthy assortment of essential, telephone-related information ranging from how to place calls of every type, to an overview of rates and conditions for basic service, to how, when and where to pay a bill and how to reach the telephone company for billing and service problems. One can find the area code for Antigua or the country code for Zimbabwe. There is information on reaching 911 emergency centers, crisis hotlines, and a first aid and survival guide. Residential customers can find basic information on reaching the company in at least six different languages in addition to English.

Nonetheless, at our public participation hearings around the state and in public correspondence from those who were unable to attend, we learned of the public’s great concern with the attrition of other essential information from the white pages over the years. After those hearings we saw several formal

complaints charging that the lists of prefixes that could be reached as local calls had disappeared from the white pages.¹⁸ The problem became more acute with the advent of dial-up access to the Internet, requiring customers to know which of an Internet service provider's access numbers are local calls and which will generate local toll or long distance charges. The white pages told customers to call the operator for that information, but we heard discouraging reports that when they did, the operator might not be able to help. Local service providers pointed to Internet service providers who in turn pointed back at the carrier, and by the time their first bill arrived, customers who got it wrong were sometimes faced with horrendous local toll or long distance bills for calls they thought were local.

We have noted in the past that customers' white page directories are a substantial source of information regarding their telephone service, that the inability to know whether a call is a toll call is an important impediment to the functioning of a competitive market, and that adequate availability of customer information is a necessary component of the market structure.¹⁹ In our Universal Service Proceeding, we defined basic exchange residential service to include a free white pages telephone directory.²⁰ We would not want to see this important source of customer disclosure continue to lose its effectiveness, but this is a relatively easy consumer protection problem to solve. Our Rule 1(f) defines a

¹⁸ See D.02-08-069 in Case 01-03-028 et al.

¹⁹ D.90-08-066.

²⁰ D.96-10-066 in R.95-01-020 and I.95-01-021.

minimum level of customer disclosure information basic service providers must include in their alphabetical telephone directories. The first requirement is taken directly from Section 2889.6.²¹ The second is from Section 2894.10. Because most of the remaining requirements were derived from an ILEC directory, most of this information is currently included in at least some white pages editions. One notable exception at the time of the June 2002 draft was, of course, the local prefix information which had recently disappeared, as so many irate customers reminded us. Under D.02-08-069, it is now being restored for the largest ILEC's directories. It would be impractical to produce an exhaustive list of necessary white pages consumer information, but Rule 1(g), which requires prior Commission approval to remove customer disclosure information, makes that unnecessary. We have not adopted all of the changes to Rule 1(f) the working group suggests in its report, because the wording they suggest, when read literally, could be used to eviscerate the rule. The most important change from the June 2002 draft decision is that it now better accommodates basic service providers who do not publish the directories they distribute to their subscribers.

Staff's proposed Rule 1(c), which now has become Rule 1(h), originated in the Commission's Streamlining decision, D.98-08-031, and may have lost something in the translation. In the D.98-08-031 context it required non-tariffed

²¹ § 2889.6 directs the Commission to require local exchange carriers to include in their directories information concerning emergency situations which may affect the telephone network. That information must include the procedures which the carrier will follow during emergencies, how telephone subscribers can best use the telephone network in an emergency situation, and the emergency services available by dialing 911.

IEC contracts to include all applicable rates, terms and conditions of service without incorporations by reference, although it did allow formulae to be used to calculate rates or charges where the components could be readily ascertained from a public source. To be meaningful and effective, carrier disclosure must be understandable to its audience. In the context of Rule 1, consumer protection Rule 1(h) has been clarified to apply those same restrictions to all carriers' service agreements and contracts, and to responses to the other customer and public inquiries that are the subject of Rule 1. Carriers expressed concern with banning incorporation by reference to tariffs, and consumer representatives agreed that limited tariff references should be permissible provided carriers provide ready access to the tariff sections referenced; we have accommodated that change. We have not accepted other carrier-suggested changes because they could have allowed contracts to consist of an essentially unlimited number of complex, interlocking references to materials the subscriber may never have been aware of or had access to.

Rule 2: Marketing Practices

Rule 2 sets forth requirements to be followed in soliciting consumers to purchase products and services, and in the service agreements and contracts that bind customers to the rates, charges and conditions for those products and services. Rules governing marketing practices are important to safeguarding consumers' *Right to Disclosure* and *Right to Choice*.

The term "solicitation" as used in this Rule and elsewhere is now defined using the language of the Business and Professions Code.

The most significant changes in Rule 2 compared to the staff proposal issued with the rulemaking order are its recognition that not all solicitations are definable in terms of typographic size; its stronger reliance on concepts such as

clarity, understandability and legibility that are meaningful regardless of the medium; its explicit statement that solicitations must be truthful and not misleading; and its deferral of in-language requirements to a subsequent phase of the proceeding. Rule 2(g) was included in the June 2002 draft to ensure that customers are not abused by misleading advertising or disingenuous use of the filed rate doctrine to deflect their legitimate claims. As revised, it now allows a customer to terminate any misrepresented service without penalty and receive a refund or credit for the loss up to the time they are informed of the true situation. We discuss the filed rate doctrine further below and in the Detariffing section later in this order.

With some exceptions, carrier commenters generally oppose any restrictions on their marketing, promotional, and contractual efforts, relying heavily on a belief that *laissez-faire* regulation will better serve to enforce the necessary standards. They see competition producing a race to the top in service quality and marketing behavior, a vision completely counter to the real-world observations related by most people who wrote, e-mailed and spoke in the public participation hearings. Comments filed by those not connected with the industry reflect positions closer to the public's: that consumers' experiences to date with competition-driven marketing practices have been less than satisfactory, and the Commission is to be commended for stepping up to its consumer protection responsibilities with these rules.

The Assigned Commissioner's June 2004 revised draft decision made extensive changes to Rule 2 in an effort to lessen its restrictions on marketing and advertising and more closely reflect the statutory wording upon which it was based. While carriers found the changes generally beneficial, they still rejected most of the rule as being costly and unnecessary in what they see as an era of

competition-driven improvement. Consumer groups, on the other hand, were strongly opposed, characterizing Rule 2 as having been “substantially gutted,” and the changes as “seriously watering down the right to ‘disclosure’ as enumerated in the Consumer Bill of Rights.” After receiving the most recent comments and reviewing again the earlier rounds of comments, we agree that the June 2004 revisions went too far. We have returned to the previous version with some modifications as explained here.

Rule 2(a) requires written solicitations to be unambiguous and legible, with the key rates, terms and conditions displayed in the equivalent of at least 10-point or larger type. This rule in part echoes the requirements of Section 2890(b). The obvious intent is to ensure that members of the public can read and understand the essential elements in written advertisements and offers directed to them, through whatever medium they are presented. The concept of 10-point type is troublesome when used in connection with other than paper-based documents, thus the “equivalent of 10-point or larger type” requirement.

Any number of factors can, by design or happenstance, work to prevent the disclosure a prospective purchaser needs to make an informed choice. The intent of Rule 2(a) would be violated, *e.g.*, in a newspaper advertisement by too-fine print which purports to convey details that a reasonable consumer would believe important to the offer, or by a lengthy qualifier message flashed for a few seconds on a television screen even if the message were otherwise legible.

Several commenters cited the California Uniform Electronic Transactions Act and the federal Electronic Signatures Act²² in connection with provisions in the draft rules that required certain communications to be written or in writing. For purposes of these revised rules, we have been careful in defining those terms. Both “written” and “in writing” may describe material intended to be read in any medium, including through electronic media. Whenever anything is required to be provided in writing or in written form (*e.g.*, a disclosure, a notice, or a confirmation), the requirement may be satisfied through the use of electronic media if both parties to the communication have agreed to do so, and if not, a tangible, hardcopy document is required. It is not possible in the context of this rulemaking proceeding to determine in advance which transactions will be governed by the federal act and which by the state’s. We have reviewed both and conclude that neither precludes any of the protections in our rules. Carriers are responsible for determining which applies to their own transactions.

²² *California Uniform Electronic Transactions Act*, California Civil Code, Title 2.5, §§ 1633.1 – 1633.17; and federal *Electronic Signatures Act*, 15 USCA §§ 7001 *et seq.* (E-Sign Act).

The *California Uniform Electronic Transactions Act* generally provides that: a record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form; a contract may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because an electronic record was used in its formation; and, if a law requires a record to be in writing, or if a law requires a signature, an electronic record satisfies the law. It also authorizes the provision of written information by electronic record and sets forth provisions governing changes and errors, the effect of electronic signatures, and admissibility in evidence. These provisions are subject to numerous conditions and exceptions. Moreover, certain provisions of the California act may be preempted by the federal act, which contains additional safeguards to protect consumers.

Rule 2(b) requires promotional and marketing materials not be combined with or into service agreements and contracts, again reflecting the requirements in Section 2890(b). This requirement was also applied to IECs in D.98-08-031, which established rules applicable to non-tariffed IECs. In response to carrier comments on the June 2002 draft, we have added a comment to clarify that agreements or contracts may be accompanied by other materials provided they are easily distinguishable and separable, meet the requirements of Section 2890(b), and the accompanying materials do not misstate or purport to restrict or enlarge the rights or obligations of any party to the agreement or contract. Any service agreements or contracts presented to consumers should be clearly identifiable as such; only the elements of the transaction belong in binding agreements. Interposing marketing materials may distract the consumer from those essential elements and generate misunderstanding and disputes.

Rule 2(c) requires service agreements and contracts to be plainly stated and understandable. A significant proportion of California's consumers to whom affordability matters most may not be sufficiently sophisticated, or may not read well enough, to decipher service agreements written in complex or legalistic language. It is both good public policy and good business to accommodate them. As with the preceding two rules, the intent is to ensure those who would be bound by carriers' service agreements and contracts are able to read, understand, and make informed choices about them before making a commitment.

Section 2890(b) also requires, "Written or oral solicitation materials used to obtain an order for a product or service shall be in the same language as the written order." Rule 2(c) as proposed in the June 2002 draft carried a similar requirement that called for agreements, contracts, bills and notices to be available

in each language employed by the carrier in solicitations directed at consumers. Carriers responded through the many rounds of comments and at the workshops by pointing out that the more in-language requirements carriers face, the more likely they (particularly the smaller carriers) were to pull back from directing information about their services and products at non-English speaking audiences. Although others suggested possible solutions, this remains a topic of particular concern to us. Rather than finalize a rule on in-language requirements now, we will address the topic further in the next phase of this proceeding. That is not to say that there will be no protections in place in the meantime, however: Section 2890(b) will continue to govern in this area while we decide whether enhancements in the form of additional rules are needed.

Advertising is playing an increasing role in informing the public. For some telecommunications services such as dial-around long distance, advertising may in fact be consumers' only source of information. One consumer group points out that the Commission currently has no rules specifically prohibiting misleading advertising for utility services, and suggests the wording which we have adopted in Rule 2(d). Rule 2(d) ensures that solicitations, including sales agreements, contracts, advertisements and other marketing materials, include clear, conspicuous and accurate disclosure of the key rates, terms and conditions for the product or service, and are truthful and not misleading. "Clear and conspicuous" is defined in the same words we used in D.01-07-030, our interim opinion in this proceeding which adopted the non-communications related charge billing rules, now Part 3 of new G.O. _____. Staff's initial Rule 2(d) would have required carriers to honor marketing materials that misrepresented rates, terms or conditions of service. That provision was separately stated as new Rule 2(g) in the June 2002 draft, and is further refined in these final rules. Rule 2(d),

however, also accommodates the possibility of inadvertent error so long as the carrier makes a timely, good-faith effort at correction.

Rule 2(e) simply implements the current prohibition against slamming found in Section 2889.5. All carriers must comply with Section 2889.5 and all other applicable provisions of state and federal law when changing customers' service providers.

Rule 2(f) incorporates into this general order the prohibition against re-establishing a customer's service without authorization, and against a carrier's relying on automatic renewal clauses in service agreements or contracts for that purpose. We previously established this requirement as Rule 3.b. in D.98-08-031 for detariffed IEC services.

The staff report pointed out in several places the difficulties consumers have in understanding the full scope of the tariff rules that may apply to a service they choose, and in attempting to resolve their disputes with utilities through the Commission or the courts. Section 532 provides, "[N]o public utility shall charge, or receive a different compensation for any product or commodity furnished or to be furnished, or for any service rendered or to be rendered, than the rates, tolls, rentals, and charges applicable thereto as specified in its schedules on file and in effect at the time..." but also allows the Commission to establish such exceptions as it may consider just and reasonable. A carrier that lures a consumer into purchasing a product or service by, *e.g.*, advertising lower rates or more favorable terms and conditions than shown in its tariffs, may be protected from later court claims of unlawful charges and billing provided the carrier has billed the customer in accordance with its filed tariffs (the "filed rate doctrine"). Rule 2(g), first separated from Rule 2(d) in the June 2002 draft, now requires carriers that misrepresent their rates, terms or conditions to make whole

a subscriber who was affected by the misrepresentation. Once the subscriber has been informed of the true rates, terms and conditions, he or she must be reimbursed through service credits or refunds for losses up to that time, be allowed to cancel without penalty any agreement or contract for the product or service and be reimbursed for any service initiation charges or fees, and be allowed to enroll in a different plan if he or she wishes to do so. Rule 2(g) applies to both tariffed and non-tariffed services; we discuss the implications of the filed rate doctrine as a defense against consumer claims in the Detariffing section later in this decision.

Rule 3 (and Former Rule 4): Service Initiation and Changes

Rule 3 combines and modifies what were Rules 3 and 4 in the staff's proposal. The combined rule is important to safeguarding subscribers' *Right to Disclosure* and *Right to Choice* when they sign up for services, and later their *Right to Accurate Bills and Redress*. Each time a customer or prospective customer initiates service, Rule 3 requires they be fully and proactively informed of the options available to them so they can make timely and informed choices. Carriers are then required to follow up by confirming the rates, terms and conditions for each service ordered.

Together, these notifications are the essence of the *Right to Disclosure*. Requiring that orders be confirmed (electronically or otherwise), and giving customers a penalty-free cancellation period, ensures they did indeed intend to place an order with that carrier for that service and have thereby exercised their *Right to Choice*. And, with a record of the rates, terms and conditions in hand, customers can monitor their charges to enforce their *Right to Accurate Bills and Redress*. The remainder of Rule 3 will ensure that customers know what actions will result in charges; level the playing field by making it difficult for carriers to

place unauthorized charges on subscribers' bills; help consumers protect their privacy and reduce identity theft; assist consumers to understand and remedy any problems that lead to service denials; and encourage carriers to recognize that their subscribers' time is valuable to them.

Consumer representatives commended the ideas behind staff's original Rule 3 and Rule 4 proposals. Several drafted revisions to clarify or tighten the wording, and some of those changes are reflected in the combined new rule. Rule 3 as presented in the June 2002 draft accepted in major part a consumer group coalition's suggested realignment of staff's proposal for confirming orders, and as now adopted incorporates additional changes suggested by consumers and carriers. Rules 3(d) and 3(e) recognize the importance of disclosure in order confirmations, and Rule 3(f) allows customers to cancel orders for services that they find, after reviewing the carrier's confirmation materials, don't match their expectations.

Many carriers requested their carrier class be explicitly exempted from draft Rule 4 because the description indicated "local exchange service." Others pointed to the distinction staff had drawn between local exchange rules and all other rules as a justification for scrapping altogether the idea of a single set of rules applicable to all carrier classes. In preparing the June 2002 draft, it became clear that none of the three former Rule 4 subsections needed to be limited in that way because the situations they address are not, or will not always be, confined to local exchange carriers. Beyond their overarching belief that no new rules are needed, or that any new rules shouldn't apply to their particular carrier class, carriers' greatest concerns were that staff's proposed rules would reduce their flexibility in taking service orders and delay them in initiating service.

Rule 3(a) originally proposed allowing service to be initiated based on written, electronic or oral agreements, and carriers applauded the idea even as they questioned the meaning of “electronic” and “oral” and expressed reservations about the remainder of the rule. New Rule 3(a) simplifies that statement to say that carriers may initiate or change service upon request in any form. The intent is to make it clear that carriers may implement new or changed service at a customer’s request as quickly as their systems permit, regardless of how the order reaches them. There was little or no opposition to this condition *per se*, but considerable concern on consumer representatives’ part with ensuring a good process is put in place to follow up. That has been done. As will be seen, consumers’ rights are safeguarded by the way staff’s proposed Rules 3(b) and 3(c) have been reframed in new Rules 3(d), 3(e) and 3(f). They now give the consumer and carrier an opportunity to correct any mistakes, misunderstandings or misrepresentations that survive the initial ordering process.

Several carriers interpreted Rule 3(c) (staff’s Rule 4(a)) as obligating every carrier to offer each of the service options listed. We did not interpret that as being staff’s intent, although one subsection as initially worded did impose such an obligation. The various subparts of Rule 3(c) apply only when the information is relevant to service options a carrier provides; any requirement to offer those options would arise from a separate statute, decision, rule or tariff.

Staff’s proposed Rule 4(a)(5) would have required local exchange service providers to inform subscribers initiating service about the availability and effect of blocking non-telecommunications related services from being billed with their telephone bills. Our Rules Governing Billing for Non-communications-Related Charges (Part 4 of G.O. ___, discussed later in this order) establish an opt-in approach to this new service. Carriers may not place non-communications-

related charges on a subscriber's bill unless and until the subscriber has been fully informed and has given express written authorization to do so.²³ Thus, proposed Rule 4(a)(5) was superseded by the Part 4 rules and is no longer needed here.

Rule 3(c)(5) was first proposed in the June 2002 draft and reflects the Section 2889.4 requirement that local exchange providers inform new residential customers of pay per use features during the order process. Rule 3(c) extends that requirement beyond residential local exchange customers, to all individual and small business customers to whom pay per use features apply.

Rules 3(b) and 3(c)(8) were also added in the June 2002 draft. We have previously noted the Section 2896 provision that the Commission "require telephone corporations to provide customer service to telecommunication customers that includes... sufficient information upon which to make informed choices among telecommunications services and providers." Customers and would-be customers calling carriers to order service have expressed their frustration at trying to obtain information about the least expensive options available to them. Carriers are understandably eager to maximize their revenues, and increasing sales through aggressive marketing is unquestionably one way to do that. Where carriers are providing essential services, however, they also have a responsibility under Section 2896 to provide consumers with sufficient information to make informed choices among those services. Rule 3(c)(8) requires basic service providers to provide customers initiating service or

²³ See G.O. ___, Part 4, C(1)(a) attached.

adding additional lines with information about their least expensive service(s) that would meet those customers' needs. We know of no other reliable way to ensure consumers who need those services are not inappropriately misdirected away from them. Rewording the rule to require informing the customer of the plan with the lowest monthly charge, or the lowest unit charge, as some suggested in comments on the June 2002 draft, is susceptible to gaming by, *e.g.*, a carrier describing a plan with no monthly charge but extremely high usage charges, or vice versa. Carriers commented that they cannot be expected to know which of their services might meet a given customer's needs, but that is in fact what they endeavor to determine each time they discuss new services with a prospective customer. Carriers making a good faith effort at disclosure as Section 2896 requires will have no problem complying with the rule.

Staff's proposed Rules 3(b) and 3(c) as initially presented were potentially overlapping, one calling for carriers to confirm service orders within seven days in writing, and the other to inform the customer of the service's rates, terms and conditions, also within seven days. Those provisions are now subsumed into new Rules 3(d) and 3(e) for tariffed and non-tariffed services respectively. Orders for both tariffed and non-tariffed services require written confirmation (which may be, *e.g.*, mailed, e-mailed, faxed, or given to the subscriber at the point of sale) by the carrier within seven days after the order is accepted.²⁴

²⁴ Carriers making a change in a residential subscriber's service provider may wish to send the Rule 3(d) or 3(e) tariffed or non-tariffed order confirmation notice with the 14-day notice required by § 2889.5(a)(4), provided the seven-day requirement is met.

No commenters opposed the concept of making rates, terms and conditions available to subscribers, but there were considerable differences as to how, or whether, to write a rule ensuring that was done. In their comments on the June 2002 draft, most consumer-oriented commenters favored having the rules define the “important,” “essential,” or “key” rates terms and conditions, and in some cases differentiated among those terms. Some carrier representatives favored a less detailed variation of that model, while others rejected any attempt at prescription. Those who objected argued that it would be impossible to identify a set of rates, terms and conditions that are most important to subscribers across all possible services and static as the industry evolves, that confirmations could become unwieldy if carriers were not given complete flexibility to determine what rates, terms and conditions were likely to be important to subscribers, or that carriers should be allowed to disclose how the information might be obtained rather than delivering it proactively. We adopt here a middle approach that defines the characteristics of what we see as key rates, terms and conditions, gives examples, and leaves it to individual carriers to fill in where there may be others equally important.

For non-tariffed services, the subscriber will need a copy of the service contract with all of its rates, terms and conditions. Because the key rates, terms and conditions important to full disclosure may be difficult to discern in long, complex contracts (and customers are not being required to sign those contracts), Rule 3(e) requires they be highlighted in some way (perhaps, *e.g.*, printed in larger or contrasting type, underlined, bolded, enclosed within text boxes, or

some combination of those or other methods) so that the subscriber is less likely to overlook them.²⁵ Alternatively, the carrier may send as part of the contract a document setting forth the key rates, terms and conditions in an easily understood summary. Corresponding Rule 3(d) for tariffed services does not require that the carrier include in its confirmation the entire set of applicable rates, terms and conditions because, as both carriers and consumer representatives pointed out in their comments on the June 2002 draft, those rates, terms and conditions are likely to be very extensive and potentially spread through multiple tariff schedules. Rather, Rule 3(d) only requires carriers to include the key rates, terms and conditions for each tariffed service ordered.

Several commenters suggested the rules include a right to cancel agreements or contracts for services that do not meet consumers' expectations, and the Assigned Commissioner proposed a rule to that effect in the June 2002 draft and refined it in his July 2003 draft. We have adopted a modified cancellation provision in today's Rule 3(f). Carriers have up to seven days to send service order confirmations; subscribers may receive those confirmations immediately if they are provided at the point of sale, or a week or more later if mailed. It may be from weeks to more than a month before a subscriber receives the first full billing statement for a new or changed service, and perhaps days additional before he or she examines it for unexpected or previously undisclosed

²⁵ Proposed Rule 3(f) in the June 2002 draft required that a subscriber, in addition to signing the contract, separately sign or initial the contract in the immediate proximity of the notice of any early termination fees, charges or penalties to indicate awareness of and agreement to them. That requirement has been dropped in favor of the highlighting called for in Rule 3(e).

charges. And in many cases it may take equally long or longer to learn whether the service itself matches what was represented. Rule 3(f) accommodates these lead times by allowing subscribers 30 days to cancel without penalties any new tariffed service or new contract for non-tariffed service. The rule does not relieve the subscriber from payment for any actual use made of the service before canceling, or reasonable charges for work done on the customer's premises (such as wiring or equipment installation) before the subscriber canceled. The carriers in making their arguments to be allowed to bind customers to electronic and telephonic orders imply that they and their customers are in harmony on the overwhelming majority of the orders they process. That being the case, very few customers will find anything so objectionable about the confirmations and contracts they receive or their telecommunications service as to renege or cancel. As one carrier representative put it, "California's millions of wireless consumers are accustomed to and demand immediate service changes and activations available through telephonic, Internet, and oral agreements, as well as the ability to conduct all kinds of business on a signatureless, often paperless basis." We agree this represents, if not reality, a worthy goal, and these rules accommodate it. To make service enrollment and changes without signatures work, carriers will have to communicate clearly with those seeking their services, be flexible when the inevitable miscommunication occurs, or both. We think they can and will, and the carriers' risks from customer cancellations will be minimal.

Rule 3(g) establishes that charges for pay per use features are not considered authorized unless the user knowingly and affirmatively activates the service by dialing or some other affirmative means. Simply remaining on the line, or failing to remain on-hook for a sufficient time, or any other ambiguous action can not by itself be sufficient to incur a charge. The nomenclature has

been changed to “pay per use features,” the term used in Section 2889.4 and equivalent in this context, from “customer-activated services” in response to suggestions that customer-activated services be defined.

Rule 3(h) is similarly straightforward: For any service for which no record of affirmative subscriber authorization is available, all disputed charges are subject to a rebuttable presumption that the charges are unauthorized.

Rule 3(i) was added in the June 2002 draft and modified following comments on the July 2003 draft: A carrier may not deny service for failure to provide a social security number, and where a consumer chooses not to provide a social security number, the carrier may request other identification information sufficient to enable the carrier to verify the consumer’s identity and run a credit check.²⁶ The first part of this provision, which we previously established for CLCs in D.95-07-054, was suggested in comments by both a consumer organization and by a carrier, and the second recognizes the carrier’s need to control its risk of loss.

Rule 3(j) requires a carrier to disclose its reasons when it denies an application for a regulated telecommunications service. The largest local exchange carrier supported this rule as proposed in the staff report, while another large LEC labeled it burdensome because of the labor and mailing

²⁶ Concerns about the privacy and security risks stemming from the widespread use of social security numbers as personal identifiers have increased in recent years. *See* Testimony of John G. Huse, Jr., Inspector General of the Social Security Administration, Before the Subcommittee on Social Security of the House Ways and Means Committee Hearing on Protecting Privacy and Preventing Misuse of Social Security Numbers (May 22, 2001); *see also* Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.3d 1344, 1353-1354 (9th Cir. 1993); *State ex rel Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. City of Akron*, 640 N.E.2d 164 (Ohio 1994).

expense involved. When consumers are denied utility service, they need to know why if they are to correct the problem, and we suspect there are very few carriers who would deny them that right. The rule will be adopted as proposed, except that the disclosure need not be in writing if the consumer concurs.

Rule 3(k) in the June 2002 draft proposed to require carriers to offer a four-hour appointment window when a subscriber must be present for an installation or repair. Not surprisingly, consumer representatives were generally supportive and carriers generally opposed. The staff-proposed initial version was ambiguous in that it could also be read to require the carrier to give the subscriber a \$25 credit if the installation or repair were not *completed* within a four-hour window; that has been clarified here in Rule 3(k) to mean the carrier's representative must arrive and commence work within the promised interval. We have also accepted (with some modification) carriers' and consumer representatives' suggestions by not requiring the \$25 credit ²⁷ when the appointment is not kept because the carrier's representative was denied access to the premises, because of force majeure, or when the carrier has informed the subscriber by 5:00 p.m. two business days before that the appointment has been canceled or rescheduled. One consumer advocacy group suggested the credit be \$25 per access line, but gave no support for that change. Another used this rule to suggest a new right to service guarantee under which carriers would grant not only a \$25 credit for missing a residential service appointment, but also: a \$100

²⁷ We have also clarified that \$25 is the *minimum* credit amount. Carriers are not limited to offering that amount if they wish to do so, *e.g.*, to dissuade customers from pressing a claim under Civil Code Section 1722(c).

credit for businesses; free installation plus a \$25 credit per extra day for every installation taking more than five days; and increased monetary credits for prolonged outages. Our intent in adopting Rule 3(k) is somewhat more limited. Subscribers' time has value to them, carriers need to recognize that value, and this rule gives them an incentive to do so. Civil Code Section 1722(c) enables utility customers to bring an action for damages in small claims court against utilities that miss their four-hour windows. Our requirement parallels in part that in the Civil Code in that it requires the customer be offered the four-hour window when the appointment is made, and in that it makes some, albeit more limited, exceptions. At the same time, however, our \$25 minimum credit is much lower than the \$600 cap on damages allowed in the Civil Code. Nothing in these rules is intended to limit subscribers' right to proceed in court under Civil Code Section 1722(c).

Rule 4: Prepaid Calling Cards and Services

Rule 4, Prepaid Calling Cards and Services, was first proposed in the June 2002 draft and revised in the July 2003 draft.

In 1998, the Legislature passed and the governor signed Assembly Bill 1994, adding a section to the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17538.9) imposing for the first time specific disclosure and service requirements on all providers of prepaid calling cards (also known as prepaid telephone debit cards) and prepaid calling services. The accompanying legislative analysis described the problem:

Prepaid phone cards are a relatively new and very popular service in the long distance industry. Nationally, sales have grown from \$12 million in 1992 to \$1.5 billion in 1997. With the growth has come consumer harm. Consumers are falling victim to the fraud and unfair and deceptive business practices that often surface with any

new industry. Consumer loss is very common in this industry because prepaid services such as this generally lend themselves to abuse and fraud. Specifically, consumers face the risk of sellers not meeting their obligations. Examples of consumer harm include outright fraud such as non-working access numbers and deceptive advertising where pricing structures, minimum charges and surcharges, and higher rates for the first minute of a call are not disclosed.

Our own experience confirms the Legislature's observations: Each year, our Consumer Affairs Branch receives hundreds of informal prepaid calling card complaints, and prepaid calling card abuse is becoming a significant focus of Consumer Protection and Safety Division's enforcement efforts.

In the same session, the Legislature also enacted Assembly Bill 1424, adding Article 9, Prepaid Telephone Debit Cards (Sections 885 and 886) to the Public Utilities Code. Under Section 885, entities offering prepaid telephone debit cards, and that are not already Commission-certificated carriers, are subject to the registration requirements in Section 1013 and are thus required to comply with those rules and regulations the Commission may establish for them. With the addition of Section 885, all prepaid calling card providers, whether certificated carriers or registrants, came under Commission jurisdiction for their prepaid calling card services.²⁸ In 2002, AB2244 was enacted, making modest revisions to Bus. & Prof. Code § 17538.9.

²⁸ Vendors that do not administer the actual service offered through these cards are not subject to Section 885 and Commission jurisdiction. Non-jurisdictional entities include those whose activities are limited to participating in the distribution chain, such as wholesalers and retailers that simply sell cards and do not buy blocks of calling time from certificated carriers and package it for resale as prepaid calling card services.

Rule 4 is in most ways identical to the current provisions in the Unfair Competition Law, for several reasons. First, these are provisions we know the Legislature intended to be enforced. At the same time, we recognize that they constitute only the behavioral floor, the lowest legally permissible standard for calling card service providers, so as we build enforcement experience we will be considering how Rule 4 should be strengthened. Second, we are sensitive to the fact that prepaid calling cards and prepaid calling services are national products. We choose to avoid creating requirements today that potentially conflict with those in other jurisdictions. And third, retaining the Unfair Competition Law wording minimizes the possibility of conflicting interpretations that could arise from differently worded laws and rules covering the same topic. Again, however, none of these reasons will dissuade us from revising the rules as our enforcement experience exposes the gaps, loopholes and gaming opportunities unscrupulous providers may attempt to exploit.

As we noted previously, our Part 2 Consumer Protection Rules are intended to apply to all carrier classes, a given rule coming into play whenever any carrier of whatever type faces a particular situation. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17538.9(b)(6) makes a single exception to that principle by not requiring facilities-based CMRS carriers to establish and maintain toll-free customer service telephone numbers with live operators to answer incoming calls 24-hours a day, seven days a week if they chose to offer prepaid calling services. We have modified that exception in our corresponding Rule 4(f)(1) because to do otherwise could both harm consumers and grant a competitive advantage to some prepaid calling service providers over others. Many of the facilities-based CMRS carriers are owned by the largest telecommunications corporations in the nation. Neither CMRS resellers, which are typically much smaller than facilities-

based CMRS carriers, nor carriers of other types, from the largest to the very smallest, are granted a similar preference under the Unfair Competition Law. We know of no reason that would justify our tilting the playing field by establishing lower performance standards for otherwise-identical products distributed to the public by facilities-based CMRS carriers, nor did the comments provide such a reason.

Because the initial staff report attached to the rulemaking order did not deal with prepaid calling cards and services, the parties' first opportunity to comment on them came in response to the Assigned Commissioner's June 2002 draft decision, and thereafter through our workshops, the working group and its report, and two subsequent rounds of comments. Consumer groups have been generally supportive of including Rule 4, and the industry less so. Both generally agree, however, that if there is to be a prepaid calling cards and services rule it should be closely modeled on the current version of Bus. & Prof. Code § 17538.9. Both have also suggested specific deviations, some of which we mention in the following paragraphs.

We have not adopted a joint wireline and wireless industry suggestion that we include in Rule 4 an introductory statement that would effectively convert the rule into an advisory reference to the Business and Professions Code section. To the contrary, we intend Rule 4 to be a Commission-enforced customer protection measure in its own right.

The wireline and wireless industries would have us echo the language of Bus. & Prof. Code § 17538.9(b)(3) in our Rule 4(c), thus applying that rule directly to vendors for their point of sale displays. Because the Commission lacks jurisdiction over non-carrier vendors, we have adopted the consumer groups' alternative wording that accomplishes the same measure of consumer protection

by ensuring that carriers, over whom we do have jurisdiction, require their vendors to provide lawful point of sale display information.

Most of the parties' remaining comments have been accommodated by our conforming Rule 4 to the current version of Bus. & Prof. Code § 17538.9 enacted by AB2244.

We take this opportunity to make two more observations before moving on. Some parties in their comments have questioned whether the Commission has authority to enforce provisions of the Business and Professions Code, implying that some of the rules proposed in the rulemaking order would be doing just that. As we discuss in much greater depth in the Enforcement section later, the Commission clearly does not have such authority. Just as clearly, however, the Commission may consider parallel requirements of the applicable laws when it is fashioning its own rules, including in this case Bus. & Prof. Code § 17538.9. That is precisely what we have done with Rule 4. And, as we point out in our Enforcement section, remedies under the Unfair Competition Law are cumulative and in addition to remedies that may be imposed under other laws. The Commission's consumer protection rules, and any action it may take to enforce them, do not deprive the courts of jurisdiction to entertain actions against regulated utilities brought by law enforcement officers under the Unfair Competition Law.

Rule 5: Deposits to Establish or Re-establish Service

Rule 5, proposed as "Local Exchange Service Credit and Deposits" in the staff report has now become a deposit rule applicable to all carrier classes for all types of service, not just local exchange. By setting limits on what all carriers can require of consumers before initiating service, Rule 5 protects consumers' *Right to Non-Discrimination*.

As proposed in the staff report, Rule 5 did not engender as much controversy among commenters as some of the other proposed rules. The largest local exchange carrier supported it; the next largest expressed no objection but did suggest a modest revision. The CMRS carriers typically wanted it made explicit that the rule didn't apply to wireless, some giving reasons and others not. Consumer representatives offered numerous changes, some of them minor, some significant. The June 2002 draft decision included in revised Rule 5 several new provisions drawn from the comments of both consumer representatives and carriers.

The most significant change from the initial staff proposal is the distinction Rule 5 draws between deposits for basic exchange service and deposits for other services. This change arises from two considerations. First, our Part 1 Bill of Rights is intended to protect consumers' rights with respect to all regulated services, but the rule as originally drafted related only to local exchange service. There was nothing to keep providers from refusing to accept a deposit in lieu of establishing satisfactory credit for other services. Second, staff and commenters alike recognize a tension between the need to refund deposits quickly and the need to hold them long enough for all charges to clear. That tension can be seen in staff's Rule 5 recommendation to refund local exchange deposits within thirty days after service is discontinued, contrasted with its Rule 7 recommendation to allow four or five months for backbilling some other, non-basic service charges. Rule 5 now addresses deposits for all services, distinguishing them by allowing thirty days to refund basic service deposits and 120 days for other deposits.

Three other factors bear on our distinction between deposits for basic service and for other services. Carriers are highly motivated to sell optional, non-basic services and thus not likely to impose deposits so high as to price

purchasers out of the market. The great variety of optional services and payment methods makes it more difficult to devise a cap on deposits for non-basic services that would be suitable across the board. And the potential for a single subscriber to run up substantial charges quickly is greater for non-basic than basic services. Thus, we have limited the amount of deposits for basic service, but not for non-basic services.

We have not attempted to devise objective criteria for what constitutes acceptable credit for basic service because Section 779.5 leaves that up to the carrier: “The decision of ... [a] telephone ... corporation to require a new residential applicant to deposit a sum of money with the corporation prior to establishing an account and furnishing service shall be based solely upon the credit worthiness of the applicant as determined by the corporation.” Instead, we require carriers to accept deposits in lieu of credit for applicants who do not meet their standards, and we limit the size of those deposits they may collect to establish basic service, but not for other services. As one carrier pointed out in its comments on the Assigned Commissioner’s March 2004 revised draft decision, some carriers may prefer to accept prepayment or credit card billing arrangement in lieu of deposits. Rule 5(a) now accommodates that possibility.

Rule 5(b) limits deposits to establish or re-establish basic service to twice the estimated or typical monthly bill for that service. The staff report proposed allowing carriers to charge an additional deposit to establish basic service for applicants who owe an outstanding balance to another utility. We have dropped that provision. Our rules do not allow providers to disconnect basic exchange service for nonpayment of other services, and it would be inconsistent to deny would-be subscribers basic service under those same circumstances. In later comments, an ILEC objected that it would have to make major changes to its

billing system if the deposit it could collect for basic service were limited and it had to begin requiring separate deposits for non-basic services. After considering the comments, we still believe that our limiting the deposit amount a carrier may demand as a condition of providing basic service is a fair and reasonable approach to balancing the interests of basic service providers and their would-be subscribers.

Some carriers objected that our 5% simple annual interest rate on deposits is excessive considering that current passbook, money market and certificate of deposit rates are below that level. While it is true that carriers hold small sums for short periods when deposits are viewed at the customer level, the rule does not require carriers to hold subscribers' deposit funds in short-term, low-interest rate vehicles. When aggregated at the corporate level these funds represent significant, relatively stable pools of capital available to carriers to use over long time periods or invest at higher rates. While we could establish a floating monthly interest rate to be applied to deposits, our 5% rate is fair to carriers and subscribers alike, and much simpler for subscribers to understand and carriers to administer.²⁹

Rule 5 has other changes as well. The June 2002 draft decision introduced a provision in Rule 5(a) that a carrier may not require a deposit for services provided by others. First, this will protect subscribers and would-be subscribers against a carrier's buying the receivables of others and enforcing collection through its regulated billings. Second, it could invite anticompetitive mischief to

²⁹ For comparison, note the 1.5% *monthly* interest rate Rule 7(a) allows (and many carriers charge) for late payments.

allow an ILEC providing competitive services to charge high deposits for subscribers who choose its rivals' services while waiving them for its own. The carrier providing the service should be the one to decide what deposit to require for that service. Consumer representatives support the rule; carriers do not. Carriers argue that requiring one consolidated deposit is more convenient for customers, and that billing carriers *do* often purchase the receivables of others and would be unlikely to continue doing so if they were exposed to additional uncollectibles risks. We have now clarified the intent of the rule by adding to it the same wording that was used in the June 2002 draft decision text: "A carrier may not require *for its own benefit* a deposit for services provided by others." This wording addresses the carriers' concerns by allowing, *e.g.*, an ILEC to collect a deposit on behalf of an IEC for which it bills, so long as the deposit is determined by and collected on behalf of the IEC.

Rule 6: Billing

Rule 6 is a series of requirements to ensure that subscribers' bills are complete, accurate and understandable. The underlying principle we intend to follow is that subscribers deserve sufficient information to confirm that their bills reflect only services they have ordered and received, at prices they have agreed to. Rule 6 is aimed at safeguarding consumers' *Rights of Disclosure, Choice, Public Participation and Enforcement*, and *Accurate Bills and Redress*.

Consumer groups and carriers alike had considerable constructive input on this topic. As a result, Rule 6 as adopted incorporates many revisions gleaned from the comments while still retaining all of the essential elements staff proposed to protect consumers' rights. Because the subsections were rewritten in major part in the June 2002 draft, our discussion of them will follow their new arrangement.

Several carrier representatives suggested that parts of Rule 6 as originally proposed should not apply to all carrier classes. We have a different view. As we have noted in earlier proceedings, the telecommunications industry is evolving and what were once clear boundaries between the various carrier classes are becoming less distinct. In D.00-03-020, our slamming and cramming rules, we noted that where only ILECs now provide third party billing, that may change in the future. The parties' comments in this proceeding indicate that they hold a similar expectation. We have previously expressed our anticipation that carriers other than ILECs would in the future become carriers of last resort as competition draws new participants into what were once the ILECs' exclusive province.³⁰ And in our Universal Service Proceeding, we provided for periodic review of the definition of the most fundamental service level, basic exchange service, as the competitive industry evolves and matures. Our earlier rules established for ILECs, CLCs and non-tariffed IECs had considerable overlap, and most of what was in them can be seen in these consolidated rules for all carriers.

Many carriers say they are currently revising their national billing programs to conform to the FCC's recently issued Truth-in-Billing rules. One of their major concerns has been that we not impose on them new, California-specific requirements that would make those programs immediately obsolete. We have taken care here not to let that happen. The FCC has explicitly allowed

³⁰ At least one CLC (Cox California Telcom II, LLC) is already a carrier of last resort, and another (MCI Metro Access Transmission Services, U-5253-C) is seeking that designation. One CMRS carrier (WWC License, LLC, U-3025-C) submitted a letter requesting the Commission designate it as a carrier of last resort for providing basic service, but was directed instead to file an application.

the states to adopt and enforce their own truth-in-billing requirements so long as they are consistent with the FCC's.³¹ Drawing on the best of the parties' suggestions, we have done so.

Rule 6(a) states simply that bills must be clearly organized and include only subscriber-authorized charges. Where carriers choose to bill for non-communications-related products and services in the same billing envelope, they must comply with provisions in Part 4 of this general order, Rules Governing Billing for Non-communications-Related Charges. The working group report suggested deleting this provision from Rule 6(a), but gave no reason for doing so. Absent that provision, there would be nothing to keep carriers from, *e.g.*, printing a subscriber's telephone bill and a Part 4-exempt run-on second bill for non-communications-related services immediately following using the same look and feel, and including both bills in the same envelope with a lead sheet indistinguishable from the telephone bill directing the subscriber to pay the total to the carrier. While we could devise yet more rules attempting to foreclose all possible abusive practices, this is not what we intended when we issued D.01-07-030 establishing the rules in Part 4.

Rule 6(b) melds an FCC Truth-in-Billing requirement with our recent slamming/cramming decisions which took an in-depth look at how carriers should be identified. Carriers must associate each service on the bill with the service provider responsible for placing that charge, and the providers' names must meet the identification requirements we set forth in D.00-03-020 as

³¹ 47 CFR 64.2400(c).

modified by D.00-11-015. In the initial comments, several carriers objected to the staff's proposal here, but no carrier explained how it was exempted from Section 2890 which also requires a billing telephone company to clearly identify each entity that generates a charge appearing on a subscriber's bill. CMRS carriers pointed out that their subscribers typically recognize them under trade names that differ from their FCC-certificated names, and ask the rule be modified accordingly. The naming requirements in Rule 6(b) were established by D.00-03-020 as modified by D.00-11-015 and we do not intend to relitigate that issue in this proceeding. We do recognize this as a legitimate concern, however, and have accommodated it by adding a comment which allows carriers to place a trade name on the bill in addition to, but not instead of, the name required under this rule. The FCC likewise allows carriers to use trade names.³² We have not accepted a consumer recommendation to mandate including any fictitious business names the carrier uses, and its U-number.

Rule 6(c) requires grouping charges by carrier, consistent with Truth-in-Billing and Section 2890(d).

Staff had suggested identifying as "new" any services appearing on the bill for the first time. Many commenters representing both carriers and consumers pointed out that the FCC had come out with a slightly different proposal after the staff's report was issued. New Rule 6(d) combines staff's suggested requirement with the FCC's Truth-in-Billing. In the FCC's words,

³² CC Docket No. 98-170, Order on Reconsideration, (released March 29, 2000), at Paragraph 10.

[O]ur rule requiring highlighting of new service providers will apply only to providers that have continuing arrangements with the subscriber that result in periodic charges on the subscriber's telephone bill. Thus, changes in a subscriber's presubscribed local and long-distance service providers clearly would be subject to the rule. Additionally, charges on telephone bills for such services as voice mail and internet access would also be subject to the rule because these services typically involve monthly or other periodic charges on an ongoing basis until the service is cancelled. On the other hand, our modified rule excludes services billed solely on a per transaction basis, such as dial-around interexchange access service, operator service, directory assistance, and non-recurring pay-per-call services.³³

This addresses commenters' concerns that, *e.g.*, wireless carriers would have to list as new every roaming call, and billing LECs would have to note every dial-around or customer-activated charge. Carriers continue to object to drawing their subscribers' attention to new recurring charges added to their bills, but this is as fully essential as calling their attention to new providers.

Several carriers initially objected to staff's proposal that carriers describe each service or product on the bill, and show the associated rate or charge. This, however, is in essence what Section 2890(d)(2)(A) already requires. The wording of Rule 6(e) as proposed in the June 2002 draft decision combined the requirements of Section 2890 and Truth-in-Billing. The working group report recommended rewording that reflects Section 2890 almost verbatim but deletes Truth-in-Billing's requirement that the description be sufficiently clear and specific that customers can assess whether they are being correctly charged.

³³ CC Docket No. 98-170, Order on Reconsideration, (released March 29, 2000), at Paragraph 5.

Other consumer representatives recommended slightly different wording. To eliminate any doubt about what is intended and whether it is consistent with state and federal law, Rule 6(e) now includes language from Section 2890(d)(2)(A), and verbatim the FCC's language from Truth-in-Billing for the second part of the rule.

In D.00-11-015, we refined our rule prohibiting disconnection of basic residential or single line business service for nonpayment of other services on the bill. Rule 6(f) reflects both the FCC's Truth-in-Billing and our specific non-disconnect criteria to ensure subscribers understand their rights. Carriers must now explain the distinction and clearly and conspicuously identify on the bill which charges must be paid to retain basic service. There was general consensus and little comment regarding this rule.

Staff's proposal that taxes and surcharges be separately identified on bills as "mandated charges" drew considerable fire from carriers, but was universally embraced in consumer groups' comments. It was sometimes difficult to tell from the carriers' initial comments whether they were confused or simply disingenuous. Among them were these: "[A]lthough carriers' costs increase because of the commission imposed charges, for those charges they are not required to recover directly from end-users, carriers are left effectively without a recovery mechanism"; "When a carrier has provided service to a customer at the customer's request, these fees are due and payable, without regard to whether the regulatory agency ordered the carrier to collect the fee directly from the customer, or whether the agency allows the carrier to collect the fee from the customer"; and, "[T]he Commission should not condone any rule that leads consumers to believe that they are not obligated to pay these charges." The first comment is wrong, the second is off-point, and the third misrepresents the

proposal. The rule is intended to make clear to subscribers which of the charges carriers place on their bills are taxes, surcharges and fees carriers have been *ordered* to collect and remit to government, and which are aimed at recovering carriers' costs of doing business, including costs of meeting regulatory requirements. As restated in the June 2002 draft and again here, Rule 6(g) makes it abundantly clear that carriers are required to list only government-mandated taxes, surcharges and fees in a bill section entitled "Government Fees and Taxes," and are not to label or describe discretionary charges in any other bill section in a way that could mislead subscribers to believe they are government-mandated as well. In their comments on each of the subsequent draft decisions, carriers objected to this straightforward practice and suggested revised wording which would allow them to combine in their own discretionary fees and surcharges. Carriers also wrongly characterize the rule as requiring them to include their discretionary surcharges in an entirely new section of their bills; it does not do that, nor does it have that practical effect. It merely requires they not be placed in the section reserved for true government-mandated fees and taxes.

Rule 6(h) gathers into one place the basic items most carriers already include in their bills. Several changes have been incorporated in response to the initial comments. "Mailing date" has been dropped because it is not critical to consumer protection, and mass-mailing practices can sometimes make it difficult to pinpoint the exact date. Likewise, including a separate mailing date is unnecessary for bills transmitted over the Internet (see Rule 6(i) following). Billing carrier names must be consistent with our requirements in Rule 6(b) above. And we agree that carriers who routinely grant their subscribers an additional grace period should be allowed to show the date after which a late-payment penalty is authorized rather than the date they actually intend to apply

it. In response to comments on the June 2002 draft decision, the Assigned Commissioner further refined the rule to incorporate all of the changes suggested by the working group and endorsed by the carriers.

Some carriers offer services which they make available only with Internet billing, and others have made arrangements with subscribers to transmit bills by e-mail or make them accessible on web sites rather than send paper copies. Rule 6(i) responds to comments seeking clarification that carriers need not send duplicate, paper bills to these subscribers, and that carriers are required to meet the same billing disclosure requirements regardless of the medium.

Rule 6(j) is an extension of Section 2890(a) intended to allow consumers who choose to do so to block non-presubscribed carriers' charges from their bills. At carriers' suggestion, we have added wording to clarify that the rule applies only to carriers that do allow non-presubscribed carriers to place charges on the bills, and to exclude collect and third party billed calls. Part 4 of this general order, Rules Governing Billing for Non-communications-Related Charges, gives subscribers additional tools for controlling what charges may be included in their bills.

Lastly, a surprising number of carriers objected to the staff's initial proposal to include Commission and FCC contact information on their bills. Section 2890(d)(2)(B) already requires telephone bills to include the Commission's telephone number. The obvious purpose of including the Commission's contact information is to safeguard consumers' Rights to *Public Participation and Enforcement* (consumers have a right to be informed of their rights and what agency enforces those rights) and *Accurate Bills and Redress* (consumers have a right to fair, prompt and courteous redress for problems they encounter). Without this information, many or most consumers won't realize

what their options are. Some of the carriers' reasons for wanting to withhold the information were strained, but we do sympathize with their concern lest the billing message undermine their opportunity to address customers' problems. The June 2002 draft decision revised Rule 6(k) to strengthen the message: contact the carrier *first* if there is a problem, and then contact the regulator if it hasn't been addressed fairly. Revised Rule 6(k) also requires notifying consumers that these rights and rules are available on the Commission's web site.

Rule 7: Late-Payment Penalties, Backbilling, and Prorating

Rule 7 establishes billing guidelines all carriers are to follow with respect to, *e.g.*, time allowed to make payment, maximum permissible late payment penalties, limitations on backbilling by carriers, and prorating charges for a partial month's service. Carriers are free to adopt more consumer-favorable practices where they wish. By establishing standards carriers must follow in their billings, Rule 7 helps safeguard consumers' *Right to Accurate Bills and Redress*. Carriers and consumer representatives alike generally accepted the need for these practices, although the carriers offered a number of modest revisions, some adopted below.

The June 2002 draft decision revised proposed Rule 7(a) to conform it to the results of an earlier Commission investigation into telephone company late payment charges and to current practice, and made several changes for clarification. Staff's proposed Rule 7(a) had allowed 16 days from the bill mailing date before a carrier might impose a late payment penalty not to exceed 1.5% per month on the undisputed, overdue amount. This was approximately the same as the 15 days currently in effect for CLCs and IECs. It was suggested in initial comments that the 16 days be revised to match the ILECs' current 22 day period; no party addressed that suggestion in the initial reply comments.

The Commission investigated telephone companies' late payment charges in I.85-01-024, finding that the large ILECs' bills were due and payable upon receipt and considered delinquent if not paid by 15 days after mailing, and that the 22 to 31 day periods then observed by the large ILECs before late payment charges were imposed were just and reasonable. The resulting decisions³⁴ established the 22-day minimum interval for all ILECs, and ordered customer bills under \$20 exempted from late payment charges. The June 2002 draft revised Rule 7(a) accordingly. Consumers subsequently endorsed, and the wireline carrier group accepted, the 22-day minimum³⁵; wireless carriers sought to reduce it to 15 days; and at least one consumer representative argued that late penalties should never be allowed because carriers can instead disconnect service for untimely payment. Carriers also pointed out that draft Rule 7(a) used wording inconsistent with the fact and draft decision statement that bills are due and payable when they are presented. Also, if a subscriber were slow in disputing charges, draft Rule 7(a) could be misinterpreted to place the carrier in violation for too quickly imposing an otherwise timely late penalty. Today's Rule 7(a) has been reworded to address those concerns.³⁶ Also in response to comments, the final version of Rule 7(a) no longer extends the \$20 minimum balance requirement to all carriers.³⁷

³⁴ D.85-12-017 (large LECs) and D.86-04-046 (independent LECs).

³⁵ Consumer groups, however, would also have the 22-day clock reset to zero on the date a carrier finds against a consumer in a bill dispute.

³⁶ Note that these rules do *not* authorize carriers to impose late payment penalties if they were not previously so authorized.

³⁷ The \$20 minimum continues to apply to those carriers to whom it applied previously.

Consumer representatives were concerned that under staff's original Rule 7(a), a carrier might unfairly apply late penalties where payments were received on time but held for posting until after the due date; and carriers thought it unrealistic to expect them to post payments in all cases on the same day they are received. The June 2002 draft decision resolved the problem with a minor wording change to require carriers to credit payments with an *effective date* of the business day they are received, regardless of when they were actually posted. Payments arriving on a weekend or holiday would be credited the following business day. The wireline group accepted the change with some minor rewording; the wireless group's comments subsequently ignored that "effective date" language to insist that for late payment penalty purposes they be allowed to consider the payment received the business day *after* it is actually received, or, if the subscriber has not included the appropriate remittance materials with the payment, the tenth business day after the carrier has the payment and all of the information necessary to properly credit it. The wireless carriers would have us tip the balance too far against consumers. Under their proposal, a carrier could assess late payment penalties against a subscriber despite having constructive receipt of payment in full within days of mailing out the bill.

Rule 7(b) also follows the staff proposal, with one significant modification. Section 737 imposes a three-year statute of limitations for utility claims against a customer, and we have cited that section in the past where customer fraud was involved. We agree with the carriers who argued these rules should not shorten

the limit on backbilling when that backbilling is necessitated by customer fraud. Here, we also continue our established practice³⁸ of limiting other carrier backbilling to periods much shorter than the three years in Section 737 as the staff has proposed.³⁹

Staff's proposed Rule 7(b) also stated a three-year limitation on customers seeking reparations for utility over-billing, and the June 2002 draft decision cited Section 736 in proposing that limitation as new Rule 7(c). Carrier representatives correctly pointed out in comments that the proposed rule could run afoul of Sections 735 through 737, which establish a considerably more complex set of limitations for customer complaints that differ from the draft decision's proposal. The Commission has jurisdiction directly to enforce Sections 735 through 737 in its proceedings, so we have dropped the June 2002 draft's Rule 7(c) as unnecessary and unhelpful for consumer protection.

Many carriers questioned whether staff's proposed Rule 7(c) (renumbered as Rule 7(d) in the June 2002 draft) should apply broadly across all carrier classes and services. While our intent is to protect consumers of all regulated telecommunications services, our priority is ensuring the highest degree of protection goes to services considered essential and for which consumers have

³⁸ See D.86-12-025 in R.85-09-008 setting telephone corporation backbilling limits which we today reaffirm with minor exceptions in the interest of making them more consistent across carrier classes.

³⁹ Both § 736 and § 737 may be read to apply only to tariffed rates, but since the Commission has jurisdiction to establish both broader requirements (*i.e.*, applicable to both tariffed and non-tariffed utility services) and tighter requirements (backbilling limits shorter than three years) that do not conflict with those sections, they need not be examined further here.

the fewest choices. Thus Rule 7(c) is modified here to apply to basic service. We anticipate providers will follow its spirit in applying its principle to other, more competitive offerings.

Rule 7(d) was new in the June 2002 draft decision (where it was numbered as Rule 7(e)). It is well established that a utility may not increase its rates retroactively; a customer must be able to know what the rate or charge will be at the time he or she chooses to use a utility service. Under Rule 7(d), neither may a utility benefit by delaying billing until after a rate increase has occurred, or use a delay or lag in billing to impose a higher rate or charge for a service than would have resulted without the delay or lag. The principle is one of “no surprises.” Carriers will be required to base their bills on the rates in effect at the time the service was used; and any delays or lags in billing must not result in a higher total charge than if the usage had been posted to the account in the same billing cycle in which the service was used. This seems so simple and straightforward that one might wonder why it should be necessary to state it in a rule. At our public participation hearings and in the very great volume of public correspondence we received, we were surprised to hear that some carriers have adopted a practice of shifting some of the calls made in one billing period to bills for a subsequent billing period. Thus, a subscriber who, for example, has chosen a plan that advertises an allowance of 400 minutes of free calling per month and \$0.35 per minute thereafter might be careful to stay within the 400-minute limit, only to find later that the carrier has unexpectedly shifted 150 minutes of actual usage from one month to the bill for one or more subsequent months. The

customer's bill then shows 250 minutes one month and 550 the next, resulting in 150 minutes of excess usage at \$0.35 per minute. A call that was to have been free at the time it was placed is instead billed at the overtime rate.⁴⁰ No subscriber should be subjected to such expensive unpredictability, nor have to accept it as a condition of receiving service. If carriers find it challenging to generate bills that meet the promises of the service plans they sell, they should either modernize their accounting and billing systems to eliminate what they say may be months-long delays in forwarding billing data, or revisit their marketing practices.

We have slightly modified Rule 7(d) to accommodate wireline carriers' observation that taxes typically must be based on current tax rates, not on tax rates in effect at the time the call was made. Thus, a charge in this month's bill for a service used in an earlier month may well carry with it a higher (or lower) associated tax amount than if it had been billed in that earlier period. We have not included a provision requested by the wireline carriers explicitly absolving billing carriers for violations that may have originated with other carriers or billing clearinghouses; instead, we would expect to examine the circumstances surrounding any such allegations at the time they come before us.

⁴⁰ Carriers point out the possibility that a subscriber may also benefit from a billing delay under certain circumstances. There is no benefit possible, however, for a customer who makes an effort to stay within his or her monthly calling allowance, as we suspect most do.

Rule 8: Tariff Changes, Contract Changes, Notices and Transfers

Rule 8 is intended to ensure that any changes to rates, terms or conditions of service are timely communicated to affected subscribers. Likewise, subscribers must be informed when carriers seek authority to transfer their subscribers to others, or to withdraw service. Where service is provided under tariff, notice of changes must be provided early enough for the subscriber's views to be made known to the Commission, and for the subscriber to choose whether to retain, change or cancel the revised service. Where service is provided under a term contract, the carrier may not make unilateral changes which bind the subscriber to higher rates or more restrictive terms or conditions without the subscriber's consent. Rule 8 helps safeguard consumers' *Right to Disclosure*, *Right to Choice*, and *Right to Public Participation and Enforcement*.

While consumer representatives supported the principles underlying Rule 8, carriers were typically opposed. The most commonly heard objection was that the rule was too restrictive in that it had the effect of denying carriers flexibility in determining how to deliver notices, applied the same notice standard for minor as major rate increases, and stifled carriers' ability to employ telephone and electronic commerce. Carriers overall maintained that Rule 8 was unnecessary.

Since the initial rulemaking order with staff's proposed rules in this proceeding, the Commission has issued two interim opinions, D.01-07-026 and D.02-01-038, in R.98-07-038, the rulemaking to revise G.O. 96-A, the general order governing informal filings at the Commission. Our task here has been simplified by the fact that D.02-01-038 (the provisions of which are intended to be included in G.O. 96-B when it is issued) conveys definitive guidelines for many or most of

the issues related to proposed Rule 8. Rule 8 was drafted to be entirely consistent with D.02-01-038.

Initial commenters found Rules 8(a) and 8(b) (formerly 8(c)) to be mildly confusing in that they could be interpreted as covering the same ground: requiring notice before higher rates or more restrictive conditions could be imposed where there are existing carrier/subscriber agreements; and barring enforcement of any changed rates, terms or conditions in carrier/subscriber contracts unless signed in writing by the subscriber.

As redrawn for the June 2002 draft decision and retained here, Rule 8(a) reflects the notice requirements set forth in D.02-01-038⁴¹ for carrier-proposed changes to their tariffed services that may result in higher rates or charges or more restrictive terms or conditions. In addition, we have now extended the rule to cover changes in carriers' non-tariffed, non-term contracts. Customers using non-tariffed, non-term services should have the same notice and opportunity to seek alternatives as customers using tariffed services. Rule 8(a) requires only *affected* subscribers be noticed. And, to address comments several carriers made, this rule applies only to changes in the *carrier's services*, so it does not include,

⁴¹ D.02-01-038 was adopted in anticipation of G.O. 96-B. Under G.O. 96-B as last proposed, changes implemented by Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 3 advice letters (Industry Rules 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 respectively) would require customer notice in compliance with Industry Rules 3 and 3.3: not less than 25 days' advance notice; a statement of the current and proposed rates, charges, terms or conditions; for general rate case LECs (GRC-LECs), a statement of the reasons for the proposed change and its impact expressed in dollar and percentage terms; and for Tier 3 filings, specific wording which includes procedures to protest.

e.g., changes in taxes, or changes in charges incurred by the subscriber on another carrier's system and simply passed through by the carrier.

Staff's proposed Rule 8(c) appeared as Rule 8(b) in the June 2002 draft and applied to contracts for non-tariffed services: "No material change in any of the rates, terms or conditions of service specified in a written contract shall be enforceable unless the change is also set forth in writing and signed by the subscriber." As simple, straightforward and fair as that requirement might seem, it was roundly denounced by a number of carriers. If it achieved nothing else, it drew the one riposte that so clearly illustrates why these consumer protection rules are needed that it begs to be quoted: "[Our] Terms and Conditions allow a change in rates and terms that may adversely affect customers upon prior written notice of one bill cycle. If the customer has had service less than 90 days the customer may cancel without an early termination fee. Carriers should retain the flexibility to handle these types of changes as they see fit based on competitive market pressures." In case it isn't clear on first reading, this carrier is saying it should be permitted to change a contract unilaterally to the detriment of a subscriber, and once the contract has been in force for 90 days the subscriber's only recourse is to cancel and pay the termination fee. In effect, "They're our sheep and we'll shear 'em any way we please."

Various carrier representatives introduced a host of additional reasons for gutting or eliminating proposed Rule 8(b), most of those based on either their misunderstanding or misconstrual of its requirement. Carriers, *e.g.*, argued that any such rule would prevent them from lowering a rate or relaxing a restrictive condition without first getting written approval from every affected customer. At the same time, this comment on Rule 8(b) from a carrier group offered support for a basic principle underlying it:

In making decisions about service initiation and/or modification, consumers are entitled to be informed about the material terms of the services provided. To the extent that the terms are provided in a non-written format – for example, in a telephone call with a service representative – carriers should provide a means for confirming those terms.

Following suggestions from consumers and carriers alike on earlier drafts, Rule 8(b) was narrowed in several ways. It now covers only *carrier-initiated, term* contract changes (customer-initiated service changes are the subject of Rule 3) and, in response to the carriers' objections, the "enforceability" concept was eliminated. The Assigned Commissioner's March 2004 revised draft restated the rule so as to parallel Rule 8(a) by requiring notice and allowing the subscriber to cancel the contract or service agreement without penalty when the carrier proposed to make any material change that may have resulted in higher rates or charges or more restrictive terms or conditions. Those changes satisfied neither the carriers nor consumer representatives.

Carriers, particularly the wireless carriers, maintain that if the Commission implements any provision to allow subscribers to cancel their contracts in response to carrier-initiated changes, it should strictly limit the window during which they may do so. The Attorney General and consumer groups, on the other hand, strenuously argue that it would be an extraordinary step for the Commission to provide carriers with a road map for breaching contracts of adhesion that they themselves have drawn up. Wireless subscribers bound to long-term contracts already face formidable disincentives to canceling term contracts early. According to the Attorney General and consumer representatives, those who do choose to cancel would likely: (1) find that the store that sold the plan and instrument claims to be independent and will require

its own cancellation fee in order to repay the “free” phone; (2) not be able to use a previously purchased phone with a new service and have to purchase a new phone and accessories; (3) expend time and money finding a new carrier, which likely would also require a long-term plan that is similarly subject to change at the carrier’s will; (4) find it difficult or impossible to find a comparable rate plan during the short period after the notice and before the old carrier’s changed provisions become binding; (5) have to learn to use and reprogram new equipment; and, (6) depending on the area, face a possible number change or a difficult period while the old number is transferred to the new provider.⁴²

We find the consumer representatives’ arguments persuasive. When consumers enter into a term contract, most believe it will be binding on both parties and do not understand or anticipate that carriers could increase their rates or impose more restrictive conditions and leave them with little option except a limited period to cancel. A carrier group comment on a different rule inadvertently supported a basic principle behind Rule 8(b): “[T]he very reason any party seeks to enter a contract [is] certainty in a future commercial relationship.”

Under our revised Rule 8(b), the carrier may only proceed with a change once it has obtained the subscriber’s affirmative, express, prior consent to do so. Absent such consent, the subscriber may choose to continue the service under the unchanged provisions for the life of the contract. The rule makes two specific exceptions to the types of changes requiring consent: (a) changes not affecting rates or charges and reasonably necessary to prevent unlawful, fraudulent or

⁴² Comments of the Attorney General on June 2004 revised draft, at p.16; comments of National Consumer Law Center, UCAN, TURN, and Consumers Union at pp. 11-12.

abusive conduct; or (b) changes in mandated government taxes or fees that are remitted to the government on a flow-through basis. Also, To make absolutely clear that the carriers' darkest interpretations do not apply, this comment has been added:

Rule 8(b) does not apply to subscriber-initiated changes. It does not apply to changes over which a carrier does not have discretion – See definition of Rates and/or Charges. It does not prohibit carriers from making unilateral changes to contracts where the changes result in lower rates or charges and/or less restrictive terms or conditions. It does not prohibit carriers from communicating notice of a change, or receiving subscriber acceptance of a change, through electronic media -- See Definitions for "Written; In Writing.

Consistent with our changes elsewhere, we have dropped the requirement for carriers to obtain a confirming signature from the subscriber. Rule 8(b) applies only to changes in rates, charges, terms or conditions of service specified in a term contract and over which the carrier has discretion, so it also would not typically encompass, *e.g.*, changes in roaming or other charges incurred by the subscriber on another carrier's system and simply passed through by the carrier without markup.

Rule 8(c) (formerly Rule 8(d) in staff's proposal) requires a carrier to notify each affected subscriber at least 30 days in advance whenever it requests approval for a transfer of subscribers. Edits have been made to the June 2002 draft version to accommodate non-controversial suggestions put forward by consumer and carrier representatives. A transfer of subscribers does not include a transfer at the corporate level that does not affect the underlying utility or subscribers. The notice must follow the requirements where applicable of General Order 96-Series and/or Section 2889.3; describe the proposed transfer in straightforward terms; explain that the transfer is subject to Commission

approval; identify the transferee; describe any changes in rates, charges, terms, or conditions of service; state that subscribers have the right to select another utility; and provide a toll-free customer service telephone number for responding to subscribers' questions. Rule 8(c) is now completely consistent with the corresponding rule for transfers in D.02-01-038. Subscriber notices of transfers requested by application are also governed by the Rules of Practice and Procedure and by the presiding officer's rulings during the course of the formal Commission proceeding.

The *Right to Choice* states that consumers have a right to select their services and vendors and to have those choices respected. Inherent in the right to choose with whom to do business are the rights to *know* with whom one is doing business and to choose with whom *not* to do business. Rule 8(c) is aimed at ensuring those as well. Drawing guidance from our recent slamming/cramming decision which took an in-depth look at how carriers should be identified, notices of transfers must show carriers' names as they appear on their certificates of public convenience and necessity. For carriers not certificated by the Commission, the notice must show the name under which the carrier is certificated by the FCC, if applicable, or the carrier's legal name as registered with the California Secretary of State. Carriers who market under other names are to inform subscribers of those business names (which must be registered pursuant to Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17900 *et seq.* and registered with the Commission's Telecommunications Division). Again, abbreviations may be used so long as there is sufficient information to make it abundantly clear to the subscriber who the carriers are.

Rule 8(d) is also consistent with the corresponding rule in D.02-01-038: A carrier shall notify each affected subscriber at least 25 days in advance of every

request to withdraw service. The notice must describe the proposed withdrawal and proposed effective date, state that subscribers have the right to choose another utility, and provide the carrier's toll-free customer service telephone number for responding to subscribers' questions. If the service to be withdrawn is basic service, the carrier must also: explain in the notice that the withdrawal is contingent on Commission approval; arrange with the default carrier(s) for continuity of service to affected subscribers who fail to choose another utility; describe in the notice those arrangements and the subscribers' right to receive basic service from the underlying carrier or carrier of last resort; and provide the default carrier's name and toll-free number.

Rule 8(e) is the refinement of staff's proposed Rule 8(b), again made consistent with D.02-01-038. Subscriber notices under these rules must be in writing, and must be distributed by one or a combination of bill inserts, notices printed on bills, or separate notices sent by first class mail. Electronic written notices may be substituted where the subscriber has agreed to receive notice in that manner. Notice by first-class mail is complete when the document is deposited in the mail, and electronic notice is complete upon successful transmission. We have not accepted carrier-suggested changes that would weaken this rule by, e.g., allowing oral notice and eliminating the need for customers to have agreed to electronic notice, because these specific notice requirements have already been considered and adopted in D.02-01-038. The Rule 8(e) requirement that was not previously considered in D.02-01-038 is consistent with our other rules: notices must be legible and use the equivalent of 10-point type or larger.

Rule 9 (and Former Rule 10): Service Termination

Rule 9 sets forth procedures all carriers must follow when preparing to terminate a subscriber's service for nonpayment of a delinquent bill. These requirements help safeguard consumers' *Right to Disclosure*, *Right to Public Participation and Enforcement*, and *Right to Accurate Bills and Redress*.

Rule 9 as proposed in the rulemaking order related to termination for all services, while Rule 10 added additional rules to be applied to local service termination. In their initial comments and replies, carriers interpreted various subdivisions of each rule, or an entire rule, as not applying to their carrier class, sometimes correctly and sometimes not. Some asked that final Rules 9 and 10 be more explicit in that regard, while one suggested they be combined. After considering their suggestions and other parties' comments and replies, it became apparent that combining both into one rule, with distinctions for different types of service where appropriate, would make the requirements easier to understand and follow. The June 2002 draft decision did so.

The largest local exchange carrier accepted most of Rules 9 and 10 as staff had proposed them, while the next largest offered more changes; for the most part the June 2002 draft decision agreed with their suggestions and included them in the accompanying draft rules. The other carriers' comments primarily repeated views and arguments noted earlier in these rules and in other proceedings with mixed success. Some asked that the requirements for disconnecting basic service for nonpayment of other services be conformed with whatever result was to be reached in R.97-08-001 and I.97-08-002, rules to deter slamming and cramming, while others reargued positions we have since rejected. We subsequently issued D.00-03-020 and D.00-11-015 in that proceeding, and the results are reflected in revised Rule 9(d). Carriers asked that

the final rules accommodate electronic notices where appropriate, and they now do so through the definition of “Written; In Writing.” They asked that we allow disconnection on shortened or no notice where the subscriber’s acts or omissions demonstrate an intention to defraud the carrier, or threaten the integrity or security of the carrier’s operations or facilities, and we have done so. They objected to any implication in proposed Rule 10(d) that carriers are required to offer delinquent customers an alternative payment plan in lieu of disconnect. Our revised Rule 9(f) makes clear that there is no such requirement. We have also incorporated numerous refinements in response to their suggestions.

Consumer representatives generally favored the principles behind Rules 9 and 10. Their most significant suggestions were aimed at clarifying and strengthening provisions for shielding basic service from disconnection for nonpayment of other services. As requested in the initial comments, we have added a requirement that payments be applied first to amounts due on a customer’s basic service unless the customer directs otherwise. We have also added language requiring disconnect notices to state the minimum amount that must be paid to retain basic service where applicable. We decline, however, to re-entertain arguments heard and rejected earlier as to which classes of carriers may leverage local service cutoffs to require payment of long distance and other non-basic service charges. That issue was decided in D.00-03-020 and D.00-11-015.

Proposed Rule 9(a) relating to deposit refunds covered the same topic as Rule 5(d) and has been deleted from this section.

New Rule 9(a) combines portions of former Rules 9(b), 9(d) and 10(a) to require notice not less than 7 calendar days prior to terminating service for nonpayment, and to list essential elements that must be in the notice. Consistent

with their positions on many other customer communications, carriers asked to be allowed to give termination notices other than in writing. Loss of service is too serious a matter to compromise this protection. Rule 9(a) still requires notice in writing, although that format is now defined to include electronic writing where appropriate. If carriers find it helpful, convenient or necessary, they are also free to augment, but not replace, their notices in writing with e-mailed, telephoned, personally delivered or any other form of disconnect notices.

One carrier group's comments on the June 2002 draft proposed changes which would allow carriers to eliminate the termination notice and instead rely on standard language routinely distributed to all customers in their bills. Our intent is that termination notices be last-chance warnings given to subscribers whose accounts have gone delinquent and are at imminent risk of losing their service, and not the routine notice of payment due date already required in Rule 6(h)(3).

In response to information provided by the workshop participants and later commenters, we have added two exceptions to the Rule 9(a) termination notice requirement: This rule does not apply to termination of non-tariffed service for having reached either: (1) a usage or spending limit, prepaid or otherwise, that was arranged with the subscriber in advance; or (2) the end of a prepaid period of service known to and anticipated by the subscriber in advance. Those two exceptions allow for carriers' spending cap arrangements with credit-challenged subscribers; and for non-subscription marketing plans which rely on selling telephones or telephone cards with prepaid usage, perhaps rechargeable.

Rules 9(a)(1) through (6) list what must be included in each notice. We have made a number of refinements in response to the comments. Carriers' FCC numbers or Commission U-numbers are no longer required, but carriers must

include names that conform to the guidelines we established in D.00-03-020 and D.00-11-015. The notice must now include the telephone number(s) associated with the delinquent account, the amount by which the account is delinquent, information sufficient for the customer to understand what service or services are to be terminated, and, if basic service is at risk, the minimum amount that must be paid to retain it. The carrier need no longer include notice of how to lodge an internal carrier complaint or request an internal carrier investigation concerning its service, rates or charges. Carriers are still required, however, to provide a toll-free telephone number to reach a carrier service representative who can provide assistance, and the telephone number of the Commission's Consumer Affairs Branch for information, appeals or complaints. As consumer representatives suggested in their comments on the June 2002 draft, carriers' toll-free lines to handle calls from subscribers being terminated must be adequately staffed.

Rule 9(b) ensures that basic exchange service is not disconnected on any day that carrier service representatives are not available to assist subscribers.

Rule 9(c) safeguards a carrier's right to disconnect a subscriber immediately for fraud. Several carriers pointed out the importance of prompt disconnection where a carrier's operations or facilities are at risk, and we have allowed for that as well now.

Rule 9(d) allows carriers of last resort to disconnect basic residential or single line business service only for nonpayment of those services. In the June 2002 draft decision, the rule had applied to basic service providers rather than carriers of last resort, a difference carriers subsequently commented on. Rule 9(d) is not intended to break new ground, but rather to reflect the guidelines we issued recently in D.00-03-020 and modified by D.00-11-015, so we have not

expanded this rule to incorporate entirely new requirements as carriers and consumers propose. Part 4 of this general order, Rules Governing Billing for Non-communications-Related Charges, also prohibits disconnecting basic service for nonpayment of non-communications-related charges.

Rule 9(e) was new in the June 2002 draft: If a subscriber makes a payment that is less than the total amount due, it must be applied first against the balance due on that subscriber's basic service unless the subscriber directs otherwise. This provision goes hand in hand with the prohibition against cutting off basic service for nonpayment of other services. If the subscriber makes a partial payment to preserve basic service, the earlier rule would be meaningless if the carrier were permitted to divert the funds to other purposes. Since bills are due and payable when they are presented, "balance due on that subscriber's basic service" in Rule 9(e) includes amounts for the most recent period shown on the bill, and not just amounts overdue. A carrier group suggested rewording the rule to first apply the amount paid against *past due* basic service charges and remove the subscriber's discretion as how to apply any remaining amount. We reject that change because it would allow the carrier to divert to other, non-basic charges amounts the subscriber had intended to be applied against the current month's basic service, and leave the subscriber vulnerable to disconnection.

Through mis-communication or otherwise, subscribers sometimes find their service cut off even after they have made arrangements with a carrier's service representative to pay their overdue balances over time. Although there are obvious benefits, carriers are under no obligation to make alternate payment arrangements and we are not prepared to mandate them here as some consumer groups request. Once they do, however, it is important that both parties have the same understanding and adhere to their agreement until the account is once

again current. Under Rule 9(f), if an alternative payment plan is arranged, the carrier must confirm its terms in writing, but only if the subscriber so requests. Written confirmation can be by e-mail or other electronic means if the subscriber agrees.

In D.91188, following California Supreme Court review, the Commission adopted a rule requiring every communications utility subject to its jurisdiction to refuse service to a new applicant and disconnect existing service to a customer when a magistrate has found probable cause to believe that the service was being or would be used in the commission or facilitation of illegal acts, and absent immediate action, significant dangers to public health, safety, or welfare would result. Rule 9(g) reflects the Commission's D.91188 rule, which is still in effect and binding on all carriers subject to its jurisdiction.

Rule 11: Billing Disputes

Rule 11 ensures subscribers have an opportunity to challenge questionable charges on their bills without fear of being disconnected for nonpayment. This helps secure their *Right to Accurate Bills and Redress*. As redrafted, it continues each of the essential elements of the staff's proposed Rule 11 and adds several provisions suggested in parties' comments.

When a customer questions charges on the bill, the carrier must investigate them to determine whether they were indeed authorized and correctly imposed, and must inform the subscriber of its determination within 30 days. Rule 11(a) in the June 6, 2002 draft followed staff's proposal, but added a 30-day time limit

similar to that required by Public Utilities Code Section 2890(e)⁴³ as suggested in a consumer group's comments, and edits to implement a carrier's suggestion to clarify that nonpayment alone is not sufficient to trigger the rule's dispute provision. Rule 11(a) now has added language protecting consumers from late penalties, adverse credit reports and/or referral to collection while the carrier's investigation is underway and a prohibition against imposing a late charge or penalty on the amount in dispute if the subscriber prevails. A carrier's initial comments suggested that the rule emphasize that carriers may employ agents to handle billing disputes, but that is not necessary because in every case these rules apply equally to carriers whether they act for themselves or through agents, and in some cases the agents who sold the service may not be the proper carrier representative to handle follow-up billing problems. In later comments, carriers requested that they be allowed 60 days to respond, or where the charges involved are older than 60 days, an open-ended "reasonable time," but they did not explain how that would meet the 30-day Section 2890(e) requirement for unauthorized charges. We have also not added a requirement sought by consumer representatives that responses must be provided in writing, or both in writing and verbally.

Staff's proposed Rule 11(b) allowed the utility to notify the customer when a bill is delinquent and warn that service may be terminated. Those provisions are now in Rules 7(a) and 9(a) and need not be repeated here.

⁴³ § 2890(f) was renumbered to § 2890(e) on July 1, 2001 and relates to unauthorized charges on telephone bills.

Once the carrier has completed its investigation and informed the subscriber of the results, the subscriber needs time either to send payment of the disputed amount to the carrier, or to send it as a deposit to the Commission's Consumer Affairs Branch along with a request the charge be investigated. Rule 11(b) ensures the subscriber has at least 7 days to do that before service may be terminated, but now makes exceptions for prearranged terminations of the type described under the Rule 9(a) discussion above, and for fraud (Rule 9(c)).

When the subscriber has submitted a claim to CAB for informal review, deposited the disputed amount with the Commission, and either paid the undisputed amount to the carrier or deposited it with the Commission, the carrier may not disconnect the subscriber's service pending CAB's determination. Although we prefer to have the undisputed amount paid directly to the carrier, some complainants forward the entire bill payment to the Commission and CAB's practice is to accept it rather than allow the subscriber to be disconnected. Since the carrier is assured at this point of receiving the undisputed amount if CAB finds in its favor, it would serve little purpose to allow the subscriber to be disconnected for an inconsequential technical violation of the procedure, and former Rule 11(d), now Rule 11(c), has been revised accordingly. We have also incorporated into Rule 11(c) the Rule 11(a) protections against late penalties, adverse credit reports and/or referral to collection while CAB's review is underway. Carriers would have us extend Rule 11(c) to require CAB to forward any undisputed amounts to them, but that is more an issue of CAB's internal practices that should be determined by the Commission through its management staff rather than set forth in a general order applicable to carriers.

Staff's Rule 11(e), now Rule 11(d), proposed that a subscriber who brings a complaint to the Commission not be held liable for a carrier's legal costs.

Carriers objected that they should be free to seek compensation for their costs in frivolous complaints. In their initial comments, consumer representatives sought to extend staff's rule to ensuring carriers may not abuse their leverage by contractually inhibiting consumers' ability to seek relief in California's courts or agencies; when residential and small business consumers seek do seek relief, it should be without the chilling effect that contractual, open-ended liability for carriers' costs would bring. Consumer representatives also provided a copy of a carrier standard contract that would require California consumers to agree to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts of another state as a condition of obtaining California-jurisdictional regulated utility services, and would limit their rights to legal recourse in other ways.

As the carriers' subsequent comments pointed out, the resulting version of Rule 11(d) proposed in the June 2002 draft decision was overly broad in that it inadvertently foreclosed contractual limitations of liability in a way that was inconsistent with the discussion of that topic elsewhere in the draft decision. Consumer groups recognized that as well, and proposed revised wording that much better captures our intent. As the wireline carrier group acknowledges, the carriers' and consumers' post-June 2002 proposals now have more similarities than differences. Rule 11(d) reflects wording proposed jointly by most of the consumer groups, but with revisions to recognize the carriers' view that some subscribers may have billing addresses that do not match their areas of primary service use. We reject the wireline carriers' continuing arguments that they should be allowed to impose on their California customers contracts governed by other than California law.

Former Rule 12

Former Rule 12 from the staff report and Assigned Commissioner's drafts has been revised to become Part 3, Rules Governing Privacy, of the new general order. Former Parts 3 and 4 have been renumbered as Parts 4 and 5.

Rule 13: Consumer Affairs Branch Requests for Information

Rule 13 is intended to enable Consumer Affairs Branch to obtain information it needs to process informal consumer complaints and inquiries. This goes primarily to assuring consumers' *Right to Accurate Bills and Redress*, but may also help protect the other rights when consumers bring their questions or allegations to CAB. A very similar requirement is in effect today for non-tariffed interexchange carriers.⁴⁴

The staff's initial proposal was a single rule requiring carriers to provide documents or information within 10 days of a request by the Commission or its staff. Most carriers objected to a firm 10-day requirement, arguing instead for a more flexible response period to accommodate those occasions when requested materials may be voluminous, in deep storage, or at a distant carrier location. This may indeed be a legitimate concern and the June 2002 draft revised the wording to recognize CAB's ability to make exceptions where warranted. To recognize CAB's current practice, we have also adjusted the response period to twenty business days for this and other CAB interactions.

In the initial comments, one carrier apparently interpreted Rule 13 as requiring it to expand its use or retention of paper records. No such inference is

⁴⁴ D.98-08-031, Appendix A, Rule 6.

to be drawn from either the proposed rule or the redrafted rule. At least three industry commenters claimed to be prevented by state and federal law from releasing some types of information to the Commission absent a subpoena or customer consent. As our advocacy division pointed out in its initial reply comments, Rule 13 is well within the authority already available to Commission staff. Among the Public Utilities Code sections the carriers cited, Sections 313, 314(a), 2891, 2891.1 and 2894, none bars carriers from providing information to CAB staff acting within the scope of their duties to examine the legitimacy of a consumer complaint.

New Rule 13(a) requires every carrier to designate one or more representatives CAB can contact in handling customer inquiries and complaints. This proposal in the June 2002 draft drew little response.

Rule 13(b) is essentially the staff's proposed Rule 13, but narrowed to encompass CAB requests only. The Commission and its staff have long since established their legal authority, methods and channels for obtaining records and information from the carriers and have no need of another rule for that purpose. To make that point, Rule 13(b) now refers only to CAB requests, and new Rule 13(c) emphasizes that these rules are not the Commission or its staff's exclusive authority for obtaining information or compliance. Carriers should understand that Rule 13(b) is intended to facilitate CAB's efforts on behalf of consumers, not to serve as grounds to resist Commission and staff data requests; carrier-proposed rewording to the contrary in comments on the June 2002 draft has been rejected.

Rule 14: Employee Identification

Rule 14 drew perhaps the least controversy of any in parties' comments. No party objected to it in the initial comments. Several suggested the first

sentence regarding identification cards be harmonized with Section 708 which sets forth essentially the same requirement. As several commenters pointed out, this rule is important to safeguarding the public's *Right to Safety*.

The wording in Rule 14(a) now adheres much more closely to Section 708 than staff initially proposed. Two refinements were added in the June 2002 draft decision. First, "employee" was added to the Definitions section to include employees, contract employees, contractor employees, agents, and carrier representatives of any and all types. Wireless carriers were the only ones to object to this, describing the definition's breadth as confusing, unnecessary and inconsistent with the law. We have retained the broad definition in the belief that members of the public should feel confident of the identification of *every* person who attempts to enter their premises to conduct the carrier's business. Second, to "customers and subscribers" has been added "applicants for service," recognizing that the latter also may receive visits from carrier employees in the course of installing service.

The second sentence of staff's proposed Rule 14, a requirement that employees identify themselves in their telephone conversations with customers, became Rule 14(b) in the June 2002 draft. Carriers objected to any implication in the last part of the draft rule that they would be required to route repeat callers to a specific service representative. Notwithstanding the specific wording used, that was not the intent and we agree with the carriers that the rule is equally effective in identifying employees without it.

Finally, carrier comments and reply comments on the June 2002 draft decision suggested adding a third subsection to Rule 14 to reflect the Section 2889.9 prohibition against misrepresenting oneself as associated or affiliated with a carrier when soliciting a telephone subscriber's business. New Rule 14(c)

adopts that Section 2889.9 wording, modified slightly to recognize that the Commission's enforcement extends to carriers as opposed to non-carrier "persons or corporations."

Rule 15: Emergency 911 Service

In suggesting the Commission add a *Right to Safety* to its Bill of Rights, several commenters gave the requirement for access to 911 service as a prime example. Rule 15 is modeled after Section 2883, which requires carriers provide residential telephone connections with access to 911 services, even if they have been disconnected for nonpayment. Section 2883 explicitly does not include wireless carriers. Section 2892, on the other hand, requires something very similar of wireless carriers. As drafted by staff, proposed Rule 15 covered both wireline and wireless and did not limit its applicability to residential telephones. About one-half of the initial industry commenters sought to have the rule more closely conformed to Section 2883. The June 2002 draft decision did that by restating it in words more similar to those of Section 2883, at the same time integrating into it requirements from Section 2892. As explained in this order and in the new general order, our intent is that these rules apply where feasible to both residential and small business services. Although this is academic for wireless carriers because, as they have been quick to point out, they do not typically distinguish between residential and business service, it is not academic for wireline. We have acceded to the wireline carriers' request that we not go beyond the residential connection requirement that Section 2883 places on them, and have revised Rule 15 accordingly. One other minor change was made to

eliminate another possible source of ambiguity: Whether it is true or not that, as one commenter stated, wireless carriers don't provide "access services," we intend wireless carriers to be covered.⁴⁵ That term has been changed here to make it clear that the rule applies to carriers who provide end-user access to the public switched telephone network.

Consumer representatives generally agreed with Rule 15 as proposed. One suggested that we tighten the rule by eliminating the qualifier, "to the extent permitted by facilities." No carrier, the reasoning went, should have been certificated in the first place if it couldn't provide ubiquitous 911 access. However, the rule as drafted conforms to Section 2883 in that respect and represents a very practical standard. We have retained the qualifier.

In the initial comments, a carrier asked that we clarify whether we intend Rule 15 to be consistent with the existing rules for reseller CLCs. We do. In D.95-07-054, Appendix B, our Consumer Protection and Consumer Information Rules for CLCs, Rule 10.C. required continued 911 access to residential services even after disconnection for nonpayment. In D.95-12-056, we further interpreted Section 2883's applicability to CLCs by requiring them to provide 911 service (which we referred to there as "warm line" service) to residential customers disconnected for nonpayment for as long as the CLC maintains an arrangement for resale service to the end user's premises. When the resale arrangement is

⁴⁵ As noted earlier, at least one CMRS carrier has sought carrier of last resort status from the Commission, characterizing its wireless service as "indistinguishable from the basic, required services provided by [California's two largest ILECs]."

terminated, the obligation to provide 911 access reverts to the underlying facilities-based carrier. We decline to revisit that earlier-decided issue here.

Part 3: Rules Governing Privacy

Purpose and Scope

While most of the consumer protection rules in this general order protect small businesses as well as individual consumers, the rules in Part 3 are designed specifically to protect the privacy interests of residential telephone subscribers. We recognize that small businesses have some of the same rights and interests as individuals, for example, the right to have call information kept confidential and the right not to be disturbed by unwanted solicitations. Some privacy interests are, however, obviously unique to individuals, and the right to privacy in one's home benefits from a heightened level of protection under the law. For example, Public Utilities Code § 2891 requires carriers to obtain a residential subscriber's written consent before disclosing the subscriber's confidential information "to any other person or corporation."⁴⁶ There is no comparable requirement for business customers. The privacy rules in Part 3 reflect this distinction. They implement § 2891 and other state law privacy protections for residential consumers. Should we determine that there is a need for regulations protecting the privacy of small business telephone customers as well, we will address that need at a later time.

Because wireless telephones used by individual subscribers are typically brought into their homes (and into other private residences), sometimes to the

⁴⁶ § 2891(a).

exclusion of landline telephone, the privacy interests of wireless customers are substantially the same as those of residential customers. Accordingly, they are afforded the same protections.

The portability of cell phones, which are usually carried on or about one's person, coupled with the public's reliance that directories of cell phone telephone numbers are not generally available, makes them considered an intimate, personal, private instrument. We deem cellular telephone subscribers who are individuals (as opposed to corporate, partnership, limited liability companies, or comparable business entities) "residential" within the meaning of Public Utilities Code § 2891. We interpret section 2891 to use the phrase "residential subscriber" to distinguish individuals who use their telephones for personal use—and thus ought to be afforded protection for, *e.g.*, "personal calling patterns" and "personal financial information"—from those who use their telephones to conduct business. Wireless subscribers are best classified as residential subscribers because of the personal nature of wireless telephony.⁴⁷ To find otherwise would be to confer a higher level of privacy protection for a static instrument that does not command the immediacy of a cell phone, an instrument the attractiveness of which seems to derive in no small part from its small, portable, and intimate nature.

⁴⁷ AT&T Wireless asserts that the legislature intended to limit the protections of Section 2891 to landline subscribers because a rudimentary form of wireless service was available in 1986 and the bill does not mention wireless service. This level of conjecture and extrapolation is not helpful in construing the statute. The opposite of a residential customer is a business customer, not a wireless customer. Wireless customers need to be assigned to one of these two categories.

Clearly, to many modern subscribers, a cell phone is a personal accoutrement more akin to communication prosthesis than a mere gadget. We cannot believe that the legislature would have us interpret § 2891, which was enacted before the widespread profusion of cell phones, to afford greater privacy protection to land line phones than cell phones.

Privacy Protection Under California Law

The notion of “privacy” as it is used in the United States actually encompasses at least two distinct interests: an interest in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information about oneself (sometimes called “informational privacy”) and an interest in making intimate personal decisions or conducting personal activities without observation, intrusion, or interference (“autonomy privacy”).⁴⁸ Each of these interests comes into play for users of telecommunications facilities, and each is protected by California law. The interest in keeping telephone communications confidential, and the interest in keeping confidential information about whom we called, when, how often, and for how long, involves both informational privacy and autonomy privacy interests.

The right to control access to information about oneself is protected by Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution, which provides:

All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life, liberty,

⁴⁸ *Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren*, 16 Cal. 4th 307, 328 (1997).

acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.⁴⁹

In 1972, California voters added privacy to the list of inalienable rights in Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution. In a 1975 opinion interpreting the new provision, the California Supreme Court observed that the “moving force behind the ... constitutional provision was ... the accelerating encroachment on personal freedom and security caused by increasing surveillance and data collection activity in contemporary society. The new provision’s primary purpose is to afford individuals more measure of protection against this most modern threat to personal privacy.”⁵⁰ That conclusion was based in part on what the proponents of the amendment had stated in the state election brochure:

The proliferation of government snooping and data collection is threatening to destroy our traditional freedoms. Government agencies seem to be competing to compile the most extensive set of dossiers of American citizens. Computerization of records makes it possible to create ‘cradle-to-grave’ profiles of every American. At present there are no effective restraints on the information activities of government and business. This amendment creates a legal and enforceable right of privacy for every Californian.

The right of privacy is the right to be left alone. It is a fundamental and compelling interest. It protects our homes, our families, our thoughts, our emotions, our expressions, our personalities, our freedom of communion and our freedom to associate with the people we choose. It prevents government and business interests from collecting and stockpiling unnecessary information about us

⁴⁹ California Constitution, Article I, § 1.

⁵⁰ *White v. Davis*, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 767 (1975).

and from misusing the information gathered for one purpose in order to serve purposes or to embarrass us. Fundamental to our privacy is the ability to control circulation of personal information. This is essential to social relationships and personal freedom. The proliferation of government and business records over which we have no control limits our ability to control our personal lives. Often we do not know that these records even exist. We are certainly unable to determine who has access to them.⁵¹

The right to privacy protected by the California Constitution applies to collection and dissemination of information by businesses as well as by the government.⁵²

An enormous body of state statutory and decisional law further reflects the importance accorded privacy rights in California. The fact that the Legislature expressly provided that a violation of Public Utilities Code § 2891 “is a grounds for a civil suit by the aggrieved residential subscriber against the telephone...

⁵¹ *Id.* at 233 (quoting November 1972 state election brochure).

⁵² *Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren*, 16 Cal. 4th 307, 328 (1997); *Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn.*, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 20 (1994). Claims that *White v. Davis*, *supra*, is inapposite do not take this fact into account. (Cf., Comments of Cellular Carriers on March 2, 2004 RDD, at p. 14.) Similarly arguments that this constitutional protection does not apply to information gathered by telephone carriers, such as a customer’s calling patterns, because collection of such information does not “implicate a interest in . . . conducting personal activities without observation” is unpersuasive. (*Id.*, at p. 13, quoting *Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren*, *supra*.)

corporation and its employees responsible for the violation”⁵³ underscores the importance accorded privacy interests under California law.⁵⁴

Telephone consumers’ interest in keeping communication over the telephone network confidential is protected by, *inter alia*, Public Utilities Code §§ 2885, 7903, 7905, and 7906.⁵⁵ The interest in controlling the disclosure of information about the subscriber to third parties is protected by Public Utilities Code §§ 761.5, 2891-2894.10. The right not to be disturbed by unwanted telephone solicitations is protected by Public Utilities Code §§ 2871-2876 (regulating automatic dialing-announcing devices) and § 2894.10, and by the

⁵³ §2891(e).

⁵⁴ Several of the Comments, e.g. Comments of Virgin Mobile on March 2, 2004 revised draft decision, point out that carriers use CPNI in marketing efforts on an opt-out basis. These comments establish that the potential for harm to California citizens is real. The fact that some carriers afford safeguards to customer privacy to distinguish themselves from their competitors shows that privacy protections are necessary. Further, carriers’ strong desire to use private information— such as calling patterns—for marketing purposes despite the fact that this practice is actually prohibited under California law demonstrates that the privacy protections of Part 3 are warranted. We disagree with the Cellular Carriers Association that practices forbidden by law do not “constitute . . . an egregious invasion of customer privacy.” (Comments of Cellular Carriers of March 2, 2004 revised draft decision, at p. 14.) We also disagree with the contention that customers have a reasonable expectation that information gathered for the purpose of rendering a bill would subsequently be retained by the carrier and used for other purposes— even though that subsequent use is prohibited by law. The fact that federal rules permit this practice does not alter this conclusion. California citizens can reasonably expect that companies doing business in California will follow California law.

⁵⁵ *See also* Penal Code §§ 631, 632, 637, 637.1, 641.

recently enacted California law prohibiting unsolicited and unwanted telephone solicitations, Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17591-17595, the Do Not Call law.⁵⁶

The privacy rules in G.O. ___, Part 3, protect the privacy interests, both informational and autonomy, of individual California telephone subscribers, particularly residential subscribers, primarily by gathering together, explaining, and implementing the applicable provisions of the Public Utilities Code. The rules also alert carriers and consumers to some of the other laws and regulations that protect customers' privacy interests, such as the regulations establishing the federal Do Not Call list, and directs carriers to comply with all applicable privacy laws.

For example, explanatory comments to the rules alert carriers and consumers to the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (47 U.S.C. § 227), the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108), and the federal Do Not Call list.⁵⁷ The comments

⁵⁶ Legislative mandates to protect privacy interests of utility customers are found throughout the Public Utilities Code. In addition to §§ 2891-2894.10, which specifically address various aspects of privacy protection for telephone users, see, *e.g.*, § 393(f)(7) (protects confidentiality of Electric Service Providers' customer information); § 497.5(c)(5) (requiring adequate privacy protection rules as a condition of granting telephone corporations an exemption from the tariff requirement); § 761.5 (protecting confidentiality of customer information obtained from centralized credit check system); § 7906 (need for telephone corporations to ensure privacy of communications over their networks). *See also* Code of Civil Procedure § 1985.3(f) (requiring subpoena to obtain personal records maintained by telephone corporations).

⁵⁷ Regulations issued by the Federal Trade Commission (16 C.F.R. Part 310) and the FCC (47 C.F.R § 64.1200) established the Do Not Call list. As of February 2004, consumers nationwide had placed approximately 55 million telephone numbers on the list. On

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note that California law (Business & Professions Code §§ 17590-17595) also prohibits telephone solicitation calls to California telephone numbers on the federal Do Not Call list.

In their comments on earlier versions of these rules, certain carriers have argued that we lack authority to adopt privacy rules, based on (1) federal preemption and (2) the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding protection of commercial speech under the First Amendment. We now turn to those issues.

Federal Preemption

Section 222 of the Telecommunications Act ("Privacy of Customer Information") protects confidential subscriber information. That statute requires carriers to obtain a subscriber's "approval" before disclosing the subscriber's customer proprietary network information (CPNI) to third parties, subject to certain exceptions. CPNI includes information carriers may derive from providing telephone services to a subscriber, for example, records of calls made and received and information about calling patterns. The statute does not specify in what form approval may be obtained; that issue was left to the FCC to determine. The FCC interpreted "approval" to mean informed consent, and after a lengthy rulemaking proceeding, issued regulations requiring that consent be obtained by an opt-in method.⁵⁸

February 17, 2004, the Tenth Circuit rejected a First Amendment challenge to the Do Not Call list brought by telemarketing companies. *Mainstream Mktg. Servs. v. FTC*, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 2564 (U.S. App., 2004).

⁵⁸ See former 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.001-64.2007.

The FCC's regulations, as amended in 1999, required a carrier to obtain a subscriber's affirmative consent before using or disclosing CPNI for any purpose other than initiating, providing, billing, and collecting for the type of service (local exchange, long-distance, or wireless) that a carrier provided to that customer. Carriers were allowed to infer permission to use CPNI to provide the services requested and to market related services, such as custom calling features, but had to obtain a customer's express approval to market a different type of service (*e.g.*, a carrier that provided only local exchange service to a subscriber would have to obtain the subscriber's express approval to market long distance or wireless service to that customer). This "total service approach" was intended to allow carriers to use CPNI to serve their customers with relative ease and to market related services to existing customers, but not to leverage their existing customer base to gain a competitive advantage in new markets.

U.S. West challenged these regulations, arguing that they violated the company's commercial speech rights protected by the First Amendment. In a split decision that has been widely criticized by legal scholars, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit struck down the opt-in requirement of the CPNI regulations on First Amendment grounds. The Tenth Circuit decision did not prohibit the use of an opt-in approach but rather found that, based on the record before it, the FCC had failed to satisfy its burden of showing that the customer approval regulations restrict no more speech than necessary to serve the asserted state interests.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ *U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC* (10th Cir. 1999), 182 F.3d 1224, at 1239. Several commenters take issue with our view that this decision has been criticized by legal scholars. Despite the

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Upon remand, the FCC modified the opt-in provisions in the CPNI regulations.⁶⁰ The revised rules allow carriers to obtain a customer's knowing consent to the use of CPNI in order to market communications-related services by means of either opt-in or opt-out approval procedures. Carriers wishing to disclose CPNI to unrelated third parties or to carrier affiliates that do not provide communications-related services must obtain express customer consent by means of an opt-in method.⁶¹ In its order, the FCC expressly acknowledged that states may, consistent with the First Amendment, develop opt-in requirements based on the state record. The FCC declined to impose a blanket preemption policy barring the states from adopting opt-in requirements. Furthermore, the FCC stated that when states adopt CPNI rules that are more restrictive than

claim by lawyers at the Goodin, McBride firm that "recourse to *Shepards*" reveals no such authority, the Shepards service available at LEXIS reveals law journal commentary calling the 10th Circuit's view "constrained" because of a "fixated conception of privacy" and asserting this decision amounted to an "unfortunate result" and a "problematic conclusion." (Cf., Comments of Cellular Carriers on March 2, 2004 Revised Draft Decision, at p. 16, fn. 49; Comment, *Conceptualizing Privacy*, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1097, 1149 (2002); Comment, *Charting a Privacy research Agenda* (2000), 32 Conn. L. Rev 929, 936.)

⁶⁰ Further Order, Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Telecommunications Carrier's Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and Other Customer Information; and Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (July 16, 2002), Third Report and Order And Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("CPNI Order 2").

⁶¹ CPNI Order 2, pp. 15 - 31, 31-50.

those adopted by the FCC, it will decline “to apply any presumption that such requirements would be vulnerable to preemption.”⁶² The FCC explained:

Our state counterparts do bring particular expertise to the table regarding competitive conditions and consumer protection issues in their jurisdictions, and privacy regulation as part of general consumer protection is not a uniquely federal matter. We decline, therefore, to apply any presumption that we will necessarily preempt more restrictive requirements.⁶³

Instead, the FCC decided that it would exercise preemptive authority on a case-by-case basis. The FCC stated that it may preempt state regulation of intrastate telecommunications matters "where such regulation would negate the commission's exercise of its lawful authority because regulation of the interstate aspects of the matter cannot be severed from regulation of the intrastate aspects."⁶⁴

In light of the FCC’s decision not to apply a blanket preemption policy barring states from adopting privacy regulations that are more protective of

⁶² CPNI Order 2, pp. 31, 70.

⁶³ Id., p. 32, 71.

⁶⁴ CPNI Order 2, pp. 31-34, 69-74. The FCC’s interpretation of Section 222 does not give the statute the automatic preemptive effect described in certain comments. (Cf., Comments of Verizon on March 2, 2004 Revised Draft Decision, at p. 12.) Claims that future actions by other state commissions could lead to an uneven application of the law requiring the FCC to adopt a national standard do not show that this effort is preempted. (Cf., Comments of Virgin Mobile of March 2, 2004 Revised Draft Decision, at p. 12.) Finally the claim that California is precluded from adopting additional requirements because that flexibility is only available to small states finds no basis in the FCC’s order. (Cf., Comments of Cellular Carriers on March 2, 2004 Revised Draft Decision at pp. 15-16.)

consumers than the CPNI regulations, and not to adopt a presumption that such regulations are preempted, there is no reason to assume that our state rules implementing state law will be preempted. Moreover, contrary to the positions of some parties, federal precedent requiring the balancing of various interests when adopting restrictions on commercial speech do not mean that federal law “require[s] . . . an opt out regime combined with the total service approach.” ⁶⁵

First Amendment

Some carriers, citing U.S. West, have argued in comments that a rule requiring carriers to obtain prior consent from a subscriber by means of an opt-in method before disclosing the subscriber’s confidential information to third parties violates the First Amendment. We have considered these arguments and have reached two conclusions. First, we do not agree that our rule violates the First Amendment. Second, state law already requires carriers to obtain written, opt-in consent from residential subscribers, and we are bound to uphold that law.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Comments of Verizon California on March 2, 2004 revised draft decision at p. 12; Comments of Verizon California on draft decision at p. 7.

⁶⁶ California Constitution, Article III, §3.5 provides:

§ 3.5. Limitation on powers of administrative agencies.

An administrative agency, including an administrative agency created by the Constitution or an initiative statute, has no power:

(a) To declare a statute unenforceable, or refuse to enforce a statute, on the basis of it being unconstitutional unless an appellate court has made a determination that such statute is unconstitutional;

(b) To declare a statute unconstitutional;

(c) To declare a statute unenforceable, or to refuse to enforce a statute on the basis

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Public Utilities Code § 2891 requires carriers to obtain a residential telephone subscriber's written consent before disclosing confidential subscriber information "to any other person or corporation." Thus, in enacting this legislation, the California Legislature adopted a written opt-in approval requirement for residential telephone subscribers. The claim that this phrase allows carriers to share information with corporate affiliates, joint venture partners or agents runs counter to the plain language of the statute.⁶⁷

Section 2891 was enacted in 1986 in response to a wave of complaints from Pacific Bell customers about disclosure of their subscriber information to third parties for marketing purposes. While debating the bill that became § 2891, the Legislature considered both opt-in and opt-out alternatives. Specifically, it considered Pacific Bell's contention that an opt out alternative could raise \$7 million that could be used to subsidize local telephone rates. Apparently, the Legislature accepted the bill proponents' view that "the amount was insignificant compared to the intrusion on customers' privacy."⁶⁸ Legislators noted that the opt-in approach was necessary because "two of the problems telephone customers complained about when Pacific initiated the sales

that federal law or federal regulations prohibit the enforcement of such statute unless an appellate court has made a determination that the enforcement of such statute is prohibited by federal law or federal regulations.

⁶⁷ Cf., Comments of Verizon on March 2, 2004 revised draft decision, at p. 9.

⁶⁸ *E.g.*, Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities, June 24, 1986 Committee Hearing Analysis of AB 3382 (1985-1986 Regular Session), as amended June 18, 1986, at p.2.

program was [sic] that they were not adequately informed before the program began, and that they had to return a confusing form if they did not want to participate.”⁶⁹ Clearly, the Legislature considered the opt-out approach and rejected it.⁷⁰

Commercial Speech Protection under Central Hudson

We do not agree with those carriers who have argued that our privacy rules violate their First Amendment rights to engage in commercial speech.

In *Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Services Commission* (1980), 477 U.S. 557, the United States Supreme Court set forth a four-part test for determining when government regulation of commercial speech is permissible.⁷¹ The reviewing court must determine:

1. Whether commercial speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading (unlawful or misleading speech is not protected by the First Amendment);
2. Whether there is a substantial state interest;
3. Whether the regulation directly advances that interest; and

⁶⁹ *E.g.*, Senate Rules Committee, Office of Floor Analyses, 3d Reading Analysis of AB 3382 (1985-1986 Regular Session), as amended July 1, 1986, at p.2.

⁷⁰ The California Legislature has acted to protect the privacy of telephone subscribers in other statutes, including § 2891.1, which protects the information of subscribers with unlisted numbers. Privacy in telecommunications is also protected by California Business and Professions Code § 16606, which protects customer lists of answering services as trade secrets, and by other statutes, some of which are cited above.

⁷¹ The test is only applicable if it is in fact speech that is being regulated. It is by no means certain that disclosure of confidential customer information for marketing purposes constitutes speech.

4. Whether the regulation is no more extensive than necessary to serve the governmental interest (subsequent cases have elaborated on this requirement, sometimes described as a “reasonable fit” between the state interest and the regulation).

The Part 3 privacy rules do not violate carriers’ First Amendment rights under the Central Hudson test for the following reasons. First, the requirement that commercial solicitations be truthful and not misleading is not subject to First Amendment protection. Second, the state’s interest in protecting telephone consumers’ privacy rights is substantial. The importance of the privacy interests is reflected in Article I, § 1 of the California Constitution and in the privacy statutes discussed above, particularly Public Utilities Code §§ 2891-2894.10. This Commission has a longstanding precedent “acknowledg[ing] that our fellow citizens place a high value in the protection of their interest in individual privacy.” (*In Re Pacific Bell* (1992), 44 Cal. P.U.C. 2d 694, 708 (D.92-06-065)). This acknowledgement reflects the high numbers of California citizens who pay a premium for unlisted numbers. Similarly, the pronounced public interest in the federal Do Not Call registry affords evidence of both the intensity and substantiality of the public’s concern.⁷² The rules directly advance this state interest in protecting privacy interests by requiring carriers to obtain express, written consent from their residential subscribers before disclosing their subscribers’ confidential information for marketing purposes. Protection of this

⁷² See, e.g., Civ. Code § 1689.7(a)(1) [required written notice of right to cancel home solicitation agreement and how to exercise right]; § 1689(c) [seller must provide two copies of prescribed form that may be used to cancel]; § 1689(f) [seller must orally disclose right to cancel].

information is necessary, among other reasons, because customers of telephone companies essentially have no choice but to provide confidential information to those companies in order to receive service, the indispensability of which is rarely questioned.

Finally, the opt-in method (rather than an opt-out method, preferred by carriers such as U.S. West) is necessary for effective protection of residential subscribers. We have carefully considered the difference between opt-in and opt-out in crafting these rules. We also have available for our consideration the Legislature's experience in enacting Public Utilities Code section 2891. The record on this issue reflects that consumer advocates have long argued that the opt-out approach can be confusing or inadequate when the means to opt out are difficult to locate, understand or implement. The opt-out notice may be buried in the fine print or included in mailings or as bill inserts that are all too easily overlooked.⁷³ The means of exercising an opt-out choice may also be made difficult or burdensome. Comments in the record point out that the elderly, who may be more vulnerable to marketing in general, are unlikely to respond to the opt-out approach.

In California both the opt-in and opt-out approach have been considered and adopted by the legislature in enacting various privacy laws. The Legislature, after considering other alternatives, enacted a requirement for prior written

⁷³ After the initial financial privacy notices required by federal law (15 U.S.C. § 6802) were sent out, an American Bankers Association survey found that 41% of those surveyed did not recall receiving the notice, 22% had received but not read it, and 36% had read it. June 15, 2001 American Bankers Association press release.

consent for the disclosure of CSI. In making this decision, we have had the benefit of being able to consider the differences between opt-in and opt-out in light of the fact that the two methods have been extensively considered and compared in the past. We believe that given the importance of the interest in privacy, and the fact that the Legislature has determined to protect that interest by adopting an opt-in mechanism, an opt-in approach is, as the California Attorney General points out, “no more extensive than necessary to serve the fundamental constitutional interest of privacy.”⁷⁴

The approach set forth in Part 3 permits the use and disclosure of CSI but still gives the subscriber an effective choice. By providing subscribers with this measure of control over the use and disclosure of their personal information, statutory law in California and these rules protect the First Amendment rights of consumers by allowing them to call whomever they wish whenever they wish without fear that their calling records will be used for unrelated purposes or shared with others.

Throughout this proceeding, the Commission has reviewed and considered hundreds of sets of comments, held days of workshops, and met directly with carriers, members of the California District Attorneys’ Association, the Attorney General’s Office, the Office of Ratepayer Advocates, and consumer groups concerning the privacy rules. These extensive comments, workshops and discussions have enabled the Commission to carefully consider all alternatives

⁷⁴ Comments of the California Attorney General and the Office of Ratepayer Advocates on March 2, 2004 revised draft decision, at p. 23.

offered by the parties and the public for protecting subscriber privacy as well as arguments both in favor of and in opposition to the proposed privacy rules. Indeed, the changes that the Commission has made to the privacy rules throughout the course of this proceeding confirm that the Commission has carefully considered the issues and alternatives raised by consumer groups, law enforcement, consumers and carriers.

Conclusion

We have endeavored to fashion rules that will protect consumers' privacy interests effectively within the framework of the state Constitution and state laws. In response to comments, the June 2002 draft decision made many clarifying changes to the first draft of the rules. The version we adopt today likewise responds to additional comments and suggestions submitted by the parties. Definitions were revised and added. In addition, the rules have been reorganized so that they are more similar in structure and organization to the FCC's CPNI rules.

Compliance Timeframe

We expect that it will be necessary for carriers to evaluate their current information handling practices, and some will need to adjust them and train staff in order to comply with the new privacy rules. We have allowed carriers 120 days to come into full compliance with new G.O. ____, including Part 3. This adjustment period does not excuse any carrier from compliance with any currently applicable requirements, including provisions of the Public Utilities Code, tariff rules, and prior Commission decisions and orders.

Part 4: Rules Governing Billing for Non-Communications-Related Charges

Cramming, the submission or inclusion of unauthorized, misleading, or deceptive charges for products or services on subscribers' telephone bills, has

become a serious problem in California in recent years. In an effort to address the problem, the Legislature enacted Sections 2889.9 and 2890, which contain provisions designed to deter cramming, and authorized the Commission to adopt rules needed to accomplish the consumer protection purpose of those statutes.

On July 12, 2001 we issued D.01-07-030 adopting a set of interim rules governing the inclusion of non-communications-related charges on telephone bills. We stated that those rules, possibly with some modifications, would be incorporated into and superseded by the new general order we adopt in this decision. Those essentially unchanged D.01-07-030 rules were included in the June 2002 draft decision.

In their comments on the June 2002 draft, wireline carriers sought a complete reversal of direction from D.01-07-030 by way of two major changes, along with a number of lesser changes. First, the wireline carriers would eliminate the option established in D.01-07-030 for a consumer to lock his or her bill against non-communications-related charges. Where D.01-07-030 adopted an opt-in standard for such billing, the wireline carriers would delete that and offer neither an opt-in nor an opt-out provision to customers seeking to immunize themselves against non-communications-related cramming. Second, the wireline companies would rely entirely on the vendors who sell products and services, and the billing aggregators who act as middlemen relaying those charges to the billing telephone companies, for all authorizations and recordkeeping. The responsibility for processing subscriber complaints would still fall to billing telephone companies, but they would be able to delegate investigations to vendors or billing aggregators as their agents and would delete the provision that currently makes billing telephone companies responsible for their agents'

compliance with the rules. They state their view as, “Anti-cramming safeguards should resemble anti-slamming safeguards, where the responsibility for obtaining, processing, and maintaining customer authorization is at the point of purchase – not at the point of billing.” Since the Commission has no jurisdiction to enforce its rules over point-of-purchase vendors, the changes wireline carriers suggest would effectively strip from Part 4 most of its consumer protective value.

Among the other changes suggested, one carrier asked to have additions made to the list of charges defined as being communications-related, and to require that the Commission act within 90 days on any petition to include further additions. The Part 4 definition of non-communications-related charges is modeled on the Legislature’s list set forth in former Section 2890(a) (now expired), and is by its own terms not exclusive; expanding the list to cover all possibilities is both impractical and unnecessary. And the Commission already has a mechanism in place under Section 1708.5 that allows petitions to adopt, amend or repeal a regulation, making it also unnecessary to add a separate provision to that effect in Part 4.

In the D.01-07-030 interim rules, we indicated in Section J, Penalties, our intent not to preclude district attorneys, the Attorney General, or other law enforcement agencies from obtaining injunctive relief, civil penalties, and other relief permitted by law against a billing telephone company, billing agent, or vendor that violates the rules. The June 2002 draft decision proposed a minor revision in Part 4, Section J, to make it clear that we intend that same provision apply to violations of state law. We have also changed our definition of “solicitation” in Part 2 of the general order, and that new definition is also included in Part 4 for consistency. The only other changes are minor, non-substantive changes to promote consistency with the remainder of the general

order. The rules set forth in D.01-07-030, otherwise essentially unchanged and no longer interim, are now Part 4, Rules Governing Billing for Non-communications-Related Charges, of new General Order ____.

Part 5: Rules Governing Slamming Complaints

Background

Slamming, the unauthorized change of a telephone customer's preferred carrier, has been a problem for consumers ever since it became possible for telephone customers to choose among competing providers. It has been equally vexing for the state and federal regulators responsible for protecting them. The Commission in 2000 completed a consolidated investigation and rulemaking proceeding⁷⁵ into slamming and, after workshops and several rounds of comments, issued D.00-03-020, Final Opinion on Rules Designed to Deter Slamming, Cramming, and Sliding.⁷⁶ D.00-03-020 addressed certain limited aspects of slamming including record keeping, letters of agency, third-party verification, and removing the economic incentive for slamming. On the latter topic, our staff had recommended that we require carriers to refund all charges paid by customers who allege that they were slammed. In response, we observed,

⁷⁵ R.97-08-001, Rulemaking on the Commission's Own Motion to Consider Adoption of Rules Applicable to Interexchange Carriers for the Transfer of Customers Including Establishing Penalties for Unauthorized Transfer; and I.97-08-002, Investigation on the Commission's Own Motion to Consider Adoption of Rules Applicable to Interexchange Carriers for the Transfer of Customers Including Establishing Penalties for Unauthorized Transfer.

⁷⁶ Later modified by D.00-11-015.

In a recent proceeding, the FCC has adopted a rule similar to that proposed by Staff. On December 17, 1998, the FCC adopted its Second Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in its docket, CC No. 94-129, which is addressing unauthorized changes to consumers' long distance carriers. The FCC decision addresses many of the issues that have been presented in this proceeding in addition to removing the economic incentive for slamming.

On May 18, 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued a decision partially staying the FCC slamming rules. Those rules remain pending before the court.

On June 27, 2000 the court lifted its partial stay, and the FCC subsequently issued its amended rules for handling preferred carrier changes, including remedies for slamming. We refer here to those rules⁷⁷ in their current form as the FCC slamming rules, or simply the federal rules.

In addition to slamming allegations, the federal rules cover carrier change order verification, letters of agency for changing carriers, preferred carrier freezes, and state administration of the unauthorized carrier change rules and remedies. It is this last topic we address here and in our new G.O. ____, Part 5, rules.

The FCC slamming rules give each state the option to act as the adjudicator of slamming complaints, both interstate and intrastate, and California has opted to do so.⁷⁸ Under 47 CFR 64.1110, each state which opts to

⁷⁷ 47 CFR 64.1100 *et seq.*

⁷⁸ On January 4, 2001 the Commission directed the President of the Commission to notify the FCC that it was electing to take primary responsibility for adjudicating

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take on that responsibility must notify the FCC of the procedures it will use to adjudicate individual slamming complaints. Our staff prepared an initial set of proposed slamming complaint handling rules in late-2000, and in January 2001, the Assigned Commissioner issued a ruling in this proceeding sending them out for comments and reply comments. After considering the parties' input and making modifications, the Assigned Commissioner included them in his first draft decision mailed June 6, 2002. There followed several additional opportunities for parties to provide input through comments, workshops, and working groups, all as described in the Background section above. The results were reflected in the Assigned Commissioner's July 2003 revised draft decision and once again circulated for comments. All of this input has been considered in the new rules the Commission is now adopting as the Rules Governing Slamming Complaints included in G.O. ___, Part 5.

The FCC Slamming Rules

The FCC prefers that subscribers who believe they have been slammed go first to the state commissions in states that have elected to handle slamming complaints. However, subscribers also have the option of filing a complaint with the FCC for slamming involving interstate service. The FCC will use the federal rules for complaints coming to them, and state commissions handling slamming complaints may administer the FCC rules using their own procedures. Because the FCC rules are complex, we set forth here only a simplified overview to help understand their major elements.

slamming complaints registered by California consumers. The President did so by letter to the FCC on January 5, 2001.

When a subscriber first reports having been slammed, the alleged unauthorized carrier must remove any unpaid charges for the first 30 days from the bill. If the carrier contests the allegation and loses after the subscriber files a complaint, it must also remit to the authorized carrier 150% of any payments it has received from the subscriber. From that amount, the authorized carrier reimburses the subscriber 50%⁷⁹ and retains the remaining 100%. The subscriber may also ask the authorized carrier to recalculate the bill using its own rates and attempt to recover from the alleged slammer on the subscriber's behalf any incremental amount in excess of the 50%. Any unpaid subscriber charges beyond the 30-day absolution period are to be recalculated and paid to the authorized carrier at the authorized carrier's rates.

If the carrier decides to contest the allegation, it must still reverse all unpaid charges for the first 30 days and inform the customer of his or her right to file a complaint and the procedures for filing. If the customer fails to file a complaint within 30 days after both the notice has been given and the charges reversed, the carrier may re-bill the customer.

The alleged unauthorized carrier may also decide not to contest the allegation, and instead grant the subscriber what the subscriber would have obtained had he or she filed a complaint and prevailed (*i.e.*, absolution for unpaid charges during the first 30 days, and 50% reimbursement or re-billing at the preferred carrier's rate for the period beyond 30 days and charges the

⁷⁹ This 50% is a proxy for the reimbursement the subscriber might have received had his billings been recalculated based on the authorized carrier's rates.

subscriber has already paid). In that case, the subscriber need not file a complaint to be made whole unless he or she is dissatisfied with the outcome.

If the subscriber does file a complaint, the agency⁸⁰ will notify the allegedly unauthorized carrier and require it to remove all unpaid charges for the first 30 days if it has not already done so. The allegedly unauthorized carrier then has 30 days to provide clear and convincing evidence that the carrier switch was valid and properly authorized. The agency will make a determination based on evidence submitted by the carrier and the subscriber, provided that, if the carrier fails to respond or to furnish proof of verification, it will be presumed to have slammed the subscriber.

The CPUC Slamming Rules

The Rules Governing Slamming Complaints we adopt today are closely modeled on the federal slamming rules, so we will limit this discussion to recapping the comments and describing those elements that do not appear in the FCC slamming rules. The full text of our slamming rules may be found in Part 5 of new G.O. ___, Appendix A to this order

Our description above of the federal rules now applies in most ways as well to our new Part 5 rules for local exchange carrier slamming allegations, and for intraLATA, interLATA and interstate toll slamming allegations. While the slamming rules proposed in the Assigned Commissioner's June 2002 draft decision paralleled the federal rules in many respects, there were some key differences explained in that earlier draft decision. In response to the comments

⁸⁰ The agency may be either the FCC or the state commission, depending on which is administering the slamming rules.

described in a following section, we have reframed Part 5, Sections B, D, E, F, and G to be very similar, and in most ways virtually identical, to the wording in the federal rules⁸¹

A key point for both the federal rules and our rules is that they do not necessarily require subscribers who have been slammed to file a complaint to obtain relief; a subscriber who has not paid for service provided during the first 30 days after the alleged slam occurred is entitled to have the unauthorized carrier remove the charges for that period. Only *after* the carrier has removed the charges *and* notified the subscriber that it will challenge the allegation must the subscriber file an informal complaint with CAB within 30 days to avoid being re-billed. Likewise, our rules (but not the federal rules) provide that carriers who learn of slamming allegations against them may deter complaints by making mutually-satisfactory arrangements to compensate subscribers and return them to their preferred carriers even if charges have been paid, provided that the alleged unauthorized carrier has first informed the subscriber of the rights afforded under these rules.

When the subscriber is switched back to his or her preferred carrier, both sets of rules require the preferred carrier to re-enroll the subscriber in his or her previous calling plan.

When the alleged unauthorized carrier challenges the allegation and the subscriber then files an informal complaint, the matter will be decided by our Consumer Affairs Branch. If CAB decides against the subscriber, the subscriber

⁸¹ Sections D, E, F, and G correspond to the federal rules found at CFR Title 47, Sections 64.1100, 64.1140, 64.1150, 64.1160 and 64.1170 respectively.

may appeal to the Consumer Affairs Manager, and may file a formal complaint at any time.

Lastly, our rules state explicitly that they are in addition to any other remedy available by law. The FCC made a similar statement in its implementing order and included a limited provision to that effect in the text of its rules.⁸²

The Parties' Comments

Fourteen groups representing 29 named entities, some of which were in turn associations of many more members, took the opportunity to file comments or replies to comments in response to the first set of draft slamming rules distributed in January 2001. Three contributors represented consumers, one represented small business, and the remaining ten represented carriers of all types. Approximately ten more sets of comments relating to the proposed slamming rules were received following the Assigned Commissioner's June 2002 draft decision and the August 2002 workshops, and more still commented on the July 2003 draft. Most of the post-draft comments were from the wireline companies, both individually and as part of the wireline working group. All of those comments are grouped here for discussion purposes.

Carrier representatives generally opposed and consumer representatives generally supported the Commission's California-specific rules. There were exceptions among both groups with respect to particular provisions.

The most frequent comment from industry representatives was that the Commission may not implement one provision or another in the proposed rules

⁸² See 47 CFR 64.1170(b).

because it is preempted from devising any rules that vary from the federal rules. Further, they argue, even if California has the authority to enact and enforce its own rules differing from the FCC's, it should wait for some period of time to see how the federal rules work first. We disagree on both counts. In establishing the federal rules, the FCC granted states which elect to handle slamming complaints great latitude in fashioning their own procedures: "We note that nothing in this Order prohibits states from taking more stringent enforcement actions against carriers not inconsistent with Section 258 of the [Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996]." ⁸³ In that First Order on Reconsideration, the FCC went on to explain that its determination to entrust primary slamming enforcement to the states was based on its belief that the states are close to the problem, experienced in addressing it, and have demonstrated that past state-devised slamming handling rules have been effective:

We agree with [the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners] that the states are particularly well-equipped to handle complaints because they are close to the consumers and familiar with carrier trends in their region. As NARUC describes, establishing the state commissions as the primary administrators of slamming liability issues will ensure that "consumers have realistic access to the full panoply of relief options available under both state and federal law...." Moreover, state commissions have extensive experience in handling and resolving consumer complaints against carriers, particularly those involving slamming. In fact, the General Accounting Office has reported that all state commissions have

⁸³ CC Docket No. 94-129, First Order on Reconsideration, Corrected Version (released May 3, 2000), at footnote 20.

procedures in place for handling slamming complaints, and that those procedures have been effective in resolving such complaints.⁸⁴

Thus, the FCC has expressed its confidence in the states' ability to fashion effective slamming rules and permits them to do so, so long as those state rules are not inconsistent with Section 258 of the federal Telecommunications Act. The rules proposed in the Assigned Commissioner's June 2002 draft decision met that test. Nonetheless, the Part 5 rules we adopt today are much closer to the federal rules than the earlier set, thus satisfying the great bulk of the concerns carriers expressed in their comments. The federal rules are so complex that everyone involved – the carriers, our staff, and most importantly, slammed subscribers – will find it challenging to understand and apply them. The modest benefit to be gained by our adopting a second, differing set of slamming rules would not justify the additional complexity they would generate.

A number of commenting carriers found the earlier proposed definition for “subscriber” too narrow, and we agree. The Definitions section of the federal rules initially did not define the term, so the June 2002 draft's proposed rules limited it to the person or persons named on the account. The federal rules, and our rules modeled on them, have now changed to define subscriber more broadly to include the person(s) named on the account, any adult the accountholder has authorized to change telecommunications services or to charge services to the account, and any person lawfully authorized to represent the accountholder.

⁸⁴ CC Docket No. 94-129, First Order on Reconsideration, Corrected Version, at Paragraph 25, footnotes omitted.

When CLCs first became eligible for certification, we adopted a set of Consumer Protection and Consumer Information Rules for CLCs as Appendix B to D.95-07-054. Rule 11B, Unauthorized Service Termination and Transfer (“Slamming”), from those CLC rules set forth carriers’ and subscribers’ rights and responsibilities where the alleged slam was of a subscriber’s local exchange carrier. That rule applied to slams of and by both LECs and CLCs. The Assigned Commissioner’s June 2002 and July 2003 draft decisions proposed to retain that slamming rule for unauthorized changes of subscribers’ local exchange carriers because it offered a greater level of protection, but that proposal has been dropped in response to comments. Today’s Part 5 rules thus apply to slamming allegations of all types.

A consumer group suggested we require carriers to report their slamming statistics quarterly as a monitoring tool and, in response the Assigned Commissioner’s earlier drafts had required that carriers submit to the Commission a copy of the biannual slamming reports the FCC already requires carriers to file. In more recent comments, carriers pointed out that the FCC has dropped this requirement. After confirming that to be the case, we have also dropped our report requirement from this final version.

In addition to these substantive changes, the parties suggested numerous lesser revisions consistent with the federal rules and our proposed rules. We have accepted them where appropriate. Other suggestions, and some of the earlier draft proposals, do not appear in the final version because after consideration we found them unnecessary or inadvisable.

Detariffing

It came as no surprise to see staff’s initial recommendation to detariff all competitive services draw as much response as any other issue in this

rulemaking.⁸⁵ It was also not surprising that carriers are generally against the idea. What made this topic different was the greater crossover of views. The largest ILEC supports detariffing competitive services, while consumer representatives and government agencies were split on the issue.

Carriers and others cited a number of reasons for retaining tariffs. The first reason is legal. Some interpret the Public Utilities Code to grant the Commission authority to permit, but not require, detariffing. Section 495.7 does grant the Commission authority to partially or completely exempt telecommunications services other than basic exchange service from the tariffing requirements of Sections 454, 489, 491 and 495. To do so, it must find that the provider lacks significant market power for that service, or that competitive services are available and consumer protection and enforcement mechanisms are sufficient to minimize the risks from unfair competition and anticompetitive behavior.

Commenters' second reason for retaining tariffs is their efficiency. Supporters find tariffs to provide an efficient, cost-effective way to establish rates, terms and conditions of service. They allow carriers to establish a legal relationship with customers more quickly than do contracts. No administrative rules, the argument goes, could embody all of a carrier's legal obligations the way tariffs do. Carriers also worry that the process of detariffing existing services would put them in a position of having to require every current customer to execute a contract before service could continue.

⁸⁵ The Assigned Commissioner's June 2002 draft decision first proposed the outcome adopted in this section. It drew few comments on detariffing except as related to limitation of liability for detariffed services, discussed in the following section.

Next, supporters point to tariffs for their ability to ensure that service is provided on a non-discriminatory basis. Detariffing would not relieve the Commission of its duty to enforce anti-discrimination requirements of Section 453. Service agreements are a poor substitute, they believe, because each is specifically tailored to one customer's needs and thereby necessarily treats that customer differently from others.

Lastly, tariffs provide a ready means for resolving customer disputes. Without tariffs as a foundation, the Commission would have to review thousands of individual contracts in resolving complaints. Mandatory detariffing would compromise the Commission's jurisdiction to pursue carriers who violated consumer protection policies that would otherwise have been tariffed. Absent tariffs, disputes would become breach of contract suits in court, bringing into play the common law rules of contract for each individual carrier/customer relationship.

Some of these arguments have merit; others are questionable.

Supporters of staff's proposal to detariff competitive services tended to be less strident in their advocacy. They see tariffs not so much as an inherently consumer-hostile mechanism as an otherwise-legitimate regulatory method turned to harm through neglect and misuse. That may explain why some consumer advocates would retire them, while others would reform and return them to their original consumer-protective role.

Carriers are fond of characterizing tariffs that have been accepted for filing as "approved by the PUC." While this may provide cover when problems arise, the reality is that the volume of carrier tariff filings is so large as to make a thorough review of each completely infeasible. As staff acknowledges, "Because the Commission does not regulate the rates of competitive services, the

continued filing of tariffs for competitive services and Commission review of such tariffs has largely become perfunctory.” Tariff rules are written by the carriers for the carriers, receive little or no staff review before going into effect, and thereafter are enforced as legally binding requirements. Staff notes, “For the Commission to formally change a tariff rule in effect is a contentious and time consuming endeavor, especially considering the number of individual utilities and their individual tariffs.” Moreover, tariff filing and maintenance drains staff resources that could be better used in enforcement and elsewhere.

With the stage thus set, tariffs intended to aid consumers are instead turned against them through application of the filed rate doctrine⁸⁶ before both the Commission and the courts. This is where consumer advocates who support detariffing converge with those who would retain tariffs. Both agree that the

⁸⁶ A carrier may be protected from later court claim of unlawful charges and billing provided the carrier has billed in accordance with its filed tariffs, or at least with its federal filed tariffs. (*See AT&T Corp. v. Central Office Tel., Inc.*, 524 U.S. 214 (1998)). This general rule, known as the federal filed rate (or filed tariff) doctrine, bars federal and state law claims attacking the rates and terms contained in a federal filed tariff, although it does not preclude carrier liability for illegal acts such as fraud, misrepresentation, and slamming committed in connection with federally tariffed services. (*See Brown v. MCI Worldcom Network Servs., Inc.*, 2002 U.S. App. Lexis 714 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2002) (slip op.); *Lovejoy v. AT&T Corp.*, 92 Cal. App. 4th 85, 100 (2001)). The federal filed rate doctrine, moreover, applies only to federally tariffed services. The scope of the California state filed rate doctrine is much narrower. (*See Pink Dot, Inc. v. Teleport Group*, 89 Cal. App.4th 407 (2001) (state filed rate doctrine does not bar action for fraud and misrepresentation); *Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 14 Cal. App. 4th 1224 (1993) (state filed rate doctrine not a bar to a price-fixing action under the Cartwright Act even though the rates in question were included in tariffs filed with the CPUC); *see also Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc.*, 232 F.3d 979, 993 (9th Cir. 2000) (“California has held, in contrast to federal law, that no filed rate doctrine exists as a bar [to a state antitrust action].” (citing *Cellular Plus*, supra)).

filed rate doctrine as it is frequently invoked today undermines consumers' legitimate business expectations because carriers can unilaterally abrogate their written contract prices and terms by simply changing their tariffs, with consumers either unaware or powerless to protect themselves. At least two commenters suggested the Commission use Section 532⁸⁷ to override the filed rate doctrine when carrier fraud or deception is involved. We agree -- it would be just and reasonable to establish the sort of exception permitted by Section 532, in cases where carriers have misrepresented their rates, terms or conditions for competitive services. No carrier should be able to rely on its filed tariffs for protection against the consequences of its own unlawful or deceptive conduct. Former Rule 2(g) was included in the June 2002 draft to ensure that customers are not abused by misleading advertising or disingenuous use of the filed rate doctrine to deflect their legitimate claims. As revised, it now becomes part of Rule 2(d), which echoes the Federal Trade Commission remedy for false advertising. Carriers who misrepresent their rates, terms or conditions must make whole a subscriber who was affected by the misrepresentation.

Staff's proposal to detariff competitive services goes hand in hand with establishing these consumer protection rules. First establish the rules, then use them to safeguard consumers' rights as tariff protections drop away. As many have noted, we need to be particularly cautious at the second stage because once

⁸⁷ § 532: "[N]o public utility shall charge, or receive a different compensation ... for any service rendered or to be rendered than the rates... and charges applicable thereto as specified in its schedules on file and in effect at the time.... *The commission may by rule or order establish such exceptions from the operation of this prohibition as it may consider just and reasonable as to each public utility.*" [Emphasis added].

tariffs are gone, consumers are at risk until the rules prove effective. Some commenters suggested a transition period during which both the rules and tariffs are in effect. We intend to adopt that suggestion.

Detariffing competitive services as staff proposes is an excellent goal. Once the rules are in effect, we expect them to bring about significant improvement. But achieving their full potential will require other steps that we have not yet taken: steps to educate consumers about their rights and the rules, steps to monitor carriers' practices as they implement the rules, and steps to enforce compliance when the rules are violated. With so much at stake, the prudent course is to put the new rules into effect *without* cutting away the tariff safety net. For now, that is what we will do.

Limitation of Liability

The staff's report referenced in the OII proposed that fully competitive services be detariffed, and recognized that, under Section 495.7(h)⁸⁸, providers would no longer be afforded a Commission-sanctioned limitation of liability for those services. This would have both disadvantages and advantages. Among the disadvantages, it might encourage litigation; put upward pressure on competitive service rates; and put additional stress on marginal competitive providers, perhaps even causing some to exit from the market. Staff and some commenters pointed out that the largest customers stand to benefit most from discontinuing the limitation on liability because they tend to take more complex

⁸⁸ § 495.7(h): "Any telecommunications service exempted from the tariffing requirements of Sections 454, 489, 491, and 495 shall not be subject to the limitation on damages that applies to tariffed telecommunications services."

and expensive services and have better access to the court system to pursue damage awards. Smaller customers, who in the aggregate provide the bulk of the competitive providers' revenue, face significant barriers in pursuing their court remedies. Another drawback would be that competitive local reseller carriers could in some cases be subject to liability for problems caused by underlying facilities-based carriers.

However, there would also be advantages to eliminating the limitation of liability. The Commission's limitation of liability provision has historically been intended to protect both carriers and their ratepayers from excessive liability risks and thus ensure the availability and affordability of utility services. This is less relevant in today's more competitive market environment where there are multiple providers and rates are not necessarily based on cost of service. Eliminating the Commission-sanctioned limitation on liability could motivate carriers to exercise greater care in providing service;⁸⁹ stop shifting consequences of utility negligence to injured parties and society at large; allow greater consumer access to legal remedies; align the system for competitive telecommunications services with the general practice for addressing commercial liability; remove an incentive for IECs to choose tariffs over detariffing; and generally reduce distortions caused by liability limitations in an increasingly competitive marketplace. Consumer advocates observed in their comments that

⁸⁹ As one of the largest ILECs acknowledged while attempting to make a different point, "There is no doubt that, in the absence of limitation of liability protections, there would be an economic incentive to provide a higher quality of service to customers who could incur significant damages as the result of a service outage and who have the means to file a lawsuit."

with rates for many services decoupled from costs of service, the primary historic benefit of limited liability – lower rates – has largely evaporated, and there is little justification for treating competitive service providers differently from, *e.g.*, Internet service providers, cable companies, or any other non-Commission regulated competitive business. Competitive carriers who want to control their liability risks may still do so in other ways. They may, for example, carry liability insurance, maintain high service levels, and/or include commercially reasonable limitations in their customer contracts.

Staff's report stopped short of endorsing an end to the Commission-sanctioned limitation of liability, recommending instead that the Commission review whether it remains appropriate. It did endorse narrowing the limitation to protect carriers from negligence rather than from gross negligence as currently, and increasing the dollar limitations. The Assigned Commissioner's June 2002 draft decision's proposal to eliminate the Commission-sanctioned limitation for competitive services generated both strong support among consumer advocates and strong opposition from carriers. Carriers were particularly concerned that even though they would be allowed to follow standard commercial practices in establishing contractual limitations for their non-tariffed services, they would still be laid bare to claims for their tariffed competitive services, including basic exchange services.⁹⁰

We share staff's and the consumer advocates' concern that the Commission-sanctioned limitation of liability for competitive services may no

⁹⁰ Those services designated as non-competitive in the Definitions section were all GRC-LEC tariffed services, and the NRF-LECs' Category I tariffed services.

longer be in the public interest, but we also acknowledge that the carriers raise legitimate questions that merit further consideration. Thus we will not narrow the limitation of liability today, but may consider the matter further in the next phase of this proceeding.

Education and Enforcement

In inviting comments from the parties, the rulemaking order in this proceeding asked a series of ten questions. One of those was, “What alternative approaches to telecommunications consumer protection should the Commission consider beyond those recommended in the staff Report?” The two themes most often proposed in response were consumer education and stronger enforcement.

Education

Parties addressed education from two perspectives: information provided by carriers about their specific product and service offerings; and information provided by government and public service-oriented groups to help consumers choose among diverse offerings from many providers. The former we have covered under Parts 1 and 2 above in discussing consumers’ *Right to Disclosure* and the rules that help enforce that right. As helpful as full disclosure is, however, both carriers and consumer groups acknowledged that the emphasis of the carriers’ disclosure efforts will always be persuasion, not education. True education to enable consumers to help themselves by making better choices must be independent from the sales motive, and that is best undertaken by consumer-oriented educators, not by the carriers. Parties offered a number of suggestions for improving education from this latter, consumer-oriented perspective.

Several consumer groups would have the Commission take a more active role in gathering service and rates data and publishing it in useful, easily understood formats for consumers. This would include, *e.g.*, carrier-specific

complaint statistics, service measures, rate comparison matrices, and listings of carriers by carrier class and geographic service area. Others would have the Commission be in addition or instead a facilitator, providing funding and working with and through consumer advocacy groups, community based organizations, and consumer-industry panels to educate consumers.⁹¹

While consumer education (apart from disclosure) was not the primary focus of this rulemaking, the rulemaking order did recognize education as an important underpinning for consumer protection. The staff report referred to this as one of outcomes from the Commission's 1998 Consumer Protection Roundtable:

The Commission should foster a marketplace in which consumers are empowered and have confidence. This can be achieved through establishing rules, educating consumers, and helping consumers understand pricing of services.

The parties' comments and recommendations on education have given us both ideas and impetus, to the point that we are convinced that an immediate effort directed at consumer education is needed. In the rulemaking order, the Commission noted that consumer protection calls for more than simply establishing rules of conduct for carriers to follow. It requires consumers be knowledgeable of their rights and what recourse they have when their rights are violated. In fact, the order specifically sought input as to "what alternative approaches to telecommunications consumer protection ... the Commission

⁹¹ The Commission has taken on such a facilitator role in the past by, *e.g.*, setting up the Telecommunications Education Trust.

[might] consider beyond those recommended in the staff report.” Many stakeholders, both consumer-oriented groups and carriers, responded by suggesting that the Commission initiate an education program to accompany the new rules.

We agree. During the course of this proceeding, we have seen that there are good reasons for the Commission to consider a telecommunications consumer education program.

First, our experience at last year’s public participation hearings and the large volume of mail we received in response to public notices demonstrated the frustration many consumers feel in dealing with carriers. For low income customers and those whose preferred language is not English, the problem is particularly acute, a view supported in the comments we received from organizations which represent them.

Second, defining consumers’ rights and rules to enforce those rights is a recent concept in the context of telecommunications consumer protection. Rights and rules can only be fully effective when consumers know about them, the protections they offer, and what recourse and remedies are available. That will not happen without a special effort on the Commission’s part.

Also, the new rights and rules will apply across all carrier classes: local exchange, wireless and long distance carriers. The consumer’s relationship with local telephone companies has been defined through a century of experience. But that relationship is changing as local telephone service providers increasingly rely on selling optional services to enhance profits. Dealing with wireless and long distance carriers is a more recent and less-understood matter for consumers, made all the more challenging by the sometimes-bewildering

variety and complexity of rate plans most wireless and long distance providers offer. Education is key here as well.

The Legislature has expressed its intent in Section 2896(d) that carriers provide, among other things, “information concerning the regulatory process and how customers can participate in that process, including the process of resolving complaints.” Further, through Section 2897 it directed the Commission to apply those Section 2896 policies to all providers of telecommunications services in California and invited the Commission to supplement them as necessary. Educating telecommunications consumers about their Commission-enforced rights and rules certainly fits within the framework of Sections 2896 and 2897.

In September 2001 Assigned Commissioner Wood issued a ruling inviting parties to the proceeding and others to submit comments and suggestions for a telecommunications consumer education program. That ruling asked those who comment to present as full a range of options as possible on all aspects: What would an effective consumer education program look like and what should it cover? Who should carry it out, and over what time frame? How should it be funded? What practical problems might the Commission and participants face, and how could they be overcome? What legal considerations should the Commission be aware of? Based on the high level of interest the parties have demonstrated to date, their responses no doubt provide some excellent suggestions, and we will keep the proceeding open to consider them in a subsequent decision.

Meanwhile, education begins with informing consumers of their rights and these rules as quickly as possible. The rules in new G.O. ____ are by necessity somewhat technically worded to ensure carriers understand and comply with

what is expected of them. Our Communications and Public Information Division will be preparing a simple, consumer-oriented summary of the new rights and rules that as part of a subsequent order in this proceeding we will direct the carriers to distribute to their subscribers. More immediately, the G.O. ___ rules will be posted on the Commission's web site. We will order links be pointed to them from the carriers' Internet sites, and under Part 2, Rule 6(k) the notice we require on each bill will invite consumers to view their rights and the rules on the Commission's web site. When the consumer-oriented rights and rules summary is ready, it too will be web posted and linked from carriers' web sites.

Enforcement

The second alternative measure parties mentioned for improving consumer protection was enforcement. Although parties on both sides endorsed stronger enforcement, consumer representatives wanted it *in addition to* the proposed consumer protection rules, while carriers almost universally urged the Commission to emphasize enforcement *instead of* new rules.

For the most part, carriers did not suggest specific measures we could use to boost enforcement effectiveness; consumer representatives did. One consumer group submitted the most extensive proposal, a series of five new Commission procedural rules proposed as new Rule 16, Enforcement in Part 2. Those included: (a) declaring the Commission would exercise concurrent jurisdiction over Business and Professions Code Sections 17200 *et seq.* and 17500 *et seq.*⁹²;

⁹² Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 broadly defines and prohibits as unfair competition "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising...." Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 *et seq.* prohibit false advertising.

(b) requiring carriers to produce documents and witnesses when subpoenaed in a California administrative or judicial proceeding; (c) allowing the Assigned Commissioner or ALJ at the outset of a complaint case to waive the Section 1701.2(d) requirement to complete adjudication cases within twelve months; (d) allowing pre-judgment attachment or bonds be required of defendants in Commission proceedings; and (e) requiring defendants to conduct customer surveys to show whether customers were indeed misled where a *prima facie* showing of misleading advertising has been made in a Commission proceeding. When other consumer parties expressed uncertainty as to whether the Commission has authority to enforce the Business and Professions Code, the consumer group revised its Rule 16 proposal to instead import the *standards* of Bus. & Prof. Code Sections 17200 *et seq.* and 17500 *et seq.* (the Unfair Competition Law) by defining charges imposed on telephone users by means of deceptive marketing as unjust or unreasonable charges or services under Public Utilities Code Section 451. Carriers opposed all of these proposals as beyond the scope of the rulemaking proceeding and not within the Commission's jurisdiction to enact.

The staff report referenced the Commission's authority to impose penalties under Public Utilities Code Section 2107 *et seq.* as part of its enforcement efforts. Consumer parties concurred and, in addition, would support civil actions against carriers when their activities violate consumers' rights. The Commission, they believe, should make clear that the courts have concurrent jurisdiction to remedy consumer fraud and other violations of the law by carriers subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. They point to the courts as being particularly well equipped through a substantial body of case law to adjudicate complaints alleging false or misleading advertising. A related recommendation would have

the Commission “make it absolutely clear that the proposed rules are not intended to affect the ability of law enforcement officers to enforce civil and criminal statutes to protect the public.”

Our new rules, which are based upon the Commission’s authority under the Constitution and the Public Utilities Code (particularly Sections 701, 1702, 2885.6, 2889.3, 2889.5, 2896-97, and 2889.9-2894.10), are not, in fact, intended to insulate public utilities from liability under other statutory schemes such as the Unfair Competition Law. The Public Utilities Code provides that public utilities subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction remain subject to other statutory schemes as well, whether those laws are enforced by the Commission or by the courts. Section 243 provides:

This part [Sections 201-2282.5] shall not release or waive any right of action by the State, the commission, or any person or corporation for any right, penalty, or forfeiture which may have arisen or accrued or may hereafter arise or accrue under any law of this State.

Penalties under this part of the Public Utilities Code do not displace penalties that may be imposed under other statutory schemes.⁹³ The Commission, moreover, has a duty to see “that the provisions of the Constitution and statutes

⁹³ Section 2105: “All penalties accruing under this part shall be cumulative, and a suit for recovery of one penalty shall not be a bar to or affect the recovery of any other penalty or forfeiture or be a bar to any criminal prosecution against any public utility... or any other corporation or person, or to the exercise by the commission of its power to punish for contempt.”

of this State affecting public utilities, the enforcement of which is not specifically vested in some other officer or tribunal, are enforced and obeyed....”⁹⁴

Actions under the Unfair Competition Law “shall be prosecuted exclusively in a court of competent jurisdiction.”⁹⁵ The Attorney General, district attorneys, and certain other law enforcement officers are authorized to prosecute such actions on behalf of the public, but the Commission is not. Thus, the authority to prosecute actions under the Unfair Competition Law on behalf of the public is clearly vested in other law enforcement agencies, and jurisdiction to impose penalties under that law lies exclusively in the superior courts.⁹⁶ District attorneys prosecute most of the consumer fraud actions brought on behalf of the public, and the Commission is required to provide them with complaint and investigation data concerning entities that they are investigating regarding possible consumer fraud.⁹⁷ Remedies under the Unfair Competition Law are cumulative and in addition to remedies that may be imposed under other laws.⁹⁸ It is clear, therefore, that the Commission’s consumer protection rules, and any action it may take to enforce them, do not deprive the courts of jurisdiction to entertain actions against regulated utilities brought by law enforcement officers under the Unfair Competition Law.

⁹⁴ Section 2101.

⁹⁵ Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17204.

⁹⁶ *Id.*, see also Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17535.

⁹⁷ Govt. Code Section 26509.

⁹⁸ Bus. & Prof. Code Sections 17205, 17534.5.

Thus, we agree with those parties who state that the Commission and the courts have concurrent jurisdiction over consumer protection matters, in the sense that public utilities are subject to standards and requirements enforced by the Commission *and* to consumer protection laws enforced by the courts.⁹⁹ A business practice that violates the Public Utilities Code and our consumer protection rules – deceptive marketing, for example, or cramming or slamming – will likely also constitute an unfair and unlawful business practice under the Unfair Competition Law, and subject the offending utility to possible court-imposed sanctions under that law.¹⁰⁰ Accordingly, we have added the following statement under Applicability in Part 2:

The Commission intends to continue its policy of cooperating with law enforcement authorities to enforce consumer protection laws that prohibit misleading advertising and other unfair business practices. These rules do not preclude any civil action that may be available by law. The remedies the Commission may impose for violations of these rules are not intended to displace other remedies that may be imposed by the courts for violation of consumer protection laws.

We have also acted on a suggestion regarding the filed rate doctrine,¹⁰¹ which we agree should not be used to immunize carriers from liability for

⁹⁹ See *People ex rel. Orloff v. Pacific Bell* (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 1132 (public prosecutors and PUC share the authority and responsibility to prosecute violations of consumer protection laws, and Legislature expects the PUC and public prosecutors to coordinate their efforts to remedy misconduct by public utilities).

¹⁰⁰ See *Day v. AT&T* (1998) 63 Cal.App. 4th 325.

¹⁰¹ See discussion of the filed rate doctrine in *Detariffing* above.

deceptive marketing and other unlawful conduct. The Commission does not permit carriers to limit their liability for willful misconduct, fraudulent misconduct, or violations of the law, and requires them to say so in any limitation of liability provisions included in tariffs. California courts have not allowed carriers to circumvent this Commission policy by omitting this important qualifier from their tariffs and then invoking the filed rate doctrine.¹⁰² In this rulemaking proceeding we reaffirm the principle that tariffs, and any limitation of liability provisions included in tariffs, are not designed to immunize carriers from liability for willful or fraudulent misconduct and violations of the law. Accordingly, Rule 2(d) in Part 2 now requires carriers who misrepresent their rates, terms or conditions to grant relief to a subscriber who was affected by the misrepresentation.

Among their other suggestions, consumer groups included stepping up Commission efforts to investigate and fine violators, publishing the results of Commission enforcement actions, and an easily remembered 800 number for consumers to report complaints and violations to the Commission. Carriers and

¹⁰² In *Pink Dot, Inc. v. Teleport Comms.Group* (2001) 89 Cal. App. 4th 407, the Third District Court of Appeal noted that the Commission policy on limitation of liability expressly provided that carriers would remain liable for “willful or fraudulent misconduct and violations of the law.” The Commission required carriers to acknowledge this provision in their tariffs. (See D.77406, 71 CPUC 229 (1970)). Teleport had omitted this provision from its tariffs, but the court of appeal held that Teleport could not avail itself of the filed rate doctrine to immunize itself from liability to which it was subject pursuant to Commission policy, and that Teleport should have acknowledged as much in its tariffs.

consumer groups alike cited enforcement as one of the most important justifications for retaining tariffs.

We agree with the many commenters who stressed the importance of enforcement. Effective enforcement requires standards that address current needs and practices in the industry. We have updated and clarified those standards with this new general order, filling gaps in our rules and making changes as warranted, and the resulting new consumer protection rules will facilitate our enforcement efforts.

The Commission has ample authority under the Public Utilities Code to enforce its orders: carriers who do not comply with the requirements of new G.O. ____ may be penalized under Section 2107 *et seq.*. At the same time, we will continue to work cooperatively with the Attorney General and District Attorneys, whose prosecutions of consumer fraud actions in court complement our own efforts to protect consumers from unfair practices by telecommunications providers.

Scoping Memo

The preliminary scoping memo included in the initial rulemaking order determined this would be a quasi-legislative proceeding and no formal hearings would be needed.¹⁰³ No party has stated an objection to our preliminary

¹⁰³ Under Rule 8(f)(2), “‘Formal hearing’ generally refers to a hearing at which testimony is offered or comments or argument taken on the record... In a quasi-legislative proceeding, ‘formal hearing’ includes a hearing at which testimony is offered on legislative facts, but does not include a hearing at which testimony is offered on adjudicative facts.” And, under Rule 8(f)(3), “‘Legislative facts’ are the general facts that help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion.” Under Rule

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categorization. The preliminary determination not to hold formal hearings was not subject to appeal.

The rulemaking order also required parties to make offers of proof with their opening comments for any matters for which they believed a hearing was required to receive testimony regarding adjudicative facts, and failure to do so would waive the parties' right to hearing. The issues addressed in this interim order are the issues set forth in the preliminary scoping memo, and the proposal to curtail the Commission-sanctioned limitation of liability was the only matter for which offers of proof were submitted. Some parties in subsequent rounds of comments requested hearings, but after reviewing those requests we have determined that no hearings are needed for this phase of the proceeding.

We conclude that it is not necessary to disturb the determinations in our preliminary scoping memo. We reserve for later the question of whether to hold adjudicative hearings in the next phase of the proceeding.

Pending Motions

More than two dozen written motions were filed during the proceeding. Most of those were addressed through Assigned Commissioner and/or assigned ALJ rulings shortly after they were filed. We decide here those that remain pending.

Greenlining/Latino Issues Forum Motion and Preliminary Proposal to Broaden Low-Income Consumer Participation in this Consumer Protection Rulemaking Proceeding (filed February 24, 2000).

8(f)(1), "'Adjudicative facts' answer questions such as who did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent."

The Greenlining Institute and Latino Issues Forum (Greenlining/LIF) motion proposed to establish a two-part pilot program for funding participation by individuals and organizations representing low-income and/or minority customers. Under the first part, up to fourteen eligible non-profits could receive up to \$5,000 each for their participation time and expenses without regard to whether they made a substantial contribution to the proceeding. Under the second, up to 100 low-income individuals would receive travel expenses and \$50 per diem to testify in the proceeding. In addition, Greenlining/LIF would have the Commission's Public Advisor develop a low-income participation training program for these participants and, if necessary, hire outside experts to assist. Greenlining/LIF estimates its pilot program would cost less than \$95,000 and suggests the Commission seek funding through outside grants or an assessment in generic proceedings. The Utility Reform Network filed a generally supportive response describing the proposal as "an innovative approach which deserves consideration." San Diego Gas & Electric Company's response opposed the motion as being unwise and a procedurally inappropriate vehicle. According to San Diego Gas & Electric, the proposal is in reality a petition to modify all of the Commission's prior decisions on intervenor compensation. As such, it would have been better suited for Commission consideration in the Intervenor Compensation Rulemaking proceeding,¹⁰⁴ or perhaps as a petition to modify the decisions already issued in that proceeding.

¹⁰⁴ R.97-01-009, Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission's Intervenor Compensation Program, and I.97-01-010, Order Instituting Investigation on the Commission's Intervenor Compensation Program.

We do not adopt Greenlining/LIF's proposal here. This rulemaking proceeding addresses only consumer rights and consumer protection rules applicable to telecommunications utilities. Greenlining/LIF's proposal, in contrast, goes to the heart of how intervenors are compensated, and if implemented could represent the first step toward a significant policy shift the merits of which would be better considered outside of this proceeding. Although we deny Greenlining/LIF's motion, we do not reject its ideas out of hand. If it wishes to pursue them further, we suggest it either choose a more appropriate forum or explore them first with our staff and with others whose interests could be affected if they were adopted.

Motion of City and County of San Francisco to Intervene and File Comments on the Draft Decision and Proposed General Order (Filed August 25, 2003).

Motion of California Foundation for Independent Living Centers Seeking Permission to Late-File Comments (Attached). (Filed December 17, 2003).

In initiating this rulemaking, our intent was to seek input from the widest variety of stakeholders. That is still our intent. No party opposed either of these motions. The City and County of San Francisco's motion to intervene is granted and its comments accepted. The California Foundation for Independent Living Centers' late-filed comments are accepted.

Joint Motion of AT&T Communications of California, Inc. and WorldCom, Inc. to Accept Late-Filed Comments Pursuant to Rule 77.5 (Comments Attached) (Filed August 26, 2003).

Comments on the July 24, 2003 draft decision of Commissioner Wood were due to be filed with the Commission and served on parties by August 25, 2003. On that day, AT&T Communications of California, Inc. and WorldCom, Inc. each served their comments on parties by mail in hardcopy, and electronically as

e-mail attachments to those with known e-mail addresses. A representative attempted to make their formal filings with the Commission's Docket Office shortly after the close of business on August 25, but was turned away, so the carriers tendered their comments for filing with a motion on August 26. No party will be disadvantaged by accepting AT&T's and WorldCom's late-filed comments. Their motion is granted.

Motion of AT&T Wireless Services, et al for Leave to File Economic Analysis (Attached) and for Shortened Response Period and Expedited Ruling (Filed September 15, 2003); and,

Motion of AT&T Wireless Services, et al for Leave to File Reply (Attached) to Responses of Consumer Groups and ORA/AG (Filed October 7, 2003); and,

Motion of the Cellular Carriers Association of California for Leave to File Rebuttal Paper by Dr. Thomas W. Hazlett (Attached) Responding to Paper by Dr. Peter Navarro Submitted by the Utility Consumers' Action Network (Filed November 4, 2003).

We address here three wireless carrier motions concerning the economic effects of the proposed new general order. Those motions are granted to the extent described below.

On September 15, 2003, seven wireless carrier representatives¹⁰⁵ filed a motion to have two studies ("the LECG studies") accepted into the proceeding

¹⁰⁵ AT&T Wireless Services, Inc.; Nextel of California, Inc.; Omnipoint Communications, Inc. dba T-Mobile; Pacific Bell Wireless LLC dba Cingular Wireless, LLC; Sprint Spectrum, L.P.; Verizon Wireless; and the Cellular Carriers Association of California (jointly, "wireless representatives").

record.¹⁰⁶ Those studies, they maintain, “provide an in-depth economic analysis of the impact that the Proposed Rules will have on the welfare of wireless customers in California, as well as on jobs, investment and economic activity in the state.”¹⁰⁷ The carriers also requested the time for filing responses to their joint motion be reduced, but that request was not granted and is now moot. Two replies were filed in opposition, one by the Commission’s Office of Ratepayer Advocates and the California Attorney General’s Office, and the second by the National Consumer Law Center, the Utility Consumers’ Action Network (UCAN), The Utility Reform Network, and Consumers Union.

On October 7, 2003, the wireless carrier representatives filed a motion seeking leave to file a reply to the consumer groups’ responses, and tendered with it their reply.

On November 4, 2003 the Cellular Carriers Association of California (CCAC) filed a motion to admit into the record a 38-page paper¹⁰⁸ (“the Hazlett paper”) in rebuttal to a study (“the Navarro paper”) UCAN had included as part of its comments on the July 2003 draft decision.¹⁰⁹ CCAC expressly did not move

¹⁰⁶ *The Financial and Public Policy Implications of Key Proposed Telecommunications Consumer Protection Rules on California Wireless Carriers and Customers: Economic Analysis (September 2003)*; and, *The Financial Implications of Key Proposed Telecommunications Consumer Protection Rules on California Wireless Carriers and Customers: Cost Study Report (September 2003)*. These are jointly referred to here as the LECG studies.

¹⁰⁷ September 15, 2003 wireless representatives’ Motion at page 2.

¹⁰⁸ Thomas W. Hazlett, *Cellular Telephone Regulation in California – A Critique of Peter Navarro’s Paper Submitted to the California Public Utilities Commission (November 3, 2003)*.

¹⁰⁹ Peter Navarro, *An Economic Justification for Consumer Protection Laws and Disclosure Regulations in the Telecommunications Industry (August 25, 2003)*, submitted as

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to strike the Navarro paper portion of UCAN's comments with which it disagreed.

The Motions and Studies and their Timing

The wireless representatives' September 15, 2003 motion claims that cost issues have not been analyzed in this proceeding, and further, that the proposed rules issued for comment on July 24, 2003 would have specific costs attached to them which compare unfavorably with the rules' benefits because those benefits cannot be quantified. That motion seeks permission to enter into the record the two LECG studies prepared for a wireless industry group. In these reports, consultants Debra J. Aron and William Palmer estimate what they represent as compliance costs for the wireless industry, but do not provide a similar analysis of the proposed rules' benefits. Nevertheless, the consultants criticize the July 2003 draft decision for failing to include a cost-benefit analysis, and argue against adoption of the proposed rules.

The Attorney General, ORA, and consumer groups the National Consumer Law Center, UCAN, The Utility Reform Network, and Consumers Union oppose the motion on the grounds that (1) it is untimely, (2) the Commission has already considered costs and benefits of the rules, and (3) the Aron and Palmer statements do not offer competent evidence about the economic impact of the rules on the California economy.

Stakeholders have now been afforded numerous opportunities to submit comments and/or replies to comments on the proposed new consumer

Attachment A to the Comments to the Draft Decision filed by UCAN on August 25, 2003.

protection rules overall or various subsets of them during the more than four-year course of this proceeding. The Assigned Commissioner issued his first draft decision in June 2002 following nine opportunities for parties to submit comments and/or replies to comments. There followed comments on that draft, four days of workshops involving the entire industry, further comments and recommendations by a joint industry-consumer working group, and consolidated reply comments on the first draft decision and the working group's recommendations. With that extensive and fully developed record in hand, the Assigned Commissioner issued for comments a revised draft decision with proposed rules in July 2003, and the final round of comments and replies on it were to have been received by September 4, 2003. All of the wireless representatives' motions were filed *after* the deadlines and after they and all of the other parties had completed their comments and replies to comments.

The wireless representatives' motion to accept the Hazlett paper is particularly troublesome. UCAN's August 25, 2003 comments on the Assigned Commissioner's July 2003 draft decision included the Navarro paper that UCAN characterized as addressing the need for and justification for the new rules. UCAN's filing was timely and, *including* the Navarro paper, well within the 25-page limit established for comments. On September 4, 2003 CCAC filed a timely reply to parties' comments addressing, among other topics, some aspects of those UCAN comments that were included in the Navarro paper. CCAC now characterizes the Hazlett paper it would have late-admitted as responding to the assertions made in UCAN's paper. CCAC had in fact already had an opportunity to reply to UCAN's comments and the Navarro paper. CCAC's Hazlett paper rebuttal is 38 pages long, packed with new factual assertions, and submitted two months after replies to comments, including comments on the

Navarro paper, were due. As such, it should not qualify as a reply to comments for its length, its content or its timing.

Thus, the wireless representatives' motions, both to admit the LECG studies and the Hazlett paper, were untimely, and the arguments raised by parties opposing the September 2003 motion have considerable merit. However, the Assigned Commissioner concluded that the Commission's ultimate decision on this issue should include a more explicit discussion of the issues raised in the motion. An explicit discussion would make clear that the considerations raised by the wireless representatives have, in fact, been present throughout this proceeding and have been taken into account in crafting the proposed rules. The Assigned Commissioner circulated a revised draft decision on March 3, 2004 that responded to all of the earlier comments and proposed to grant the wireless representatives' motions. That revised draft contained language that made the treatment of the economic issues more explicit, and addressed the studies prepared by the wireless representatives' consultants. Provisions of Rule 77.3 that would have limited the scope of comments on the proposed treatment of economic issues in the draft decision were waived, and parties were explicitly invited to comment on the wireless representatives' studies, and to submit relevant studies of their own if they desired. To ensure the parties were not unduly constrained, these comments and replies to comments on the draft decisions' treatment of the economic issue were *in addition to* the parties' comments and reply comments on the remainder of the decision, and no page limit was put on any studies the parties wished to attach to their comments. The Assigned Commissioner anticipated taking those comments, studies, and replies to comments into consideration as the final decision was prepared for the Commission's consideration.

Taking this approach provided two benefits. By distributing the proposed decision text for parties to review and comment on, the Assigned Commissioner sought to bring the issue directly to the parties and to focus their review, while at the same time allowing the parties' comments to be incorporated into the Commission's final decision. In addition, by addressing the issue in a revised draft decision and then considering the comments, further time was not lost on this issue.

Claims that this invitation to comment on the expanded discussion of economic effects contained in the March 2004 draft decision reflects a belated acknowledgment of the importance of economic impacts of the consumer protection rules, and of the Commission's legal obligation to consider those impacts, are misplaced. Potential economic impacts of these rules have been considered throughout the unusually extended comment process in this rulemaking proceeding. We have continuously balanced concerns about implementation costs, for example, which were repeatedly brought to our attention, along with the need for clear, adequate, and updated consumer protection rules. In the many rounds of comments and in the workshops, carriers objected to many rules based on implementation costs. And as the Wireless Carriers have acknowledged, some rules were modified in the March 2004 revised draft decision to accommodate those concerns.¹¹⁰

Claims that the Commission has allowed insufficient time for parties to prepare and submit economic impact studies, or insufficient notice and

¹¹⁰ Wireless Carriers' Comments on Economic Issues (March 23, 2004), Exh.B. at p. 17.

opportunity to be heard on these issues, are unfounded. Parties have had four years and many previous opportunities to submit comments on potential economic impacts of the rules. Costs and benefits of these rules have been extensively discussed and considered throughout the proceeding. The Assigned Commissioner's invitation to comment on the March 2004 revised draft decision's *treatment* of economic issues did not open up a new subject. A flurry of eleventh-hour filings raising new cost-benefit *arguments* does not require this Commission to launch a whole new phase of record development.

We disagree with those carriers who argue that due process requires further delay in this proceeding in order to conduct more detailed, quantitative analyses of the potential costs to carriers. The case law on which AT&T relies in making this argument is inapposite. This is a rulemaking proceeding to set policy and standards for an entire industry, and to implement existing law. It is not an adjudicatory proceeding, or even a ratemaking proceeding. The facts that are germane to the proceeding are legislative facts, not adjudicatory facts. Due process does not require regulatory agencies to conduct evidentiary hearings when setting policy and standards for an entire industry in a quasi-legislative proceeding such as this one.¹¹¹ Company-by-company cost studies are not required for purposes of this proceeding, nor would they be helpful. In fact, when, as here, "a new policy is based on the general characteristics of an industry, rational decision is not furthered by requiring the agency to lose itself

¹¹¹ See *United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co.* (1973) 410 U.S. 224; *Committee for Effective Cellular Rules v. FCC*, 53 F.3d 1309 (D. C. Cir. 1995); *WBEN, Inc. v. FCC*, 396 F.2d 601 (2nd Cir. 601).

in an excursion into detail that too often obscures fundamental issues rather than clarifies them.”¹¹²

This decision confirms the Assigned Commissioner’s approach. The two LECG studies and the Hazlett paper are accepted into the record.¹¹³ Our comments on those papers are included in the following discussion of economic considerations.

Economic Considerations in the Proceeding

In the many rounds of comments in this proceeding, various parties have addressed the costs of implementation and made suggestions for minimizing those costs, many of which were adopted. Some suggestions were rejected because they would have resulted in rules that did not achieve our objective of protecting consumers. As a result, the rules adopted in this decision represent a balancing of the need to protect consumers with the various interests presented by the industry, including issues of costs, benefits and economic effects.

The record in this proceeding demonstrates the great need for the rules we adopt today. Having heard from consumers directly in public hearings, having reviewed thousands of letters and electronic messages from them, and having reviewed the extensive record developed by parties including consumer groups, representatives of small businesses, ORA, and the California Attorney

¹¹² *WBEN, Inc. v. United States*, 396 F.2d 601, 618 (2d Cir. 1968).

¹¹³ UCAN’s Navarro paper is already in the record, being part of UCAN’s timely filed comments.

General, the need for better, more comprehensive, more unified, and more easily enforceable consumer protection rules is clear. Furthermore, we remain unpersuaded by arguments that the number of consumer complaints is insignificant. As the Attorney General and ORA have persuasively argued, credible research shows that only a small fraction of dissatisfied consumers file a complaint with regulatory agencies.¹¹⁴ A recent nationally-representative statistical study of 18- to 65-year-olds who use wireless service found that only two percent of consumers considered the State Public Service Commission as a potential point of contact to resolve an unresolved billing or service dispute or service problems with their wireless service provider.¹¹⁵ This same study found that nearly half of all cell phone users reported not knowing whom to contact if their cell phone provider could not resolve a billing or service problem to their satisfaction.¹¹⁶ In a 2003 survey, Consumer Reports found that consumers' satisfaction with cellular service is lower than for other businesses they rate such

¹¹⁴ Opening and Reply Comments of the California Attorney General (June 6, 2000) (citing Best, Arthur, *When Consumers Complain*, Columbia Univ. Press (1981).

¹¹⁵ Christopher Baker & Kellie Kim-Sung, AARP, *Understanding Consumer Concerns About the Quality of Wireless Telephone Service* (July 2003) ("AARP Report") (cited in Reply Comments of the California Attorney General and ORA Regarding Economic Impacts in the Revised Draft Decision Issued on March 2, 2004). This study, designed by AARP and the Princeton Survey Research Associates, was based on a nationally representative sample of 3,037 adults living in households with a telephone. (See AG/ORR Reply Comments at pp. 1-2).

¹¹⁶ AARP Report, p. 4.

as auto insurers or hotel chains.¹¹⁷ Even a study apparently paid for by the wireless industry suggests that only a small percentage of dissatisfied customers file complaints. The study cited by CCAC found that 49% of customers are “very satisfied” with their cellular service and 34% “somewhat satisfied.”¹¹⁸ Assuming the Yankee Group correctly found that only 17% of cellular customers are dissatisfied, the complaint data shows that most of them do not file complaints. Thus, we agree that the approximately 130,000 complaints we have received from telephone consumers since we opened this rulemaking proceeding, including over 30,000 complaints from wireless consumers, most likely represent “the tip of the iceberg.” These rules will provide numerous benefits to telecommunications customers in California. The parties’ comments point out that some of those benefits will be economic. The benefits to individual consumers and to California businesses have been described by parties.¹¹⁹ As we note earlier in the Background section of this decision, these rules incorporate or supersede numerous earlier rules set forth in various Commission orders.

¹¹⁷ “Three Steps to Better Cellular,” Consumer Reports, February 2003 (cited in AG/ORA Reply Comments on Economic Issues).

¹¹⁸ See CCAC Comments on Economic Impacts at p. 4.

¹¹⁹ The California Small Business Roundtable and the California Small Business Association’s reply to comments filed September 4, 2003 is particularly telling. In urging the Commission to adopt the Assigned Commissioner’s draft decision, it stresses small businesses’ importance to the California and national economy and states, “Some industry commenters noted how important their particular industry segment was to the California economy, bemoaning the Bill of Rights as possibly driving their industry into ruins. CSBRT/CSBA refuses to use similar scare tactics about the state of small business should it not be afforded the protections of the Bill of Rights.”

Consolidation into a single new general order will generate economic benefits through reduced complexity and regulatory uncertainty. As the Attorney General, ORA, and the consumer groups have pointed out, this streamlining and clarification of requirements should provide economic benefits to carriers as well as to consumers, such as reduced customer churn and reduced complaints, and these benefits have the potential to offset some of the costs of compliance with the rules.

Throughout the course of this proceeding, the wireless industry had ample opportunity to present information on the cost and economic effects of the rules on the record. Other parties did bring economic issues before the Commission. The revised rules are the product of an enormous investment of time and effort by a substantial number of active parties in this proceeding, and thousands of consumers and representatives of nonprofit groups who participated through our public participation hearings and sent e-mail messages and letters overwhelmingly supporting the adoption of consumer protection rules. As discussed below, the wireless representatives' main claim in their September 2003 motion—that the Commission ignored economic issues and ignored relevant law—is unfounded, and we decline to reject the rules on that basis, or to limit their application to certain industry segments as the wireless industry would have us do. However, this decision now contains an further discussion of economic issues to make it abundantly clear that the wireless representatives have mischaracterized our decision-making process and its results.

The Wireless Studies' Unhelpful Information

The wireless industry is wrong when it claims in its motion that the Commission proposes to adopt rules “without any idea” of the economic effects

those rules will have. Economic issues were considered throughout the course of this proceeding, as discussed above. What the motion appears to contend is that the specific cost information contained in the LECG studies should be dispositive of the issues here. That claim is incorrect.

Three major flaws significantly reduce the value of the LECG studies. First, they rely on implementation cost estimates of dubious accuracy and value. Palmer engages in calculations that produce a seemingly concrete estimate that the implementation costs of the proposed rules is approximately \$3.86 per subscriber line per month. However, this estimate is in fact produced by aggregating cost estimates provided by the five largest wireless representatives in California. The carriers' estimates were in no way analyzed or verified. It is unclear what weight, if any, these cost estimates should be given as a result. Because there is no independent analysis of the accuracy of the carriers' estimates, it may be that the LECG studies simply represent a numerical version of the claim that the wireless representatives are unhappy with the proposed rules.

In addition, as the Attorney General and ORA point out, the reports assign costs to rules that reflect current law, such as Public Utilities Code § 2891 (confidentiality of subscriber information), § 2890 (governing solicitations) and Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 and 17500 (prohibiting misleading advertising and other unfair business practices). Palmer makes no attempt to distinguish requirements in the rules that are already required by existing law, so there is no way to tell what portion of the "quantified" \$3.86 per subscriber line per month will actually be produced by the adoption of the proposed rules.

Second, the LECG studies rely on a great deal of unsupported speculation, even though they claim to provide a quantitative analysis. For

example, Aron's estimate that an average customer's bill will increase by a specific percentage both adopts an unverified cost estimate from the wireless industry and assumes that 100% of those costs will be passed on to the consumer. Aron also argues that the rules may not be necessary because carriers have a profit motive to initiate consumer protections on their own. The record of this proceeding, which unlike Aron's statement is based on actual information gathered by the Commission, overwhelmingly demonstrates that there is a need for the consumer protection rules we adopt today. Aron also opines that the proposed rules "may induce significant nuisance litigation costs."¹²⁰ No substantiation is provided for this statement. As the Attorney General and ORA point out in their opposition to the motion, there is no reason to believe that Aron is qualified to offer a legal opinion. This opinion also fails to take into account that a single set of clear rules offers many benefits to litigants and could actually reduce litigation costs.

Third, neither Palmer nor Aron addresses potential cost savings that could partially offset implementation costs. For example, according to a study cited by Aron, "churning" (customers switching carriers) cost the wireless industry \$10 billion in 2001 (presumably, nationwide).¹²¹ Yet neither Aron nor Palmer considers whether the consumer protection rules could reduce churn stemming from, *e.g.* customer dissatisfaction with quality of service,

¹²⁰ Aron, page 34.

¹²¹ Aron, page 13, footnote 24.

misunderstandings generated by inadequate initial disclosure, or other, abusive practices these rules are intended to cure.

The unsubstantiated and speculative nature of the LECG studies makes the estimates contained in them of little help in deciding whether to adopt or limit the proposed consumer protection rules. We are particularly concerned with the wireless representatives' claim that the consultants' cost estimates are worthy of more serious consideration than are the benefits the rules will produce because those cost estimates have, allegedly, been quantified. The LECG studies reveal, in fact, that the costs of the rules may not be subject to documentation, since Aron and Palmer were unable to document or to verify their accuracy. As a result, the conclusion that the consumer protection rules we adopt today will be harmful, "particularly given the absence of documentation of genuine potential benefits," is simply not supported.

The Motion's Misstatement of the Law

The wireless representatives further argue that the Commission has not met legal requirements to "assess the potential adverse economic impact on California business enterprises of proposed rules and regulations." This argument ignores the analysis of these issues the Commission has provided, and misstates the law.

The Wireless Industry relies upon Government Code § 11346.3 to support its claims. That statute is inapplicable here. It is Public Utilities Code § 311 read in conjunction with §§ 1701.1, 1701.2, 1701.3, and 1701.4 that specifies the procedures that the Commission must use to adopt a general order. Section 311(h) specifically exempts the Commission's general orders from the requirements of Government Code § 11346.3. Public Utilities Code § 321.1 in fact directs the Commission to consider economic issues "as part of" its normal

consideration of a proceeding and not to create any special office for that purpose. That is what we have done here, as explained above. Section 321.1 specifically prohibits us from going outside our “existing resources and existing structures,” yet the wireless representatives, by asking for us to disregard procedural rules regarding the development of the record, or to include the efforts of the Office of Administrative Law, are asking us to do exactly that. ¹²²

The Record’s Support for Adopting The Rules

Consumer groups the National Consumer Law Center, UCAN, The Utility Reform Network, and Consumers Union state in their reply to the wireless representatives’ September 2003 motion:

It is often the case that regulations that protect the public health, safety and welfare impose significant costs on the regulated industry that can be estimated, even if imprecisely, while providing benefits that cannot easily be reduced to dollar terms. Examples include virtually all pollution control regulations, where the regulated industries can incur substantial engineering, design, construction and equipment purchase costs while the public receives much harder-to-quantify reductions in illness and intangible increases in enjoyment of air, water and land resources; consumer protection and disclosure rules that address fraudulent and deceptive practices, where regulated parties may face increased printing, marketing, advertising, or call center costs while the public avoids an unquantifiable number of deceptive practices; and the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) number portability rules, where the industry must invest millions of dollars in the technology that allows for number portability while

¹²² Wireline carriers similarly misconstrue section 321.1 when they argue that it imposes a new cost-benefit analysis requirement.

consumers gain the hard-to-quantify benefit of being able to switch carriers more easily.¹²³

We agree with these comments. Benefits of the proposed consumer protection rules include:

- Bills that are easier to understand (demanded by hundreds of consumers);
- Reduced overbilling, cramming, and slamming, which wastes customers' time and money;
- Easier process for correcting billing errors, saving time and money;
- Contracts that are easier to understand;
- Greater deterrence of deceptive advertising;
- Better protection of confidential subscriber information, resulting in better protection of privacy and safety interests of consumers;
- Clarification of rules and remedies — one general order setting forth requirements currently found in different statutes, decisions, and orders; and
- Easier identification of carriers when needed to resolve customer complaints and for enforcement.

Earlier in this decision we explained our belief that a comprehensive set of telecommunications consumer protection rules is needed. We were particularly drawn to a consumer group's comment that reflects our own view and bears repeating:

¹²³ Reply of NCLC, TURN, UCAN and CU to Wireless Industry Motion for Leave to File Economic Analysis, pages 8 and 9.

In a perfect world, all telecommunications carriers would operate honorably and never seek unfair advantage at the expense of their residential and business customers. Unfortunately, perfection in competition and conduct remains only an ideal. In the meantime, it is the Commission's responsibility to enact clear and concise rules to guide industry conduct. In the long run, such rules will benefit consumers, carriers and the general public alike.

As Navarro also points out, consumer protection laws are a “well-accepted part of the U.S. regulatory landscape” because (in addition to promoting benefits to consumers and fair competition) they “make markets more competitive and therefore more efficient.” Navarro reminds us that regulation is necessary in part because even competitive markets do not behave perfectly, and regulation can protect against (or compensate for) market failure. In his view, the current telecommunications markets suffer from several types of market failures, which include “asymmetric information, and oligopolistic market structure featuring few sellers.” It is true that there are relatively few sellers, and the current trend towards consolidation of the major players is readily observable. According to Navarro, this makes it possible for sellers to collude on practices that undermine consumer choice.¹²⁴ Navarro believes that the rules are economically justified because they address both the causes and the consequences of those market failures. Disclosure requirements, for example, by helping to inform consumers, address both the causes and the effects of the problem of “asymmetric information.” Clear disclosure of terms, especially terms like “early termination

¹²⁴ Navarro study, p. 102.

fees,” and a cancellation period that allows a customer to cancel service if it proves to be unsatisfactory, without paying an early termination fee, will help to facilitate market entry and exit on the consumer side, and will “help thwart the use of complex pricing and billing schemes to deter competition.”¹²⁵ We agree with Navarro that the rules should help the markets to function better.

SBC and other wireline carriers advance arguments, similar to those of the wireless industry, that the costs of compliance are excessive, even after the significant accommodations to their concerns made in the March 2004 revised draft decision, which they have acknowledged. SBC provides testimony by its consultant, Robert Harris, but Harris does not suggest that a methodology exists to weigh quantitatively the costs and benefits of consumer protection rules, nor does he address the potentially positive impact of the rules on the markets and the state economy discussed by Navarro.

Industry representatives have also predicted dire economic consequences as a result of our including the Part 3 privacy rules in new GO _____. But, as the Attorney General and ORA correctly point out, the European Union’s very protective opt-in data privacy law has not impeded the expansion of cell phone use in the EU. There is no apparent reason why carriers serving California customers cannot similarly comply with rules to protect customers’ confidential information, and prosper.

Many of the rules we adopt today are not simply policy decisions, but statutory requirements binding on both the carriers and the Commission.

¹²⁵ Id. at p. 17.

We have taken care to cite those statutes in the sections on rules above, and to explain how they led us to the specific rule.

The record of this proceeding shows that there is ample reason to adopt the proposed consumer protection rules. The wireless representatives' criticism of this Commission's approach is not founded in law, or in good policy. The LECG studies offered by the wireless representatives are significantly flawed and we will accord them little weight. These studies reveal that the alleged costs of consumer protection rules cannot be quantified in a way that does not simply reflect the policy positions of the wireless representatives or their consultants. We reject the argument that we should give less weight to the record where it demonstrates the benefits these rules will confer. We similarly reject the claim that we should give more weight to the wireless representatives' late-filed motion and LECG studies than we give to the well developed record in this proceeding.

These rules provide substantial benefits to consumers and to the public that outweigh the likely costs of compliance. We agree with those parties who contend that carrier claims of excessive implementation costs appear exaggerated.

Latino Issues Forum's and Greenlining Institute's Motion to Request Official Notice (Filed October 22, 2003).

Greenlining/LIF's motion asks that we take official notice "of the United States Census data on language preference, the Commission's own data on wireless and other complaints, the Commission's authority to create and enforce rules that apply to wireless carriers, and the 'no disconnect' policies of other states." Wireless representatives filed a reply objecting to the second and third of those requests and expressly not objecting to the first and fourth.

In a rulemaking proceeding such as this one, we may consider publicly available reports such as United States Census reports without taking official notice of them, assuming they are relevant.¹²⁶ We may also consider publicly available decisions and reports issued by this Commission and by other state and federal agencies without taking official notice. Thus, we will deny as unnecessary the request to take official notice of data regarding language preference in the census report, wireless complaint data in this Commission's 2002 report on "The Status of Telecommunications Competition in California," and "the 'no-disconnect policies of other states.'"

It would be inappropriate for us to take official notice of this Commission's authority to create rules that apply to wireless carriers. Where we discuss this issue, we cite to the relevant provisions of the state Constitution, state and federal laws, and court decisions.¹²⁷ The existence of these authorities is not in dispute, and there is no need to take official notice of them. To the extent we offer our interpretation of the law, that would not be an appropriate matter for official notice.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ See *Rivera v. Division of Industrial Welfare* (1968) 265 Cal. App. 2d 576, 589-91.

¹²⁷ See, e.g., discussion above in Part I, Bill of Rights (re: §§ 2896 and 2897); and Part 2, Consumer Protection Rules, Applicability to Carriers (re: carriers generally) and Relationship to Existing Rules and Tariffs, CMRS Rules and the CMRS Proceeding (re: wireless carriers specifically). For the Commission's authority to apply the Part 4 rules to wireless providers specifically, see the Interim Opinion in this proceeding, D.01-07-030, at Section III.B. and Conclusion of Law No. 4.

¹²⁸ See Evid. Code § 451(h).

For these reasons, Greenlining/LIF's motion to take official notice is denied.

Motion of AT&T Communications of California, Inc. to File Comments Under Seal (Comments Attached) (Filed March 23, 2004).

Motion of Nextel of California, Inc. to File Corrected Reply to Non-Economic Comments (Attached) (Filed April 8, 2004).

AT&T Communications of California filed its comments on the Assigned Commissioner's March 2, 2004 revised draft decision with a motion that they remain under seal, and served a redacted version on the parties. The information claimed to be proprietary consists of figures that AT&TC characterizes as "very high-level guesses based on past experience" of its costs to implement the proposed rules, and the rate it earns on customer deposits. Since no party has filed a response to AT&TC's motion, we will grant it consistent with our usual practice. The unredacted version of AT&T's comments filed under seal as an attachment to its motion shall remain under seal for a period of two years from the date of this ruling, and during that period shall not be made accessible or disclosed to anyone other than Commission staff except on the further order or ruling of the Commission, the Assigned Commissioner, the assigned ALJ, or the ALJ then designated as Law and Motion Judge. If AT&TC believes that further protection of the sealed information is needed after two years, it may file a motion stating the justification for further withholding it from public inspection, or for such other relief as the Commission rules may then provide. Any such motion shall be filed no later than 30 days before the expiration of the two-year period.

Nextel of California filed reply comments on non-economic issues in the Assigned Commissioner's March 2, 2004 revised draft decision on April 6, 2004.

On April 8, Nextel filed a motion to file a corrected version of those comments. No party filed a response, and no party will be disadvantaged if we accept Nextel's corrections. Nextel's motion is granted.

Comments on Draft Decision

The draft decision of the Assigned Commissioner was mailed to the parties on the service list for public review and comment in accordance with Public Utilities Code Section 311(g)(1). After revising the draft to reflect comments received, the Assigned Commissioner sought additional input on those changes, and particularly invited anything additional the parties might have on the draft decision's treatment of the economic effects of the proposed new general order.

In response to comments, we have made substantive changes in the decision and the general order.¹²⁹ We provide an overview of those changes here, and we describe them, and the reasons for them, more fully in the decision text.

The July 2003 draft general order added a comment in Part 1 that the Bill of Rights is to serve the same purpose as a statement of legislative intent. Some service providers have asked us to clarify further whether the Part 1 Bill of Rights, in and of itself, creates a private right of action. We clarify that it does not create a private right of actions for damages, and we have added wording to

¹²⁹ There have now been four opportunities for comments or replies on the Assigned Commissioner's June 2004 revised draft decision and general order, in addition to the 14 earlier filed sets (18 total) and four days of workshops that addressed some or all of the issues in this proceeding. Although we have evaluated and considered every filing, some 350 submittals totaling many thousands of pages, it would not be possible to address every suggestion made by every party, and we have not attempted to do so.

the Part 1 comment to that effect.¹³⁰ Part 1 simply identifies the fundamental consumer interests the rules are designed to protect. That said, these rules do not in any way displace, preempt, or limit any statutorily created private right of action.¹³¹ Moreover, as we have explained elsewhere in this decision, conduct that violates the rules may be separately actionable under various laws, such as the Unfair Competition Act. Thus, we have clarified several principles in the introductory sections of Parts 2, 4 and 5. Compliance with these rules does not relieve carriers of other obligations they may have under their tariffs, other Commission general orders and decisions, FCC orders, or state and federal statutes. Any remedies the Commission may impose for violations of these rules are not intended to displace other remedies that may be imposed by the courts for violation of consumer protection laws.¹³² These rules do not preclude any civil action that may be available by law, nor do they limit any rights a consumer may have. We intend to continue our policy of cooperating with law enforcement authorities to enforce consumer protection laws. Prosecution,

¹³⁰ The same is true of the Part 2 rules, and a similar statement has been added there. This is not confusing as the comments suggest; it is creating a new, private right of action for damages that should be precluded.

¹³¹ *E.g.*, Pub. Util. Code §§ 2891(e) and 2891.1(d), which allow a subscriber to file a civil action against a corporation responsible for disclosing confidential customer information (§ 2891) or an unlisted telephone number (§ 2891.1) in violation of those statutes.

¹³² *See* People ex rel. Orloff v. Pacific Bell (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 1132 (public prosecutors and PUC share the authority and responsibility to prosecute violations of consumer protection laws, and Legislature expects the PUC and public prosecutors to coordinate their efforts to remedy misconduct by public utilities).

whether civil or criminal, by any local or state law enforcement agency to enforce any consumer protection or privacy law does not interfere with any Commission policy, order or decision, or the performance of any duty of the Commission, related to the enactment or enforcement of the rules. These are not new provisions, but not all of them were explicit in each of the Part 2, 4 and 5 drafts as they are now.

Some service providers have requested that we clarify the purpose of the comments that appear throughout the general order. The comments serve the same purposes as official comments that accompany many statutes and rules (*e.g.*, the California version of the Uniform Commercial Code, or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). They are included to aid in interpreting these consumer protection rules, primarily by explaining the purpose and intent of specific provisions. Some of our comments include illustrative examples of how a rule is to be applied. Those examples are intended to be helpful to service providers, customers, and decision makers who may be called upon to interpret the rules. Some comments include cross-references, for a variety of reasons. Some cross-references highlight the fact that a rule implements or incorporates certain statutes. Others clarify the relationship of these rules to other laws. Thus, the comments and any examples they may contain are not rules. They are simply intended to elucidate the purpose of the rules and to aid in interpretation. Should there be any inconsistency between the rules and the comments in a given situation, the rule governs.

The Parts 2 and 4 definition of “solicitation” has been revised to match that used in the Business and Professions Code.

In response to comments on the July 2003 draft and March 2004 revised draft, several changes have been made in Part 2, Rule 1 that will make it easier

and more economic for carriers to comply while still providing the disclosure subscribers and the public need. Carriers may not, however, continue what some indicated is their current practice of referencing supplementary material (marketing brochures, rate sheets, etc.) as a binding part of their service agreements and contracts, in part because subscribers may never have been aware of it or been provided copies. References to tariff terms and conditions are still permitted so long as subscribers are provided easy access to them.

Rule 2 has been largely restored to its form in the July 2003 Assigned Commissioner's draft, in response to comments from consumer groups' that it had been substantially gutted in the March 2004 revised draft. At the Attorney General's suggestion, we have added a Finding of Fact supporting our use of Section 532 to establish an exception from the filed rate doctrine for Rule 2(g). When a utility gains an advantage from unfair or unlawful conduct, including untrue and misleading statements, deceptive advertisements, any unfair or unlawful act or practice, or any violation of G.O. ____, the prohibition under Section 532 on the receipt of different compensation from that in the tariffs should not apply as a defense to actions or proceedings brought to redress that conduct. Rule 3 has been modified to make compliance easier and more economic. Rule 3(c) has been narrowed to apply only to carriers offering basic service rather than to all carriers as in the draft. Carriers that considered the draft decision's 30 and 45 day no-penalty service cancellation provisions burdensome will find relief in Rule 3(f): subscribers with new tariffed service or any new contract for non-tariffed service now have 30 days to cancel without penalty, and the penalty-free period begins when service is initiated rather than when their written contracts and confirmation materials are provided. Rule 3(g) returns to its earlier, less redundant and less prescriptive wording granting

subscribers a rebuttable presumption that disputed charges for which no record of affirmative subscriber authorization is available were not authorized. Under Rule 3(i), consumers who are concerned about identity theft may still withhold their social security numbers when requesting service, but carriers may request other identification sufficient to verify their identities and run a credit check. Rule 5(a) now recognizes that some carriers accept prepayment or credit card billing in lieu of deposits. In Rule 6(g), carriers' suggestion to rename the former "Taxes" section to "Government Fees and Taxes" has been accepted, thus recognizing that some fees required by government to be collected from subscribers and remitted are not legally taxes.

Rules 4, 9, 11, 13, 14 and 15 remain substantially unchanged from their July 2003 and March 2004 draft versions. Rule 7 has only one change: Rule 7(a) no longer prohibits late payment penalties on overdue balances of less than \$20.

Rule 8(b) once again allows subscribers to hold carriers to the term contracts they enter into. Carriers may still make unilateral changes that do not raise rates or impose more restrictive terms or conditions; changes not affecting rates or charges and reasonably necessary to prevent unlawful, fraudulent or abusive conduct; or changes in taxes and fees mandated by and passed through to government.

Former Rule 12 from the staff report and Assigned Commissioner's drafts has been revised to become Part 3, Rules Governing Privacy, of the new general order. Former Parts 3 and 4 have been renumbered as Parts 4 and 5. Our new Part 3 privacy rules are explained fully in the corresponding section of this order above.

The only substantive revisions to Part 4, Rules Governing Billing for Non-Communications-Related Charges, are those to the introductory and definition sections explained in the preceding paragraphs.

The most significant revision to Part 5, Rules Governing Slamming Complaints, is deletion of former Section D, Unauthorized Local Exchange Carrier Changes. Where the Assigned Commissioner's draft decision proposed retaining the current local exchange carrier slamming provisions established in D.95-07-054, Appendix B (Consumer Protection and Consumer Information Rules for CLCs), local exchange carrier slamming allegations will instead be subject to the same requirements as those involving intraLATA, interLATA and interstate toll service. A Part 5 provision requiring carriers to provide copies of their FCC slamming reports has been deleted in recognition of the FCC's having discontinued the report. Lastly, all lead times for carriers responding to CAB requests have been extended to twenty business days in recognition of CAB's current practice.

We have dropped the potentially time-consuming step proposed in the July 2003 draft of having carriers prepare and submit for Telecommunications Division's review a plan for implementing new G.O _____. Carriers will now have 120 days after the date this decision is mailed to bring their operations into compliance with G.O. _____ and this interim order, and to certify that they have done so. We have not extended the compliance period as recommended by carriers. We anticipate that carriers can and will revise their tariffs and practices within the time allowed. Our Rules of Practice and Procedure already provide a procedure in Rule 48(b) for parties to seek an extension of time to comply with a Commission order by sending a letter to the Executive Director, with copies to all other parties. We would expect any such extensions to be granted only where

the carrier has demonstrated that the delay was unavoidable, has tailored the request as narrowly as possible to encompass only that part of the order and general order for which it is truly needed, has submitted a reasonable plan and timetable for achieving compliance within the requested time extension, has taken all feasible steps to lessen the effects on customers of the requested delay, and is able to demonstrate good faith compliance with all other parts of the order and general order.

We have added additional discussion of our Rules Governing Privacy, and our treatment of the economic effects of the new rules, to further explain our determinations and address comments received in response to the Assigned Commissioner's March 2004 revised draft.

We have made other, lesser changes in various parts of this order and the new general order to update them, to correct minor errors, and in some cases, to better express or explain what the draft intended. We have also added a section confirming our preliminary scoping memo. This is consistent with our practice for proceedings in which the order is issued without hearings and where no changes to our preliminary scoping memo's determinations are needed. Lastly, we have added a section addressing pending motions, one of which was filed early in the proceeding and the others after the Assigned Commissioner's draft decision or revised draft decision was issued.

Assignment of Proceeding

Carl Wood is the Assigned Commissioner in this proceeding and James McVicar is the assigned Administrative Law Judge.

Findings of Fact

1. The ongoing shift to a more competitive telecommunications marketplace increases consumers' vulnerability and challenges the Commission to step up its

efforts to protect them. Establishing updated consumer protection rules applicable to all regulated telecommunications utilities should be part of those efforts.

2. Through its statements in the many public participation hearing sessions held throughout California in this proceeding, and through its follow-up letters and e-mail, the public has conveyed its frustration with the present state of consumer protection in the regulated telecommunications industry, and its approval of the Commission's assuming a stronger consumer protection role.

3. To promote consumer protection, all California consumers who interact with telecommunications providers should be afforded the following basic rights as defined in Part 1 of G.O. ___, Appendix A to this order: Disclosure; Choice; Privacy; Public Participation and Enforcement; Accurate Bills and Redress; Non-Discrimination; and Safety.

4. The Part 2 Consumer Protection Rules will help protect the consumer rights set forth in Part 1.

5. Small businesses suffer many of the same problems as individuals and need the protections the Part 2 rules will provide.

6. Large businesses are less dependent on the kinds of rules we are establishing in Part 2. Even though those rules do not apply to them directly, large businesses will benefit from improvements the rules will generate.

7. The Part 2 rules were designed taking into consideration the Consumer Protection and Consumer Information Rules for CLCs set forth in D.95-07-054, Appendix B. With implementation of these Part 2 Rules, those CLC rules are no longer needed.

8. The Part 2 rules were not designed to replace the Initial Rules for Local Exchange Service Competition in California set forth in D.95-12-056.

9. The Part 2 rules were designed taking into consideration the Consumer Protection Rules for Detariffed Services set forth in D.98-08-031, Appendix A. With implementation of these Part 2 Rules, those non-tariffed non-dominant IEC rules are no longer needed.

10. The Part 2 rules were designed to meet the need stated in D.96-12-071 for a generic set of consumer protection rules for CMRS providers that would supersede any previously filed CMRS consumer protection tariff rules.

11. The Part 2 rules were designed to be applied to Commission-regulated carriers of all classes, their agents, and other entities providing telecommunications-related products or services which the Public Utilities Code makes subject to the Commission's rules.

12. The rights and rules in G.O. ____ do not conflict with any other Commission general orders.

13. It is not in the public interest to allow any carrier to rely on its filed tariffs for protection against liability for unlawful or deceptive conduct.

14. It is just and reasonable to establish an exception as permitted by Section 532, in cases where carriers have misrepresented their tariffed rates, terms or conditions for competitive services.

15. It is unjust and unreasonable for a utility to gain an advantage from unfair or unlawful conduct, including untrue and misleading statements, deceptive advertisements, any unfair or unlawful act or practice, or any violation of G.O. _____. The prohibition under Section 532 on the receipt of different compensation from that in a utility's schedules on file with the Commission should not apply as a defense to actions or proceedings brought to redress such conduct.

16. The privacy interests of wireless customers who are subscribed as individuals are substantially the same as those of residential customers and should be afforded the same privacy protections under our rules.

17. The Part 3 Rules Governing Privacy will protect the privacy interests of individual California telephone subscribers by gathering together, explaining, and implementing the applicable provisions of the Public Utilities Code.

18. The Part 3 rules will protect consumers' privacy interests effectively within the framework of the state Constitution and state laws.

19. The Part 5 Rules Governing Slamming Complaints were designed to parallel the FCC's slamming rules in most respects.

20. The Part 5 rules will help protect consumers' rights.

21. There are currently consumer protection requirements in carriers' tariffs, the Commission's previous decisions, its general orders, state and federal statutes, and FCC orders. While G.O. ____ draws on those sources, it does not supersede them except as explicitly stated in this interim order.

22. It is not in the public interest to allow carriers to weaken or eliminate current consumer protection provisions in their tariffs.

23. It is not in the public interest to foreclose consumers or others from enforcing consumer protections through the courts.

24. It would be prudent to enact new G.O. ____ and monitor its effectiveness for some time before deciding whether to detariff competitive services.

25. During the course of this rulemaking proceeding, the Commission distributed the initially-proposed rights and rules which have evolved into Parts 1 through 5 of G.O. ____, Appendix A to this order, and the Commission's proposed policy changes for limitation of liability and detariffing. The

respondent utilities and all interested parties have been afforded an opportunity to submit comments and replies to comments on each of those topics.

26. The initiatory order in R.00-02-004 required parties to make offers of proof with their opening comments for any matters for which they believe evidentiary hearings are required, and failure to do so would waive the parties' right to hearing. The proposal to curtail the Commission-sanctioned limitation of liability was the only matter for which offers of proof were submitted.

27. Consumers need to be aware of and understand the rights and rules in G.O. ____ if those rights and rules are to be fully effective in protecting them.

28. Consumer protection is strongest when consumers have multiple avenues of enforcement.

29. The LECG studies rely on implementation cost estimates of dubious accuracy and value, assign costs to rules that reflect current law, rely on unsupported speculation and unsubstantiated statements, and fail to address potential cost savings that could partially offset implementation costs. These are major flaws that significantly reduce the weight that should be given to them.

30. The rules we adopt in this order will provide numerous benefits to telecommunications consumers in California, including substantial economic benefits.

31. The rules we adopt in this order incorporate or supersede numerous earlier rules in various Commission orders. Consolidating these rules into new G.O. ____ will generate economic benefits through reduced complexity and reduced regulatory uncertainty.

32. The rules adopted in this decision represent a balancing of the need to protect consumers with the various interests presented by the telecommunications industry, including issues of cost and economic effects.

Conclusions of Law

1. Through AB 726, the Telecommunications Customer Service Act of 1993, the Legislature directed the Commission to ensure that carriers of all categories abide by certain basic standards of disclosure and customer service, and acknowledged the need for some of the consumer protection measures we implement in this proceeding.

2. The Consumer Protection and Consumer Information Rules for CLCs set forth in D.95-07-054, Appendix B, should be superseded by G.O. ____.

3. The Consumer Protection Rules for Detariffed Services set forth for non-tariffed non-dominant IECs in D.98-08-031, Appendix A, should be superseded by G.O. ____.

4. Any previously filed CMRS consumer protection tariff rules should be superseded and canceled, consistent with the intent stated in D.96-12-071.

5. Commission-regulated carriers of all classes, their agents, and other entities providing telecommunications-related products or services which the Public Utilities Code makes subject to the Commission's rules should be required to respect the consumer rights and comply with the new rules in G.O. ____, Part 2.

6. G.O. ____, Part 2, should be applied to protect both individuals and small businesses.

7. Section 532 prohibits utilities from charging rates that differ from those in their tariffs, but permits the Commission to establish such exceptions as it considers just and reasonable.

8. The Commission should establish an exception as permitted by Section 532, in cases where carriers have misrepresented their rates, terms or conditions for competitive services.

9. The California Constitution, Article I, Section 1, recognizes privacy as an inalienable right of all people. It applies to actions by businesses as well as by government. The privacy provisions of G.O. ____ are consistent with Californians' constitutional right to privacy.

10. State law reflects the high importance accorded privacy rights in California.

11. In enacting Public Utilities Code § 2891, which requires carriers to obtain a residential telephone subscriber's written consent before disclosing confidential subscriber information to any other person or corporation, the California Legislature adopted a written opt-in approval requirement for residential telephone subscribers.

12. The Part 3 privacy rules we adopt must be, and are, consistent with state law that requires carriers to obtain written, opt-in consent from residential subscribers.

13. California has a substantial interest in protecting telephone consumers' privacy rights. The Part 3 rules directly advance this state interest by requiring carriers to obtain express, written consent from their residential subscribers before disclosing their subscribers' confidential information for marketing purposes.

14. The FCC has acknowledged that states may, consistent with the First Amendment, develop opt-in CPNI sharing requirements that are more restrictive than those adopted by the FCC; and if they do so, it will decline to apply any presumption that such requirements would be vulnerable to preemption.

15. There is no reason to assume that our Part 3 privacy rules implementing state law will be preempted under federal law.

16. The Part 3 privacy rules do not violate carriers' First Amendment rights under the test set forth in *Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Services Commission* (1980), 477 U.S. 557.

17. By AB 994, the Legislature cited this rulemaking proceeding as a proper vehicle for the Commission to implement billing safeguards covering non-communications-related charges in telephone bills. After considering the comments and reply comments of the parties, the Commission by D.01-07-030 adopted the Rules Governing Billing for Non-Communications-Related Charges included as Part 4 of G.O. ____.

18. Through its orders in CC Docket No. 94-129, the FCC has given each state the option to act as the adjudicator of slamming complaints, both interstate and intrastate. California has opted to do so.

19. The FCC has given states which elect to handle slamming complaints great latitude in fashioning their own procedures, so long as those procedures are not inconsistent with Section 258 of the Communications Act of 1934 as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

20. The Rules Governing Slamming Complaints included as Part 5 of G.O. ____ conform to the FCC's requirements of states which opt to act as adjudicators of slamming complaints, and with the Federal Telecommunications Act.

21. Except as set forth in the ordering paragraphs below, this interim order and G.O. ____ do not relieve any carrier from compliance with any existing Commission decision, rule or general order, any state or federal statute, or any other requirement under the law.

22. The rights and rules in G.O. ____ are just and reasonable.

23. The Commission should adopt G.O. ____, Rules Governing Telecommunications Consumer Protection, Appendix A to this interim order.

24. Parties and respondents in this proceeding have implicitly waived their right to evidentiary hearing on any issue decided in this interim order.

25. No evidentiary hearings are needed.

26. Under Section 2896, the Commission may require carriers to inform and educate customers of their rights, these rules, and the procedures available to them for redress.

27. The Commission is not and should not be the only avenue available to enforce consumers' rights.

28. The Commission's adoption of G.O. ____ and its associated rights and rules should not preclude any civil action that may be available by law. The Commission intends to continue its policy of cooperating with law enforcement authorities to assist them in their efforts to enforce consumer protection laws against Commission regulated utilities.

29. This proceeding should remain open to consider whether the Commission should implement a telecommunications consumer education program, and if so, how it should be structured; whether to curtail the Commission-sanctioned limitation of liability; and whether earlier-proposed rules requiring that communications directed at consumers and subscribers be in languages other than English are needed.

30. The record of this proceeding is based on information gathered by the Commission and demonstrates that there is a need for the consumer protection rules set forth in G.O. ____.

31. Over the course of this proceeding the parties have had sufficient opportunity to present on the record information on the cost and economic effects of the new rules. The cost and economic effects considerations raised by

the wireless representatives have been taken into account in crafting new G.O. ____.

32. Public Utilities Code § 311(h) specifically exempts the Commission's general orders from the requirements of Government Code § 11346.3. The Commission has complied with Public Utilities Code § 321.1, which directs the Commission to assess the economic effects or consequences of its decisions as part of its normal consideration in a rulemaking proceeding.

33. In fashioning new G.O. ____, the Commission has considered relevant law and the cost and economic effects of its new rules.

34. In a rulemaking proceeding such as this one, the Commission may consider relevant, publicly available reports and decisions and reports issued by this Commission and by other state and federal agencies without taking official notice of them.

35. This interim order should be made effective today to afford consumers greater protection as soon as possible.

INTERIM ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that:

1. General Order ____ (G.O. ____), Rules Governing Telecommunications Consumer Protection, Appendix A to this interim order is adopted and shall become effective as of the effective date of this interim order.

2. Commission-regulated telecommunications carriers of all classes shall bring their operations into full compliance with G.O. ____ and this interim order not later than 120 days after the date this decision was mailed. Not later than 120 days after the date this decision was mailed, each carrier shall serve on the Commission's Telecommunications Division a letter certifying that it is in

compliance with this ordering paragraph. Each such certification letter shall be in a format provided by the Telecommunications Division, and shall be verified following the procedure set forth in the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 2.4, Verification.

3. The Consumer Protection and Consumer Information Rules for CLCs set forth in D.95-07-054, Appendix B, are superseded by G.O. _____. Each affected carrier is relieved of its obligation to comply with those D.95-07-054, Appendix B, rules as of the date that carrier achieves full compliance with G.O. _____ as directed in Ordering Paragraph 2 of this interim order.

4. The Consumer Protection Rules for Detariffed Services set forth for non-tariffed non-dominant interexchange carriers in D.98-08-031, Appendix A, are superseded by G.O. _____. Each affected carrier is relieved of its obligation to comply with those D.98-08-031, Appendix A, rules as of the date that carrier achieves full compliance with G.O. _____ as directed in Ordering Paragraph 2 of this interim order.

5. Any previously filed commercial mobile radio service consumer protection tariff rules are superseded and shall be canceled.

6. Each Commission-regulated telecommunications carrier having California intrastate tariffs in effect shall evaluate those tariffs for compliance with the requirements of G.O. _____ and the ordering paragraphs of this interim order. Each carrier having tariff provision(s) inconsistent with G.O. _____, or required to be revised or canceled to conform to the ordering paragraphs of this interim order, shall file not later than 60 days after this decision was mailed and make effective on the 120th day after this decision was mailed an advice letter in accordance with G.O. 96 Series making only such revisions or cancellations as are necessary to bring its tariffs into compliance with G.O. _____ and this interim

order; provided, however, that no carrier shall use the advice letter filed in accordance with this interim order to make any tariff revision reducing the level of any current consumer protection. Each carrier shall also submit with its advice letter a tariff-tracking inventory prepared following guidance to be issued to carriers by the Telecommunications Division and demonstrating how its tariffs will be in compliance with G.O.___. Advice letters which do not comply with the requirements of this interim order are subject to suspension as provided in Commission Resolution M-4801.

7. Each carrier having tariffs on file and having determined that none of its tariffs need revision under Ordering Paragraph 6 shall not later than 30 days after this decision was mailed serve an information-only compliance letter on the Telecommunications Division notifying the Commission that it has evaluated its tariffs as ordered herein and found none needing revision. Each such information-only compliance letter shall be verified following the procedure set forth in the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 2.4, Verification. Each such carrier shall also submit with its information-only compliance letter a tariff-tracking inventory prepared following guidance to be issued to carriers by the Telecommunications Division and demonstrating how its tariffs already comply with G.O.___.

8. Every carrier required under G.O. ___, Part 2, Rule 1(a) or 1(b) to have a World Wide Web site on the Internet shall include on that site one or more active links to the G.O. ___ rights and rules on the Commission's web site, and when it is available, to the Commission's summary of those rights and rules. Each such link shall be associated with a clear and conspicuous explanatory caption.

9. The provisions of G.O. ____ are severable. If any provision of G.O. ____ or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.

10. The various motions described in the Pending Motions section of this order are granted and denied as set forth in that section. The two LECG studies and the Hazlett paper tendered in those motions are accepted into the proceeding record. The Navarro paper is part of Utility Consumers' Action Network's timely filed comments and already in the record.

11. Rulemaking 00-02-004 shall remain open to consider whether the Commission should implement a telecommunications consumer education program, and if so, how it should be structured; whether to curtail the Commission-sanctioned limitation of liability; and whether additional rules requiring that communications directed at consumers and subscribers be in languages other than English are needed.

This interim order is effective today.

Dated _____, at San Francisco, California.

APPENDIX A
GENERAL ORDER ____